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ABSTRACT 
 
Mediation theory has developed separately from mainstream theories explaining 
foreign policy.  Specifically, mediator motivations and constraints have often been 
overlooked.  I extend an argument explaining mediator motivations, and thus mediation 
occurrence and strategy, in terms of domestic political institutions and leader 
performance. The notion that leaders use foreign policy in order to help further their 
domestic fortunes and those of their party is widely accepted in the international relations 
literature, as is the notion that political survival is pre-eminent in any leader’s decision-
making calculus.  Scholars have also shown that leaders shift their focus to foreign policy 
when institutional factors, such as an opposition controlled legislature, make addressing 
poor domestic performance through legislation especially difficult.  Empirical tests of 
such arguments have been limited to the use of force and have not been extended to other 
aspects of foreign policy such as third party mediation.  Given that a leader is focused on 
political survival, but is also constrained by domestic circumstances and evaluated by a 
domestic audience, the use of military force to engineer a policy success is to be a risky 
and potentially costly policy option, given the other policy options at his disposal.   
 
Conflict mediation is a policy option that is both low-cost and low-risk, relative to 
the use of force, which also has the potential to be billed as a high-profile success for an 
administration.  As such, leaders should be seen using mediation as a foreign policy 
option when domestic policy options are unavailable or are considered inefficient for 
demonstrating success.  This project examines the incentives (or motivations), 
constraints, strategies, and benefits US Presidents confront when using mediation as a 
policy tool, given this goal of developing a record of success in the eyes of a domestic 
political audience.  It tests whether engaging in mediation yields domestic political 
benefits. I find limited support for the argument that leaders engage in mediation in 
response to poor domestic conditions when domestic political configurations make the 
passage of legislation difficult.  There is also support for the argument that partisan 
support in congress provides “cover” for the president to engage in mediation. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“The act of mediation is not a neutral act: it is a… political act undertaken by the 
mediator to achieve desired ends.” (Webb 1988) 
 
Liberal Political Thought and Conflict Mediation 
The mediation research program has emerged primarily out of the real world need 
to understand the process by which conflicts can be resolved peacefully.  There are 
clearly several tangible and important benefits to understanding the process by which 
political leaders can help to facilitate peace through negotiations and mediation.  
Additionally, the end of the Cold War and the proliferation of democracies worldwide 
have led scholars and policy makers to believe that the international community has the 
capability to create and ensure widespread peace.
1
  Further, the advent of nuclear 
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction has made the need for both peace and 
stability in the international system of paramount importance. At the beginning of the 
1990s, while the fears of systemic conflict were lifting, numerous regional and intra-state 
conflicts previously obscured in an international system dominated by rival superpowers 
were being exposed.
2
  Increased levels of economic interdependence worldwide mean 
that small conflicts in remote parts of the globe have the potential to impact world 
                                                 
 
1
 There was a drastic increase in the number of new mediation attempts worldwide beginning in 1991.  
According to Jacob Bercovitch’s ICM dataset, there were 1,110 new mediation attempts worldwide during 
the Cold War years (1945-1995), averaging 24.67 per year, with the highest one-year totals being 70 
attempts in 1990 and 62 in 1976.  In the short time for which data was collected in the post-Cold War Era 
(1991-1995), a total of 1,005 new mediation attempts were made, with the lowest one-year total being 108 
in 1991 and the highest 285 in 1994. 
2
 In fact, Luttwak (1994) contends that during the Cold War and prior, great powers “often instigated or at 
least encouraged and materially supported” regional conflicts, ostensibly to keep both sides relatively weak 
and thus easier to manage, but that the opposite is the case in the post-Cold-War setting.  The absence of 
great power interest has led to increased levels of violence in these conflicts. 
 2 
 
politics in ways previously unseen.  As a result, political leaders and international 
organizations have often sought to use the resources at their disposal to help bring about 
peaceful conflict resolution and scholars have established a substantial research program 
examining conflict management processes and the factors contributing to their successes. 
Despite the presence of such a research program and liberal theories suggesting that the 
proliferation of democracy should lead to a more peaceful world, conflict remains a 
major problem in international relations, and conflict management attempts often fail.
3
   
Third-party mediation is seen by many scholars and policy makers as the conflict 
management strategy most likely to succeed in creating a peace settlement.  Mediation 
differs from other conflict management strategies because it is non-binding, but utilizes a 
third party that can help to facilitate an agreement either because of its prestige, rapport 
with the belligerents, or its resources, which it uses to induce the parties to come to an 
agreement.  It has several characteristics seen as favorable to bringing about conflict 
resolution in the anarchic international system, as well in intra-state conflicts, where the 
traditional security structures of the state have failed or the legitimacy of the government 
in power has been disputed.  Mediation allows both disputing parties to “save face” and, 
in the case of international conflicts, maintain their sovereignty.  Based on this notion, 
scholars have done a great deal of work to explain how mediation works and what factors 
are likely to yield a successful agreement (see Rubin, ed. 1981; Bercovitch, ed. 2002; 
Bercovitch and Gartner, eds. 2009; Grieg and Regan 2008, Touval and Zartmann 1987, 
                                                 
 
3
 Interestingly, more than 50% of mediation attempts are unsuccessful for the data period, compared with 
only 4.26% of attempts yielding a full settlement of the dispute.  There is no discernible change in success 
during the post-Cold War period, despite the marked increase in mediation volume over that time period.   
 3 
 
etc.).  However, the mediating party and its incentives and constraints are often assumed 
away in systematic and large-N studies of mediation, where mediators are categorized by 
unchanging system-level and state-level characteristics.   
One needs only to look at the ongoing conflict between Israelis and Palestinians 
to see how pro-peace leaders can be constrained by their political audiences, and research 
has begun to examine disputing parties from such a perspective (Melin and Svensson 
2009).  A similar analysis should be applied to mediators’ entrance into conflict 
management; they should be seen pursuing policy outcomes in a way most likely to 
improve their political fortunes.  Given that we see a great deal of variation in states’ 
interest in and commitment to conflict resolution over time and space (despite the almost 
constant presence of conflict) these motivations and constraints should be important 
factors in explaining the likelihood that conflict management is successful.   
In this dissertation, I build on findings and conclusions from the mediation 
research program that imply that mediator motivations are likely to play a significant role 
in the strategies, timings, and level of commitment that mediators display when 
attempting to end conflict.  In doing so, I explain mediator motivations and commitment 
as functions of domestic politics, which brings theories of conflict management in line 
with more general, state-of-the-art theories of foreign policy decision making.  
Specifically, I examine domestic institutional configurations and leaders’ political 
vulnerability and argue that leaders have incentives to focus on mediation when they are 
politically vulnerable and when domestic institutional configurations make passing 
domestic policy legislation an inefficient way to build a record of policy success. 
 4 
 
States and Mediation 
Sovereign states are thought to be the most capable mediators because of their ability to 
credibly commit resources to a conflict management effort that manipulates the payoffs 
for both disputing parties in ways that induce a peaceful settlement (see Kleiboer 2002; 
Pruitt 1981).  While international organizations (IOs) such as the United Nations and 
more regionally focused organizations such as the African Union and the Organization of 
American States have a great deal of legitimacy in the international system, they are 
faced with commitment problems when it comes to using resources to push disputants 
closer to an agreement.  These commitment problems, which are essentially collective 
action problems, are well documented in the literature (see Krasner 1983, Baldwin, ed. 
1993).  Additionally, such organizations are often limited in their mandate to enforce 
peace agreements, as was seen with the UN in the 1994 Rwanda genocide (see Fortna 
2003), and research suggests that short-term interventions focusing on the promotion of 
democracy are unlikely to be successful in the long term (Paris 1997).   
Although the involvement of sovereign states often means a biased mediator in 
which the mediator maneuvers for a negotiated outcome that asymmetrically benefits one 
of the disputing parties, often the one with which the mediator has a relationship, such 
mediations have been shown to be most likely to yield an agreement (Kydd 2003; 
Crescezi, et al. 2012).  Despite the presence of bias, powerful states such as the U.S.
4
 
                                                 
 
4
 Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) find that the US, as world hegemon, occupies a special place in the 
pantheon of mediators.  As a result of its vast resources, it is called on to mediate more often than any other 
country.  They also argue that manipulative strategies can only be credibly employed by a select number of 
powerful states, which they characterize as either permanent members of the UN Security Council, or 
regional hegemons exerting their influence within their own region. 
 5 
 
have the leverage to push disputants toward agreement by credibly introducing “carrots 
and sticks.”  However, the question of what factors induce states to focus on mediation 
and use these manipulative strategies is an important piece of this conflict management 
puzzle that remains unaddressed. 
 Despite the fact that powerful states can often use their resources to induce peace 
agreements and subsequently enforce them, they vary in their willingness and 
commitment to doing so.  The extant research on mediation treats states as unchanging 
actors, defining them in terms of their international power, regime type, or alliances, and 
does not account for the factors that cause these states to choose mediating conflict as a 
policy focus from the set of domestic and foreign policy options.  In fact, much of the 
literature on third party mediation has emerged separately from the foreign policy 
decision making research program and attempts to reconcile the two have been few (see 
Touval 2003; Greig and Beardsley 2010).   
 Because of the concrete, real world need for peaceful conflict resolution, research 
on the subject often focuses on the factors leading to peace agreements, assuming away 
mediator motivations.  Thus, research has often assumed, explicitly stated or not, that 
mediators’ primary goals are to peacefully resolve conflict.  However, in his review 
essay, Saadia Touval (2003) takes stock of the conflict resolution program and argues 
that there has been a fundamental disconnect in its progression—it fails to recognize that 
mediation is in fact a type of foreign policy and s driven by factors similar to those 
driving other foreign policy decisions. Additionally, Touval correctly contends that 
mediation occurs within the existing political environment and thus is a political act, as 
 6 
 
Webb (1988) describes, undertaken with political goals and the potential ramifications 
thereof in mind.  While a moral motivation for conflict resolution almost certainly exists, 
in the case of mediators from sovereign states, such motivations are likely subordinate to 
those of political survival and success (see Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003). Therefore, as 
political motivations change, mediator availability, commitment, and strategy are likely 
to change as well.  Such variation in mediator behavior should, in turn, affect the 
likelihood that mediation efforts will be successful.   
Domestic Politics, Leaders, and Mediation 
An increasingly strong consensus among scholars of foreign policy decision 
making holds that leaders make foreign policy decisions with their domestic 
consequences in mind (Ostrom and Job 1986; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003).  Because 
leaders are ultimately beholden to domestic political audiences, which determine whether 
or not they will continue in office, they are thought to make decisions that they believe 
will be seen favorably those audiences (Downs 1957; Neustadt 1960).  However, such a 
rationale has not been applied to the choice to engage in diplomacy, especially when 
pertaining to conflicts where the leader is a third party.  Here I argue that the decision to 
engage in mediation and the subsequent strategies employed stem from domestic political 
conditions. 
 Given a leader’s need to build a record of policy successes to ensure re-election 
both for himself and for members of his party, he will likely choose policies and employ 
strategies that are likely to maximize the political benefits of success.  A substantial body 
of research has emerged suggesting that leaders tend to use the foreign policy arena to 
 7 
 
build such a record when poor domestic political conditions exist (see Levy 1989; 
Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992) and when domestic political 
configurations make the use domestic policy difficult (Brulé 2006; Marshall and Prins 
2011; Russett 1990; Gelpi 1997).  In contrast, strong evidence exists contending that 
democratically elected political leaders are ultimately punished by their domestic 
audiences for using military force (Gaubatz 1991; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003; 
Chiozza and Goemans 2003).  However, the primary dependent variable in all of this 
research has been the use of military force.  I argue, however, that because rational 
political leaders seeking to improve their electoral fortunes and those of their party 
should be risk averse in their decision making, and because the use of military force is 
risky, non-violent foreign policy options such as third party mediation should be 
attractive policy options.  Thus, in situations in which leaders need to demonstrate 
competence through policy success but legislative opposition makes the passage of 
domestic policy difficult, they will seek to engage in diplomacy to achieve such a 
success. 
Dissertation Scope and Outline 
In this dissertation, I argue that mediator motivations and constraints should be 
pivotal factors in determining policy choices and subsequently the success of conflict 
management efforts.  By reviewing the relevant research from the conflict management, 
foreign policy decision making, and leader survival literatures, I argue specifically that 
given incentives to focus on foreign policy when domestic conditions require presidential 
action and the makeup of Congress is not conducive to passing legislation, third-party 
 8 
 
mediation should be an appealing outlet for presidents to create the image of competence 
and success.  Moreover, given the need for a policy victory, presidents should choose 
mediation strategies that are most likely to yield short-term resolution of conflict.  This 
argument works to better our understanding of the dynamics of conflict resolution 
processes and brings the study of conflict resolution in line with prevailing theories of 
foreign policy decision making and leader behavior.  I test my argument empirically 
using a time-series modified version of Jacob Bercovitch’s International Conflict 
Management dataset (see Bercovitch and Fretter 2007) for United States mediation 
attempts from 1945-1995.  The empirical results are generally supportive of the 
argument. 
 In the first empirical chapter, I focus specifically on how the interaction between 
domestic political conditions and the makeup of Congress influences foreign policy 
choices.  I begin by analyzing models that suggest presidents are more likely to use 
mediation in response to deteriorating approval ratings and when congressional support is 
low.  From there, I build on this argument by contending that the mediation strategy 
employed in these situations should seek to manipulate the payoffs for the disputing 
parties rather than simply facilitate negotiations, in order quickly to induce a peace 
settlement—and thus better the chances of a president’s success in the upcoming election.  
 The second empirical chapter focuses on election cycles and the makeup of 
Congress, and their subsequent impact on the frequency and strategy of mediation.  
Similar to the way that deteriorating economic conditions and low approval ratings make 
a president vulnerable, democratic elections are a built in vulnerability that presidents 
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must face.  As such, it can be argued that presidents should engage in policy making 
strategically to maximize their electoral prospects.  Thus, I argue that as elections near, 
presidents should seek to build a record of success through policy initiatives.  When 
confronted with nearing elections and a hostile Congress, presidents should be seen using 
foreign policy as an avenue to build this record of success, because of their greater 
autonomy in foreign policy making process. Coupled with the notion that leaders are 
thought to be punished electorally for engagement in military conflict, non-violent 
foreign policy endeavors, such as third party mediation, should be attractive to presidents.  
Additionally, I argue that given their need to generate a series of high-profile successes 
before campaigns get underway, manipulative strategies that are likely to induce 
agreement should be employed.  The results of these analyses largely suggest support for 
the hypotheses, but also that more research should be done to explain all of the factors at 
work in the process.   
 Finally, in the third empirical chapter I examine the effects that mediation has on 
presidential approval.  The dissertation to this point has focused on presidential behavior, 
arguing that a president’s increasing vulnerability—due  either to deteriorating approval, 
low levels of congressional support, or selection institutions, will give him incentives to 
focus resources on mediation.  But does this focus on mediation have the desired effect?  
I test the public’s response to mediation using the president’s approval rating as a 
dependent variable.  Empirical results largely support my argument. 
 The contributions of my findings are twofold.  On the one hand, they contribute to 
a growing literature on the nature of foreign policy decision making that suggests that 
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leaders use foreign policy like any other policy, to help them build a record success that 
serves to improve their electoral fortunes.  On the other hand, they inform the conflict 
management literature on the dynamics of mediation processes.  Because state mediators 
are constrained and incentivized by domestic political considerations, such conditions 
need to be taken into account when attempting to explain the factors that lead to 
successful conflict resolution.   It is not enough simply to consider state mediators as 
unchanging, unitary actors categorized by states’ international characteristics.  Rather, the 
mediator’s domestic situation must be taken into account.  Such an approach should help 
to explain why states pay varied levels of attention to mediation over time and why it is 
often unsuccessful, despite mediators’ ability to commit many resources to the effort and 
induce the disputants to come to a peaceful agreement.  
 11 
 
Chapter Two:  Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
Mediation
5
 has traditionally been studied through the normative lens of conflict 
resolution, seeking to provide members of the international community with the tools to 
successfully resolve international and civil conflict peacefully.  However, such a goal 
often led to the examination of conflict resolution processes from the perspective of the 
disputing parties, and with the tacit assumption that the mediators’ primary goal in 
mediating a conflict was to engineer a successful and lasting resolution (Touval 2003).  
Additionally, mediation theory has emerged separately from theories of foreign policy 
decision making, which have developed with a focus on the political incentives and 
constraints that leaders confront both domestically and internationally.  As such, 
mediators have been considered as unchanging, unitary actors when they are included in 
models of conflict resolution processes, and their strategic political motivations for 
engaging in mediation have not been taken into account.  Even so, we see varying levels 
of interest and commitment from the same mediators across time and space, suggesting 
that this unitary state actor approach is insufficient to explain mediator behavior.
6
 
Many case studies of mediation do mention that mediator motivations should be 
considered when analyzing mediation processes (see Rubin, ed. 1981; Jabri 1990; Touval 
                                                 
 
5
 For the purposes of this work, I use Bercovitch’s (1992) and Princen’s (1995) definition of mediation.  
Mediation is defined as a form of triadic, non-binding conflict resolution that occurs when the two 
disputing parties agree that there is a peaceful, negotiated outcome that can be reached, but require some 
assistance in actually arriving at that outcome.  While mediatiors may “sweeten or sour the deal” by adding 
guarantees, they do not use punishment as a tactic, but rather rely on persuasion and rewards.  For a 
comprehensive discussion of the nature of mediation, see Bercovitch and Fretter 2007, 145-146.  
6
 For instance, the United States has been involved in several peacemaking attempts in the Middle East 
since 1948, but its level of interest and commitment to peace have varied over time as evidenced by 
different ranking mediators, and different mediator strategies, as well as the conspicuous absence thereof. 
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1992; 1982), but such considerations have not been taken into account in systematic 
studies of mediation across time and space.
7
  Despite the prevalence of the single case 
study in early analyses of the mediation process, and although mediation must be a 
flexible and adaptive enterprise, scholars have come to the consensus that it can be 
studied systematically in a statistical fashion (Bercovitch 1992, 127, Schrodt and Gerner 
2004, 325).  Such a conclusion has led to numerous studies and a significant body of 
research surrounding mediation, primarily focusing on the factors leading to mediation 
success.  Where mediator strategies and motivations have been taken into account, 
however, scholarship has focused overwhelmingly on describing mediator characteristics 
and how variation in these characteristics influences the conflict resolution process.  It 
has not, though, focused on leaders’ political motivations behind choosing such to engage 
in mediation, their tactics when doing so, or, especially in unsuccessful cases, the factors 
that constrain them from using more extreme measures to bring about peaceful conflict 
resolution.  Such an analysis will better inform discussions of when, where, and how 
mediation is likely to be offered, which should in turn play a significant role in 
determining the potential for a peaceful settlement, as well as the characteristics of that 
settlement.  
                                                 
 
7
 Grieg and Regan’s (2008) primary focus is on the motivations for accepting an offer of mediation, rather 
than the motivations.  They posit a liberal interdepence argument and find that mediation is most likely to 
be accepted when there are historical or economic ties between the mediator and a state involved in a civil 
war.  From such a conclusion, it can be implied that states have economic and cultural motivations to offer 
conflict mediation to states with which they have strong economic and historical ties.  Several studies 
address bias (see Kydd 2003; Crescenzi et. al), which I discuss later in this chapter.  However, the presence 
of bias is addressed in the context of the willingness of disputants to accept mediation, and not regarding 
the motivation to offer it. 
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In this chapter, I outline mediation as a political process and take stock of the 
mediation research program, highlighting findings suggesting that applying a strategic 
decision making approach is both appropriate and necessary to explain the variation in 
occurrence and commitment to conflict resolution by state mediators.  Then I review the 
foreign policy decision making literature focusing on two-level games, the strategic use 
of foreign policy and foreign policy substitutability, to synthesize an argument 
contending that this variation in focus on and commitment to mediation is driven by 
domestic politics, political vulnerability, and the availability of domestic policy outlets. 
The Disputants’ Perspective: Why Mediation? 
Case studies of conflict mediation attempt to trace the mediation process and 
highlight the factors that contributed to or hindered peaceful resolution of the conflict.  
While theory generation has not always been the primary goal of these case studies, they 
have generated a number of conclusions that characterize the nature of mediation 
processes.  From a rationalist, state-centered perspective, third-party mediation is 
appealing to states and factions engaged in military conflict because such conflict is 
thought to be ex-post inefficient; the agreement made at the end of the conflict is often 
one that could be made prior to violence.  Disputes are not settled peacefully because of 
the lack of information about each side’s capabilities and their resolve to get what they 
want, as well as issue indivisibilities where there is a constant sum payoff at stake 
(Fearon 1995).  Thus, the extreme nature of conflict outcomes (clear winners and losers 
and the intervening human, political, and economic devastation) make a negotiated 
settlement appealing to leaders and publics alike, but difficult to realize because of the 
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high stakes involved and the difficulty of reaching a mutually agreeable compromise 
(Rubin 1981).  Much of this difficulty stems from the fact that leaders of the disputing 
factions are politically vulnerable, although often to different extents, and thus cannot 
agree to a settlement that is unsatisfactory to their domestic political constituencies, 
which they have likely spent a great deal of political capital motivating to fight.  
However, as the costs of conflict compound, especially if hostilities near a stalemate, the 
marginal utility of continuing conflict decreases and the parties’ resolve will begin to 
wane, meaning that  their domestic constituencies are likely to begin to favor a settlement 
over continued hostilities.  
While it is common that strategies for conflict management are multi-faceted and 
tailored to the specific nature of the conflict, scholars have identified a typology of 
intervention or “conflict management” strategies that has made systematic inquiry 
possible.  While the term “intervention,” when used referring to disputes, can have many 
meanings—ranging from military activity as a belligerent to an arbitrator with decision-
making power—the conflict management literature uses the term to refer to the latter part 
of this spectrum, focusing specifically on peaceful attempts made by a third-party to be 
an intermediary and to peacefully end conflict (Frazier and Dixon 2009, 46).
8
   As 
mentioned above, multilateralism tends to be the norm in conflict management, at least 
initially (Frazier and Dixon 2009), while unilateral, manipulative strategies tend to induce 
outcomes (Kleiboer 2003, Touval 1992, Touval and Zartmann 1985).  One of the major 
problems with multilateralism and international organizations, especially with regard to 
                                                 
 
8
 In this work, “intervention” and “conflict management attempt” are used interchangeably. 
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the use of traditional peacekeeping missions and standing arbitrators is that such outlets 
were created to deal with conflicts in a state-centered environment.  However, given that 
an increasing number of conflicts on the world stage involve non-state entities and deal 
with problems more complex than sovereignty and border disputes, more flexible and 
specifically-tailored strategies are necessary. 
The variation in how parties in conflict attempt to come to a peaceful agreement is 
great, and despite numerous efforts, such agreements that substantively create peace are 
rare, despite the fact that attempts are numerous.  However, three major types of conflict 
management have emerged: negotiation, mediation, and arbitration.  Each of these 
vehicles for conflict resolution is different with respect to the amount of sovereignty 
(control and decision-making power over their own obligations) that the parties retain and 
the proximity to the adversary with which discussions take place.  Thus, with each of 
these conflict management types, leaders are faced with the question of which 
concessions to make, which concessions to ask for, and which means to use in getting 
them.  A major component of their decision is whether leaders should give up their 
sovereignty in order to guarantee that a peace agreement will become a reality.  On one 
hand, relying on a third party may give them the leverage they need to gain the necessary 
concessions from their adversaries, thus impressing key domestic constituencies by 
producing peace.  On the other hand, the devolution of decision-making power to a third 
party may signal a leader’s weakness and expose him to political criticism, and thus make 
him more vulnerable to removal.  A third-party may also strengthen a leader’s domestic 
standing, because the concessions that he made are not direct ones.  Working through a 
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third party can even provide distance and cover for leaders who might otherwise be 
politically unable to make controversial concessions.  Additionally, in the case of civil 
conflicts, where one of the disputants is a non-state actor, agreeing to negotiate through a 
third party adds to that actor’s credibility and legitimacy as a political entity (Beardsley 
2009).  
Issue Indivisibilities and Commitment Problems– Problems with Peacekeeping, 
Arbitration, and Adjudication 
 
The United Nations has, since its inception, held a special place among 
international institutions because of its mission to peacefully prevent and resolve conflict 
between states.  However, the end of the Cold War has led to a greater focus on, and need 
for, resolution of conflicts within states or between non-state actors (Paris 1997, 54-55).  
Such a change has led to a need for new strategies and exposed the limits of traditional 
peacekeeping along with some of the deficiencies of international organizations in the 
conflict management arena. 
Peacekeeping   
 Peacekeeping missions, as the name would suggest, have traditionally focused on 
preventing conflict as much as resolving it.  The most common peacekeeping strategy in 
the postwar period has been to use UN troops and international observers to serve as a 
buffer between conflicting parties.  Such a strategy has proven successful in numerous 
conflicts where there is a clear geographical separator of the belligerents such as a 
border.
9
  However, peacekeeping missions have had less success where the belligerents 
                                                 
 
9
 Prime examples are the UN peacekeeping missions after the 1956 Suez Crisis, the UN presence in the 
Korean de-militarized zone from 1953-1967, and the ongoing UN presence in Cyprus to prevent conflict 
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are not easily separated geographically and where protracted conflicts between enduring 
rivals have flared into violence (Goertz and Diehl 1993).  Moreover, most modern 
peacekeeping missions have occurred alongside attempts at wholesale liberalization of 
both politics and economics within the conflict region.  Paris (1997, 85) aptly points out 
that such liberalization can hinder the prospects for peace due to the fact that liberal 
policies often create competition for power and political dissensus that hinder the overall 
prospects for peace, largely because there is no political culture reinforcing democratic 
values or historic precedent for upholding the rule of law.
10
 
 Instances such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide and UN failures in Bosnia 
Herzegovina further illustrate the limits of traditional peacekeeping missions and 
international institutions attempting to resolve intra-state conflicts (Fortna 2003, Paris 
1997, Regan 2000).  In conflicts such as these, underlying factors such as lack of 
development, ethnic tensions, and power struggles make physically separating the 
conflicting parties impossible.  Moreover, the extent of the geographic integration of the 
conflicting parties and the scarcity of resources create issue indivisibilities, such as which 
side’s leaders will hold the most political power after a settlement is forged or who will 
have access to scarce resources; consequently, the current range of potential payoffs may 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
between ethnic Turkish and ethnic Greek Cypriots.  In each of these cases, the peacekeeping force’s goal 
was to keep the belligerents on their side of a predetermined border (see Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000).  In 
these cases, the role of the peacekeepers was to keep belligerents apart from one another once a cease-fire 
had been agreed upon. 
10
 Paris continues by arguing that the key to true and lasting resolution of conflict in troubled regions must 
occur through a long-term, multi-faceted approach that includes conciliation, investment, and political and 
military support, much like the US strategy in the Marshall Plan after World War II.  His conclusions 
support those of Yuen and Werner (2005) that contend that manipulated peace agreements are most likely 
to see relapses in violence, due to the fragile nature of such agreements and the failure to address the 
underlying causes of conflict. 
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be unsatisfactory to those involved.  Therefore, scholars have prescribed longer-term, 
active attempts to change and improve conditions on the ground, ones that are 
specifically-tailored to the situation.  In particular, research has demonstrated that state 
actors who seek to manipulate the conflicting factions by providing incentives that 
increase the payoffs for both sides and provide some guarantee of peace are the most 
successful in ending or curtailing conflict (Svenson 2009, Bercovitch and Regan 2004, 
Zartmann and Touval 1985). 
Negotiations 
Bilateral negotiations involve only the conflicting parties engaging in peace talks 
(Merills 2005; Druckman 1997).  There are several obstacles that make the mere 
occurrence of bilateral negotiations difficult.  Due to the fact that the parties have 
recently been in conflict with one another, often with high and indivisible stakes, purely 
bilateral negotiations might appear unlikely to yield substantive results.  Moreover, the 
conflicting factions often require a starting mechanism, some externality that makes the 
stakes of the conflict more transparent, thus inducing negotiations (Druckman 1997).  
Finally, there are strategic barriers to engaging in negotiations (Bercovitch and Jackson 
2009).  Conflicting factions, especially in civil wars, do not recognize their adversary as a 
politically legitimate entity, and often at least one of the factions lacks broad recognition 
from the international community.  Therefore, they are often reluctant to engage in 
negotiation, as the very practice of doing so concedes at least some legitimacy to the 
other side, as well as precludes the prospect of total victory, thus potentially exposing 
political leaders to domestic criticism.   
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Within the scope of negotiations, there are two major perspectives from which 
negotiators are thought to work: problem solving and bargaining (Hoppman 2001).  
Where negotiators are political actors, either political leaders or their deputies who are 
beholden to some domestic political audience, bargaining often trumps problem solving.  
Because negotiating can make a leader appear weak to his domestic supporters and, in 
cases where conflict has reached a relative stalemate, the zero-sum nature of the payoffs 
often reduces the utility of concessions.  Furthermore, leaders have incentives to err on 
the side of security, which often precludes the making of concessions necessary for 
substantive negotiation (Druckman 1997).  Thus, the factions are often caught in a 
security dilemma, whereby making concessions (especially being the first to move) is 
politically, and perhaps militarily, risky.  As such, these political actors are constrained 
from agreeing to terms that weaken their domestic political position, even if they might 
result in peace.  As a result, negotiation cannot happen successfully while the belligerents 
view the conflict as zero-sum in nature (Starkey, Boyer, and Wilkenfeld 2009).  
However, negotiations are thought to have some utility after hostilities because the 
process of the conflict provides each side with previously unknown information about the 
other’s resolve and capabilities—and this occurs at the point where the conflict itself is 
beginning to have negative effects on leaders, as the result of a stalemate.   
Despite the obstacles, certain characteristics of negotiation make it an appealing 
policy strategy for leaders.  Negotiations allow the parties to maintain full sovereignty in 
the bargaining process.  Maintaining sovereignty is important for political leaders 
because the delegation or devolution thereof can expose them to criticism from domestic 
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political adversaries seeking to characterize them as weak or ineffective.  Thus, in 
negotiating bilaterally after hostilities, political leaders address the decreasing utility of 
conflict with new information about their adversary.  Negotiations are also likely to be 
the safest, or at least most conservative, political option leaders can select when choosing 
a conflict resolution strategy.  However, likely because of the intractability of the 
disputing parties’ positions (Merrills 2005), negotiations are unsuccessful more than half 
of the time, and are successful in bringing about a full settlement only slightly more than 
four percent of the time.  ( 2.1)
11
 
Arbitration and Adjudication 
Arbitration is a more binding form of conflict resolution that can occur when both 
parties agree to give up their own decision-making power and agree to the terms put forth 
by a court, tribunal, or other organization prior to knowing what those terms are (Merrills 
2005).  Such a remedy can have several appealing benefits to belligerents, but is also the 
least likely to occur (see Figure 2.2), most likely because there are several obstacles to 
getting both sides to agree to arbitration.  Similar explanations can be given for the 
inability of freestanding arbitrators to successfully curtail many of these modern 
conflicts.  Pre-existing tribunals such as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) were 
created to adjudicate “legal” disputes between state actors.  However, as Bilder (1997:
                                                 
 
11
 “Success” in the ICM dataset is defined as the cessation of hostilities and/or the agreement of the 
belligerent parties on some or all the terms over which they were fighting.  Success is further disaggregated 
into the following categories: cease-fire (temporary agreement to stop hostilities in search of a peaceful 
solution), partial settlement (peaceful agreement on some of the issues over which they had been fighting), 
full settlement (agreement on all issues over which they had been fighting).  Success is not defined in terms 
of the longevity or durability of the agreement.  In fact, even in cases where conflict management (all 
types) yields a full settlement, conflict re-emerges at some level roughly 77% of the time.  Thus, the 
definition of success is a weak one, with a short-term focus.   
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Figure 2.1: Summary of Bilateral Negotiation Outcomes (from ICM Dataset 1945-
1995, N=1144) 
Negotiation Outcomes by Frequency 
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Figure 2.2: Conflict Management types by frequency (from ICM Dataset 1945-1995, 
N=3479) 
Conflict Management Types by Frequency 
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166) points out, many of the disputes needing resolution today are “political” conflicts 
and therefore actors involved consider them inappropriate for adjudication.  Arbitration is 
a political solution in that leaders must weigh the costs and benefits of agreeing to 
arbitration given the potential for all possible outcomes.  For both sides to agree to 
arbitration, they must both consider the arbitrator to be sufficiently neutral, which is 
likely difficult to achieve given the depth of many conflict issues and the incentives for 
third parties seeking to serve as an arbitrator.
12
  This is especially the case in issue areas 
involving a party’s honor or interests considered to be vital to its existence or purpose.  
Given that arbitration and adjudication are measures that generally involve a clear winner 
and loser, the expected utility for one of the parties to continue the conflict should usually 
outweigh the expected utility of losing an arbitrated settlement.  However, given the fact 
that the win set of possible outcomes is likely to include indivisible issues, such as who 
holds power after the conflict, agreement to abide by such a decision is unlikely
13
 (Bilder 
1997, Maoz and Terris 2009).  Finally, adjudicating bodies such as the ICJ are designed 
to work in a state-centered system.  However, given the prominence of conflict with non-
state actors, such institutions are unable to provide a functional solution. 
 In the case of international conflict, pre-existing tribunals such as the ICJ may be 
employed to settle disputes, although jurisdiction is often limited and vague.  However, in 
the case of civil wars or other intra-state conflicts, arbitration is less likely to be agreed 
                                                 
 
12
 Bias on the part of an arbitrator is likely to hinder conflict resolution attempts since arbitration more 
clearly yields a winner and loser.  However, with mediation, which is discussed later in the chapter, several 
scholars (see Kydd 2003; Crescenzi, et al. 2012) argue that bias on the part of a mediator is desirable, 
because it is more likely to induce concessions,  
13
 For parties to agree to any form of conflict management, the expected utility of the outcome must 
outweigh that of continuing conflict (see Maoz and Terris 2009, Grieg 2005 for examples).  
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to.
14
  Because in order for arbitration/adjudication to occur in a civil war, the status quo 
power, who was recognized internationally as the sovereign before the start of hostilities, 
must acknowledge that their adversary is a legitimate political entity whose plight 
deserves some consideration from external arbitrator—which is unlikely to happen 
because it significantly diminishes the differential in legitimate power between the two.
15
 
While an arbitrator or tribunal will give a definitive decision on how conflict is to be 
settled, the disputing parties must agree ex ante to abide by the terms and conditions that 
an arbitrator decides (Merrills 2005).  Thus, except in the case of pre-existing arbitrators 
or tribunals, agreeing on an ad hoc arbitrator is difficult and unlikely.   
Despite the fact that it sees the highest full settlement rate and lowest 
unsuccessful rate of the conflict management types, arbitration occurs the fewest times 
over the observation period. ( 2.3)   As such, arbitration is likely to be limited in its 
relevance to certain types of conflicts.  Moreover, guarantees or enforcement mechanisms 
for the terms the arbitrator lays out are likely to be limited, depending on who the 
arbitrator is or represents.  Thus, the ability of the arbitrator to lay down a “full 
settlement” as defined by Becovitch and Fretter (2007) is undermined by the fact that in 
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 Arbitration and referral to/adjudication by an international organization are similar in that both conflict 
management types involve an adjudicating third party, whose ruling is theoretically binding.  The primary 
difference is the consent of the belligerents.  Arbitration must be agreed to by both parties, whereas a pre-
existing body with some level of monitoring or enforcement power, such as the UN Security Council, can 
refer states or conflicts to tribunals whose jurisdiction and mandate pre-exists that conflict, and, in other 
cases, one of the parties can bring the issue to before the tribunal without prior consent of the other. 
15
 While arbitration is the rarest of conflict management types, due to the difficulty of agreeing to 
arbitration, it is even rarer in civil/intra-state conflicts. It occurs roughly three times more often in interstate 
conflicts than in civil conflicts. Similarly, interstate conflicts are referred to international or regional 
organizations at a rate approximately three times greater than that of intrastate/civil wars.  
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Figure 2.3: Summary of Arbitration Outcomes (from ICM Dataset 1945-1995, 
N=29)
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an anarchical international system, monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are 
necessary to guarantee that both sides abide by such a settlement. 
Additionally, the adjudication of military conflict by international or regional 
organizations is rare and, for the data observation period, never yields a full settlement ( 
2.4).  Because international organizations and their associated tribunals are limited in 
their jurisdiction and mandate, it is difficult for them to effectively address all aspects of 
grievances between two belligerent parties, be they states or other entities.  Moreover, 
while prominent international organizations, such as the UN or World Trade 
Organization (WTO), may have stronger enforcement mechanisms at their disposal, 
many international and regional organizations are less able to enforce their tribunal’s 
decisions.
16
  While many international organizations exist to prevent conflict, they are 
less adept at stopping it once it has begun, especially through peaceful means.
17
   
Mediation 
Mediation can be seen as a middle ground strategy between negotiation and 
arbitration that, on its face, overcomes many of the obstacles to negotiation and 
arbitration/adjudication.  As such, it is the most common type of conflict management 
strategy employed (see Figure 2.2).  It is a more flexible form of conflict resolution that 
can allow both sides to save face, while coming to a peace agreement (Rubin 1981; 
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 For example, the Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Tribunal ruled against the 
Mugabe Regime’s eviction of white farmers in 2008.  However, during the court’s proceedings, Mugabe’s 
representatives left in protest.  Once the court had ruled in favor of the white farmers, Mugabe simply 
withdrew Zimbabwe from the international agreement empowering the SADC Tribunal. The SADC 
Tribunal lacked enforcement mechanisms and has, as result, of Zimbabwe’s action been examined the 
SADC members for decommissioning. 
17
 The ICM Dataset does not contain information on military interventions used in conjunction with 
peaceful conflict management efforts, although such information is likely relevant to this discussion since 
peacekeeping, and increasingly peacemaking, is a regular component to conflict management. 
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Figure 2.4: Summary of Adjudication by International/Regional Organizations 
(ICM Dataset 1945-1995, N=155) 
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Merrills 2005), as well as one that can overcome commitment problems and problems 
with the lack of credible information between the two parties (Bercovitch 2002; Touval 
and Zartman 1985).  Leaders can save face by coming to an agreement in a way that does 
not admit or concede defeat, but effectively ends hostilities.  In addition, they are not 
bound to terms ex ante, meaning that leaders are more likely to agree to mediation, 
probing the range of possible peaceful outcomes, rather than being forced to accept one 
that is decided by external actors. 
Because of its flexible nature, mediation has become seen by scholars and 
politicians as the optimal way for conflicting parties to come to a peaceful agreement.  
However, despite its appeal and prevalence as a conflict management strategy, 
empirically, mediation is no more successful than other types of conflict management in 
bringing about successful conflict resolution, even by the weak definition of success 
being employed here. ( 2.5).  Thus, the question must be asked as to why it is no more 
successful than other strategies, especially given the extent of the resources some 
mediators are willing to put toward the effort.  The answer, I argue, is not just in the 
capabilities of the mediators, but also in their motivations.  In the next sections, I describe 
different mediation strategies and mediator types, and argue that state mediators have the 
greatest capabilities to bring about peaceful settlements of conflict due to their unique 
ability to effectively use manipulation strategies, and also because most likely to be 
motivated by political factors in their execution of the mediation process. 
 29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Summary of Mediation Outcomes (ICM Dataset 1945-1995, N=2111) 
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Traditional Approaches to the Study of Mediation 
 Traditionally, scholars of mediation have sought to understand the factors that 
lead to successful conflict resolution, thus creating a theoretical recipe that practitioners 
can then institute.  The research program has yielded several generalizable conclusions 
about the scope and nature of mediation as a conflict resolution strategy.  Bercovitch 
(1986) finds that three conditions are thought to most affect the likelihood that mediation 
is successful: the identity of the disputing parties, the nature of the conflict, and the 
characteristics of the mediator.  Among these three factors, the nature of the dispute and 
the identity/characteristics of the conflicting parties have received the overwhelming 
majority of attention in the scholarly research.  Because mediation is ultimately a 
voluntary exercise, the disputing parties have received the most scholarly attention.  
Mediators, however, play an important role in the conflict resolution process because of 
their ability to change the nature of the conflict, its potential outcomes, and the likelihood 
that peace can be arranged.  Additionally, an emerging literature suggests that the conflict 
resolution research program should be brought into line with prevailing theories of 
foreign policy decision making, as the decision to offer, engage in, and accept mediation 
are political decisions.  As such, theories explaining foreign policy behavior should try to 
be used to explain the dynamics of conflict resolution.  Thus, from the perspective of the 
mediator, the decision to offer mediation is a strategic one, made from a range of policy 
options, both foreign and domestic.  
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Mediation Strategies 
Mediators have several tools at their disposal, depending on who they are and 
who they represent, to bring about a peaceful resolution to conflict.  The key to mediation 
success is for the appropriate actor to use the proper tools and resources to effectively 
address the nature of the conflict (Bercovitch 1992; 2002).  In each case, however, there 
are several similarities in the mediator’s goals.  Specifically, the mediator is trying to do 
three things: change the conflict resolution environment, change disputants’ perceptions 
of the stakes/payoffs, and change the level/nature of motivation that disputants have to 
come to an agreement (Bercovitch 1992:16).  At the lowest level, they can use their good 
offices, and the prestige and persuading power of the government or the organization that 
they represent, to provide credible information about their adversary’s intentions, 
capabilities, etc.; they can also use their own resources and information provision 
capabilities to guarantee that each side upholds the agreement.  In many cases, however, 
mediators go beyond this simple provision of information by providing a venue and 
change the stakes of the conflict by introducing “carrots and sticks” to induce a certain 
end to the conflict, often with their own interests in mind.   
Because mediation has generally been characterized within the normative 
framework of conflict resolution, it is assumed as a “good” at face value (Bercovitch 
2002, 4).  Success through mediation has thus become the primary dependent variable in 
academic studies.  However, it has been made clear by scholars that not all mediation 
attempts and not all mediators should be considered equal in what they are able to 
achieve or willing to do (Bercovitch 1997: 137).  Touval and Zartman (1985) outline a 
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typology of mediation that allows scholars to examine the range of mediation techniques 
systematically.  Specifically, mediators have been shown to take three general 
approaches: information strategies, formulation strategies, and manipulation strategies.  
Such a typology focuses on mediator behavior, rather than the disputants, and introduces 
the notion that mediator actions are strategic, chosen to induce specific outcomes.     
Communication strategies are those in which the mediator primarily serves as a 
facilitator of information (Touval and Zartman 1985).  These mediations occur when 
communication between the disputing parties is strained or difficult to realize and when 
there is a minimal level of trust of between them.  In these cases, a mediator has rapport 
with both parties and serves as a conduit between them, laying the groundwork for 
further substantive progress in the conflict resolution process.  As such, information 
strategies are often executed away from negotiating tables, but work to create an 
environment in which the parties are willing to come together.  Tactically, information 
provision works to clarify the grievances each side has with the other, to identify the key 
issues to be discussed, and to supply each side with a more transparent view of the 
situation by providing missing proprietary information.  These mediations rarely resolve 
conflicts in their entirety, but rather pave the way for more formal discussions about a 
peace agreement.
18
   
Formulation strategies are those where a mediator serves as a facilitator for actual 
negotiations by providing a meeting place, moderating discussions in such a way that the 
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 Much of Henry Kissinger’s “shuttle diplomacy” in the 1970s involved the provision of information to the 
Israelis and Egyptians.  Kissinger’s primary goal in shuttling back and forth between them was to build a 
framework for further negotiations by clarifying the key issues, encouraging communication between the 
two sides, and suggesting that a peaceful agreement between them was feasible (see Rubin, ed. 1982) 
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disputing parties can save face and begin to suggest substantive measures and 
concessions for each side to make (Touval and Zartman 1985).  The key goal with 
formulation strategies is to limit the number of variables in play during discussions and to 
manage the environment under they take place.  Examples of tactics used in by mediators 
in formulation strategies are choosing/providing a meeting place, controlling the 
intensity/formality of discussions, and controlling the external environment (Bercovitch 
1992:17).  Thus, mediators can help to reduce tensions by providing secrecy and thus 
limiting the extent to which outside influences not at the table play a role in the outcomes 
of the talks.
19
  However, the mediator remains fairly removed from deciding the actual 
stakes and payoffs of any agreements, as well as the provision of guarantees or 
enforcement mechanisms.   
Finally, manipulative strategies are those used when a mediator actively engages 
the parties and adds a dimension to the payoff structure for one or both of the disputing 
parties, whether it is an incentive or a guarantee (Bercovitch 1997, 137-138).  Because of 
the “carrots and sticks” nature of this type of mediation, it is usually carried out by 
powerful actors who can “sweeten” or “sour” the deal for disputing parties.20    Moreover, 
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 Norway’s role in the Oslo Accords negotiations in August 1993 is prime example of a formulation 
strategy.  The Norwegians did little to influence the actual nature of the agreement, but were able to 
provide an environment in which substantive discussions could take place.  By providing secrecy and 
security, the press, pundits, and potential spoilers, such as HAMAS, were unable to take actions that would 
derail the process, thus allowing keen negotiators to focus on coming to an agreement (see Jones 1999).  
20
 The US government’s role in the discussions leading up to the Camp David Accords signed in 1978 is an 
example of a mixed strategy with characteristics of both formulation and manipulative strategies.  During 
the actual negotiations, the Carter administration worked to control the negotiation environment by setting 
an agenda and imposing time limits on sessions, thus working to keep representatives of both sides eager to 
forge an agreement.  However, it also took an active role in carrying out the peace agreement, providing 
both sides with substantial amounts of military aid in addition to a guarantee to use its military power to 
enforce the agreement.   
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because the mediating party is taking responsibility for some aspect of the resolution, 
whether it be monitoring, enforcement, or rewards for concessions (Bercovitch 1992:17), 
it is the strategy most likely to be driven by the mediator’s own political motivations.   
 As the previous paragraphs imply, different parties are best-suited to serve as 
mediators based on the strategy that is being employed (Bercovitch 1987).  Individuals, 
acting on their own behalf, whether it be formally or informally, have a great deal more 
latitude to experiment with when acting as a mediator, but are unable to provide the 
guarantees or the “carrots and sticks” that are necessary to manipulate the disputing 
parties by changing their payoff structures.  Similarly, international organizations have 
commitment problems when attempting to try to manipulate disputing parties because of 
their inability to guarantee security or certain payouts over the long term, largely because 
such organizations lack the clout that state actors have (Bercovitch 1997, Touval and 
Zartmann 1985, Kleiboer 2002).  Thus, it is state leaders and those high level 
representatives thereof who are able to provide the most clear guarantees to disputing 
parties and, as a result, make their incentives to negotiate and come to a resolution 
strongest.  The nuances and consequences of mediator types are discussed in the next 
section.  
Mediator Types 
 Third-party mediation can be carried out by several different types of actors, from 
private individuals to international organizations whose members comprise most of the 
sovereign states in the international system.  Variation in mediator type largely 
determines the process of the mediation effort due to the fact that different types of 
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mediators have different capabilities, in terms of the types of peaceful agreements they 
are able to broker and in terms of the different motivations for agreeing to or seeking to 
engage in mediation.  Research has shown that individual mediators are often not judged 
on their ability to successfully resolve a conflict (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000).  States 
or individuals who have a track record as successful mediators are not necessarily chosen 
to be mediators in other conflicts.  Instead, a state’s status on the international scene plays 
the most prominent role in how often it is a mediator, with the United States’ role as 
hegemon having the largest effect (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000, Kleiboer 2002, 
Touval 1992).  Such a finding suggests that perhaps only prominent and wealthy states 
have the wherewithal to engage in mediation, but also that they are more likely to have 
incentives to mediate.  This result is coupled with another that suggests mediator 
neutrality is not important in the “market for mediation” (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000, 
145).  Such a conclusion suggests that states involved in mediation are motivated by 
more than simply success.  A further discussion of the variation and relevant literature 
follows in the proceeding sections.  
Private Citizens as Mediators 
Private citizens of some prestige have attempted to mediate military conflicts and 
are thought to most credibly be neutral mediators whose purpose for engaging as 
mediator is altruistic.  Often times private citizens who mediate use their status as a 
former official, religious leader, or academic expert to gain favor with the disputing 
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parties.
21
  Mediations by private individuals can be formal or informal, each having its 
own advantages.  For instance, while formal mediators have procedural advantages in 
terms of creating agreements, in cases of civil conflict, informal mediators are often more 
successful because they are acting as a conduit between asymmetrical actors—such as 
where one is a state entity and the other a breakaway group (Hare 1992).  Therefore, 
formal mediation would amount to formal recognition of both parties as politically 
legitimate political actors, a risk that most leaders will be unwilling to take.  In these 
cases, mediators are usually not formally invited, but instead find a way, often through 
means of providing humanitarian relief, to earn the confidence of disputing parties.
22
  
Because they lack direct political ties, private citizens are thought to able to be 
more flexible than representatives of states or international organizations and thus can 
suggest a broader range of potential agreements and outcomes (Bercovitch and Schneider 
2000).  However, in cases where the mediator represents a non-governmental 
organization or religious institution, the mediator may limit their efforts to outcomes 
synchronous with their organization’s doctrine or ideology.23  Because of the mutual trust 
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 Perhaps the best example of a private citizen acting as a high-profile mediator is former Jimmy Carter’s 
work in Haiti and Korea.  While Carter carried the prestige associated with being a former president of the 
United States, he did not carry a political mandate to negotiate on behalf of the US administration.  Thus, 
his reputation as a committed peacemaker gave him the necessary credibility with both parties to facilitate 
negotiations. 
22
 Quaker mediation in 1984 Sri Lanka demonstrates how informal mediation can be beneficial to building 
a framework for peaceful discussions.  At a time when the Sinhalese majority was unwilling to publicly 
recognize the Tamil rebels, Joseph Elder of the London Quaker office was dispatched to help facilitate 
communication between the two parties.  His efforts required that each side keep knowledge that the 
discussions were occurring secret and limited only to the top officials.  Because of his powerless political 
position and his commitment to confidentiality (which meant receiving no formal credit for his work) Elder 
was able to carry messages between the two parties and begin to facilitate a peace process (Princen 1992; 
1994; Bailey 1985).  
23
 Quaker mediators have often focused on achieving consensus among parties before moving forward with 
peace discussions, as consensus is consistent with Quaker religious governance (Bailey 1985).  Similarly, 
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the disputants often have in the mediator, he or she is thought to be most helpful in 
overcoming misunderstandings between them, but often lacks the power and capabilities 
to add substantive guarantees or oversight to the effort. Such guarantees are often 
necessary to assuage concerns the disputing parties have that the other will renege on any 
agreement that is made.  Thus, the ability of private citizens to engineer peace on their 
own is considered to be somewhat limited. 
The literature shows, however, that private citizens and other apolitical mediators 
can often play a substantive role in peace processes.  Because of their relative lack of 
political ties, and thus political motivations, private citizens are more adept at providing 
information to both sides of a dispute.  As previously discussed, conflict is often thought 
to be the result of information problems and the inability of actors to credibly 
demonstrate their resolve and capabilities to achieve their political goals (Fearon 1995).  
Consequently, individuals as mediators can play a key role in what Greig and Diehl 
(2001) call a “softening up” process—making both sides more amenable to a peaceful 
settlement by informing them about their adversary and creating a framework for 
subsequent discussions.  In doing so, mediators are largely trying to change the culture or 
mindset of the disputants from one of a zero-sum game to one with mutually beneficial 
outcomes (Antrim and Sebenius 1992).  Then, as both sides become more amenable to 
conflict resolution, more powerful mediators can enter the negotiations and attempt to 
add the necessary guarantees and enforcement mechanisms to create a peace agreement. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
the Vatican has been criticized for seeking to mediate conflicts in Latin America in ways that protect its 
interests there (Princen 1992a; 1992b) 
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International Organizations as Mediators 
Major international organizations, such as the United Nations, have a great deal of 
prestige in the international system as well as a great number of resources that can be 
brought to bear in guaranteeing the terms of peaceful agreements.  Such organizations are 
thought to be relatively neutral in their approach to conflict resolution, as their reason for 
existence is to facilitate peace in the international system.  However, they are thought to 
be less effective mediators than state actors when success is measured as a full 
settlement. 
The most salient problems that international organizations have as mediators are 
collective action problems.  Because international organizations are comprised of 
sovereign states, members have incentives to try to benefit from the actions of the 
organization, without contributing their own resources to those actions.  As such, 
mediation attempts by international organizations often lack credibility from the 
perspective of guarantees and enforcement, although their ability to provide information 
and transparency may still be greater.  Beyond that, the range of potential mediation 
strategies and conflict resolution outcomes is often limited by strategic bargaining by 
member states through institutional structures, such as the veto power held by permanent 
members of the UN Security Council.   Because the decision to mediate, the mediation 
strategy, and the choice of enforcement and guarantee mechanisms are all political in 
nature, actions that the organization takes are often watered-down after several rounds of 
political compromising.  Thus, member states’ international political goals and concerns 
are likely to limit international organizations from putting their full weight behind peace 
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efforts.  Along these lines, Zartman and Amoo (1992: 131) argue that regional 
organizations “are under pressure to endorse rather than to mediate.”  Thus, while the 
stated goal of the organization might be to preserve peace and security in a region, its 
abilities to do so are subservient to its member states’ political and security goals.  
Accordingly, peace efforts by these international organizations are often cumbersome and 
rarely yield a full settlement of the conflict.   
In a similar vein, the extent to which international organizations can induce 
conflicting parties to make concessions is limited, along with the extent to which they are 
able to provide guarantees and enforcement mechanisms. Unlike in arbitration and 
adjudication, where bias is seen as an obstacle to success, researchers have contended 
that a biased mediator may actually be more likely to engineer a successful conflict 
resolution agreement (Walter 2002, Kydd 2003, Crescenzi, et al. 2012).  For instance, 
Kydd (2003) suggests that the Palestinian Authority was most willing to accept the 
United States as a mediator, despite a clear pro-Israel bias, because of its ability to best 
draw concessions from the Israeli government.  Thus, neutral mediators who do not have 
a clear political stake in the outcome, other than perhaps the universal benefits the 
members of the international system enjoy from increased peace and stability, are less 
able induce the conflicting factions to make peace. 
States as Mediators 
 State actors are thought to occupy a special place in the market for mediators due 
to the characteristic of sovereignty (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Kleiboer 2002; 
Touval 1992; 2003).  Sovereignty, on its face, allows states to overcome the collective 
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action problems that international organizations face when seeking to induce conflicting 
parties to come to a peaceful agreement, and they possess more resources and thus 
greater capabilities to engineer such an agreement.  As such, research has shown that 
powerful states are the most sought after mediators (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000).
24
 
Additionally, the likelihood that states will receive more mediation mandates does not 
increase with a record of mediation successes and states that have policies of neutrality 
are not more commonly involved in mediation than non-neutral states (Bercovitch and 
Schneider 2000).  Therefore, it can be argued that powerful states are most often able to 
engage in mediation because of their unique ability to credibly commit substantial 
amounts of resources and political capital to a mediation attempt.  Similarly, it can be 
argued that because they most often seek to manipulate the disputing parties using 
“carrots and sticks” to create more desirable payoffs, state mediators are ultimately 
attempting to improve their own political standing by mediating.   
 However, because states are political actors and thus their primary motivations 
for using such manipulation are unlikely to be altruistic or humanitarian, it can be said 
that they have their own payoffs for mediating conflict, which exist on different 
dimensions than those of the disputing parties (Kleiboer 2002, Touval 2003, Yuen and 
Werner 2005).  In fact, state actors often seek to engage in mediation, even if it appears 
that an attempt at conflict resolution will be unsuccessful from the outset (Greig 2005; 
Bercovitch 1992).  Along these lines, research shows that manipulated payoffs are likely 
to lead to relapses in violence, because both sides recognize that added resources may 
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 Nation-states accounted for roughly 53% of all mediations for the 1945-1995. 
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help their cause in the long run and give them an opportunity to regroup.  Similarly, they 
argue because the agreement is not brought about “organically,” meaning that neither 
party is ready or willing to agree to terms without outside incentives, it is likely to break 
down (Yuen and Werner 2005).  Further, sustained peace becomes incumbent on the 
mediator, who becomes the guarantor of the agreement and does not necessarily quell 
discord between the two factions (Pruitt 1982).  Such a situation is most visible with the 
Camp David Accords where the large amounts of military aid and military guarantees 
that the US gives to both Israel and Egypt were the keystones of the agreement, and 
without which, no settlement would have been made.  As such, the literature suggests that 
a greater examination of what these political motivations are needs to be done, in order to 
understand why mediators would knowingly mediate conflict in such a way that is 
unlikely to yield peace. 
In order to bring about such an understanding, it should first be noted that 
different types of states are likely to engage in mediation for different reasons.  For 
instance, as I discuss more thoroughly below, power considerations are likely to influence 
strong and weak states differently (Touval and Zartman 1985).  Moreover, democratic 
states engage in mediation a great deal more regularly than do non-democratic states 
(Bercovitch and Schneider 2002).  However, I argue that the common thread behind 
states’ motivations is the domestic standing of political leaders.  For instance, as I outline 
further in the next sections, weaker states often seek to mediate in order to increase their 
international prestige and to open doors to trade agreements, which serves to help the 
incumbent leader’s domestic standing.  In a similar vein, leaders of powerful states seek 
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to use their resources in ways that portray their regimes as competent when dealing with 
key international issues. 
Weak States as Mediators 
 While powerful state actors are the most common mediators, and the USA is most 
common by an overwhelming margin, the occurrence of weaker state mediators may play 
an important role in the conflict resolution dynamic.  Beardsley (2010) argues that 
belligerents will often seek out weaker states as mediators to provide themselves with 
political cover when making concessions.  As discussed above, the making of 
concessions can make a political leader appear weak to his domestic constituency.  
Therefore, by seeking out mediation, the conflicting parties are seeking to manipulate 
their domestic audiences, deflecting some of the negative fallout for making concessions 
onto the mediator and the peace process.   
The weak state mediator benefits from the international prestige that it gains as a 
peacemaker and the leaders thereof demonstrate competence handling difficult 
international problems (Beardsley 2010).  Algeria’s mediation of the Iran Hostage Crisis 
demonstrates several of these aspects of small state mediation (Slim 1992).  Since its 
independence, Algeria struggled to find its own national identity and sought to build 
strong relationships with strategic allies.  By helping to negotiate the hostage crisis, 
Algeria forged a relationship with Iran that enhanced its position in OPEC as well as 
demonstrated to the world and to rank and file Algerians that it was a viable political 
entity on the international stage.  Similarly, the mediation effort worked to improve 
relations between Algeria and the United States, opening several trade doors in the 
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process.  Finally, as a result of the international prestige Algeria gained from successfully 
managing conflict between two international heavyweights, President Chadli Ben Hadid 
bettered his domestic position by demonstrating managerial competence as a leader (Slim 
1992; Tarar 2006). 
Powerful States as Mediators 
Despite the fact that several rationales exist for weak state mediation, it remains 
the exception to the rule.  Powerful state actors are the most common state mediators (the 
USA being most common by an overwhelming margin).
25
  They appeal to conflicting 
parties because of their ability to introduce guarantees and incentives to the conflict 
resolution process and change the landscape of negotiations.  However, strong states 
commonly seek out mediation opportunities, rather than passively wait to be asked to do 
so (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Bercovitch and Fretter 2007).  Such occurrences 
suggest that state actors see the potential for political gain through mediation.  Thus, an 
understanding of how and where these actors expect to see political gains is necessary to 
fully understand whether or not the conflict resolution attempt will actually bring about 
peace and to understand the full dynamic of the conflict resolution process.  
The sum result of these findings suggests that state actors’ primary motivations 
are not resolution of the conflict, but rather some political benefit, whether it is 
international or domestic.  As such, the motivations of the state and its political actors 
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 Bercovitch and Schneider (2000) report that the US mediated without help from other parties 84 times 
for the period 1945-1995, which accounts for roughly 31% of single-state mediation attempts.  Permanent 
members of the UN Security Council account for roughly 42.5% of all single-state mediation attempts.  
However, China does not mediate on its own at all for that data period and the Soviet Union mediates only 
5 times, accounting for less than 2% of all one-state mediations.   
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should be taken into account when assessing the likelihood that mediation will be offered 
and whether or not mediation attempts will be successful (Grieg and Beardsley 2009; 
Touval and Zartman 1985; Touval 1992), and whether or not the agreement reached will 
last (Yuen and Werner 2005).  The question that stems from this broad analysis of state 
actors as mediators is: What political incentives drive states to want to engage in 
mediation?   
Given that powerful states are most adept at using manipulative mediation 
strategies, taken along with research suggesting that manipulative interventions most 
often lead to short-lived agreements, it can be argued that state actors engaging in 
mediation are primarily driven by the political benefits of such a short-term agreement.  
In addition, it suggests that these leaders deem that the resources and effort needed to 
ensure a more durable peace agreement to yield little marginal political benefit.  Because 
state leaders’ primary goal is to stay in power (Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003), which is 
accomplished by compiling a record of policy successes (Neustadt 1960), mediation can 
be characterized as a tool to achieve that end.  Also, because leaders stay in power by 
appealing to a domestic audience, it can be argued that the primary goal of any mediation 
attempt is to impress that domestic audience.
26
  Thus, an understanding of mediation 
within the dynamics of leader decision making is necessary to fully explain its occurrence 
and process. 
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 Due to the lack of mediation attempts by internationally powerful, non-democratic states, such a 
statement can really only be made with regard to a democratic audience.  While leaders of non-democracies 
must satisfy domestic audience, albeit often much smaller, to stay in power (see Bueno de Msequita, et al. 
2003), it is unlikely that mediation or other forms of diplomacy can be used to appeal to such an audience. 
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Mediation as a Foreign Policy Decision 
Those who have examined mediator motivations systematically have argued that 
the decision to mediate occurs within the context of the existing foreign policy landscape 
and have criticized the conflict resolution program for largely ignoring such a fact 
(Touval 2003; Touval and Zartman 1985).  However, to the extent that mediator 
motivations have been tested, examinations have been limited to structural explanations 
of foreign policy, focusing on alliance, economic, and historical ties (Kleiboer 2002; 
Greig and Regan 2008; Touval and Zartman 1985); more importantly, these studies have 
not focused on how domestic political factors affect leader decision making.  Such an 
approach fits well within the Cold War thinking that international relations trumped 
domestic politics and that states acted in the international arena as rational unitary actors 
constantly seeking to increase their security (Waltz 1979).   For instance, Kleiboer (2002) 
suggests that the United States sent Alexander Haig to help mediate the Falklands Crisis 
because conflict between two key Cold War allies, the United Kingdom, a prominent 
NATO ally, and Argentina, an influential member of the Organization of American 
States, threatened its position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.  Using a similar rationale, 
scholars have made several attempts to explain where states are likely to offer their 
services as mediators.  However, in doing so, they overlook key dynamics in the conflict 
resolution process.  Specifically, these explanations have difficulty distilling why we see 
variation in states’ willingness to engage in mediation across time (even within one 
conflict) and why there is variation in the mediation strategies that states employ.   
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While Cold War stability was likely the overarching factor contributing to US 
involvement in the Falklands, inter-bloc armed conflict of this type is rare.  In addition, 
we see a great deal of variation in interest from states in resolving ongoing conflicts over 
time.  For instance, the US has at times committed large amounts of resources to 
resolving the ongoing conflict between Israelis, Palestinians, and the neighboring Arab 
states, including a great deal of the President’s political capital, while at other times, the 
incumbent administration focuses its attention elsewhere.  Such an occurrence suggests 
that a simple state-centric model of mediator motivation is too simple to explain the 
politics behind the decision to focus on conflict resolution. 
Seeking to explain mediation occurrence (and offers) requires a more nuanced 
approach to foreign policy decision making that recognizes that diplomacy is chosen as 
one policy option out of the many that state leaders have at their disposal. And, moreover,   
a calculated decision process takes place in choosing to focus on mediation from this 
range of policy options, which includes domestic and international endeavors.  In recent 
years, the field of international relations and the study of foreign policy have focused on 
political leaders as the key players in decision making.  Specifically, because leaders act 
in both the domestic and international political realms, but are ultimately held 
accountable by a democratic voting audience, foreign policy endeavors are likely to be 
undertaken with their domestic political ramifications in mind.  Similarly, leaders can 
attempt to use foreign policy as a tool to improve their domestic political standing.  Thus, 
not only do international factors influence domestic politics, as neorealism contends, but 
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domestic motivations and constraints influence the way that leaders behave on the 
international scene (Putnam 1988; Gourevitch 1978).   
Theory of Mediator motivations, Political Survival, and Two-level Games 
The concept of two-level games focuses on the notion that domestic politics and 
international politics are linked, but only through certain specific actors, political leaders, 
who function in both areas and make decisions strategically to further their political 
fortunes (Putnam 1988).  Thus, the domestic political landscape is not only driven by 
international factors, such as the distribution of international power, as neorealism claims, 
but also by the domestic political sphere influences international politics.  These domestic 
factors,  such as economic performance, public sentiment and institutional configurations 
(veto players, etc.) and institutional makeups (partisan makeup of the legislature) can 
expand and constrain the number of potential policy options a leader is likely to have 
available to them based on their political goals, the most paramount of which is political 
survival.  As such, political leaders choose policy options from the range of options 
available to them, given domestic and international conditions. 
To fully understand how such constraints are likely to influence mediation 
behavior, it is first important to understand the cognitive calculus leaders are thought to 
perform when making policy choices.  Political leaders are thought to value their political 
survival above all else (Neustadt 1960; Bueno be Mesquita, et al. 2003).  This finding has 
led to an emerging consensus among international relations scholars contending that 
foreign policy, like domestic policy, is aimed at enhancing a leader’s domestic political 
fortunes (e.g., Ostrom and Job, 1986; Morgan and Bickers, 1992; Bueno de Mesquita et 
 48 
 
al., 2003).  Thus, rational political leaders will not select policy options that hinder their 
political fortunes or those of their co-partisans.  Yet, systematic studies of mediator 
motivations, up to this point, have been largely silent as to this possibility.  Additionally, 
the primary methodological approach to studying the motives of mediating parties has 
been the case study (e.g., Touval 2002; 1982; Kleiboer 2009).  Examining the decision to 
engage in mediation systematically, in light of these domestic political conditions, the 
variations in which are likely to change incentives to engage in mediation, will yield a 
more complete understanding of the factors affecting such a decision-making process. 
Diversionary and Political Uses of Foreign Policy 
 The notion that political leaders use international politics to improve their 
domestic political fortunes has been debated at length when it comes to the use of 
military force (see Levy 1989; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Meernik 2001; Fordham 1998; 
Foster 2006; Foster and Palmer 2006; Brulé 2006; Brulé and Hwang 2010; Tarar 2006).  
The academic debate surrounding the political use of force has centered on identifying 
the causal mechanism: What is it about a focus on foreign policy that leaders believe will 
improve their domestic political standing?  Two schools of thought have emerged: the 
rally effects hypothesis and the managerial competence hypothesis, both of which are 
outlined and discussed in the next sections.   
Party Cover 
 The prevailing scholarly sentiment about when leaders choose to focus on foreign 
policy is embodied in Howell and Pevehouse’s (2007) “party cover” conjecture.  Their 
argument contends that the president is likely to focus on foreign policy endeavors when 
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he enjoys broad support in congress, so as to diffuse responsibility for the endeavor 
across branches of government and to keep partisan criticism to a minimum.  Similar 
arguments suggest that presidents do not want to take actions which may later be 
hindered or by congress (Kriner 2006).  Thus, while the president enjoys a great deal of 
autonomy in foreign policy dealings, his actions are not completely unilateral and the 
congress can function as a check on presidential behavior in the foreign policy realm, 
even if it does so in the form of partisan criticism or through ex post measures such as the 
withholding of funding for the president’s agreements.   
 Despite the notion of the president’s needing partisan support to “cover” the 
administration’s actions, several arguments have been made suggesting that domestic 
political conditions, and not necessarily partisan support, create incentives for 
engagement in foreign policy.  Several scholars suggest that foreign policy, especially the 
use of military force, is an appealing policy arena for politically vulnerable leaders 
seeking to better their domestic political standing.  The next sections discuss the 
prevailing arguments in the literature concerning the matter. 
Rally Effects 
The initial explanation for how the use of military force can improve a leader’s 
domestic political standing involves “rally effects.”  The rally effect occurs as result of 
the in-group/out-group dynamic (Simmel 1955), whereby presidents seek to divert 
attention from poor economic performance (James and Oneal 1991) or other domestic 
political woes (such as scandal) by using military force overseas.  Thus, they create 
domestic political cohesion by shifting the focus of their domestic political audience 
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toward a common plight against a foreign adversary—invoking patriotism in the process.  
Research has shown, however, that when these rallies do occur, they are often short-lived 
and small, lasting only 1-2 months (Russett 1990:35) and yielding only a 2-3% increase 
in approval, which ultimately regresses to original levels (Lian and Oneal 1993:283).  
Beyond that, research suggests that the “prudent public” is capable of discerning the 
policy objectives and calculating the potential risks of a use of force; consequently, they 
are unlikely to blindly support the use of force (Jentleson 1992).  In sum, these findings 
call into question the idea that a leader can actively choose to use force overseas in order 
to bolster his domestic approval ratings in an electorally substantive fashion.   
The causal mechanism used to explain rally effects in the diversionary literature is 
an indirect one, which assumes that an increase in patriotic sentiment or domestic 
cohesion translates into approval for the president (Levy 1989).  While this correlation 
likely does exist in the very short term, many uses of force—the fleeting spike in George 
W. Bush’s approval after the 2003 invasion of Iraq, for instance—suggests that 
substantive boosts in presidential approval are more closely tied to policy success, or at 
least the image thereof, than to a public rally in response to the presence of a foreign 
adversary.    
Managerial Competence 
A second explanation for the strategic political use of foreign policy suggests that 
the president’s goal is to use international politics as an arena to demonstrate managerial 
competence when dealing with complex political issues, thus inducing an increase in his 
level of domestic political support (Tarar 2006).  This explanation fits well with the 
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notions of policy availability and policy substitution (see Brulé 2006; Russet 1990; Gelpi 
1997; Marshall and Prins 2011).  Such arguments characterize the president as a rational 
actor using the resources and processes available to his office to engineer the image of 
success, given the institutional constraints he faces.   
The policy availability argument, which is most clearly discussed in terms of the 
American case, specifically takes into account both the level of congressional support 
that the president enjoys, which in turn dictates the policies available to him, as well as 
how he is viewed by the public, either directly, through approval surveys, or indirectly, 
through economic performance.
27
  Presidents must act in response to deteriorating 
domestic conditions in order to maintain credibility as a leader and favor with the 
electorate.  However, they are constrained in the number of policy options available to 
them based on domestic institutional conditions, specifically an opposing Congress.  
Thus, while the passage of domestic legislation is most likely the ideal remedy, under 
such conditions an opposition Congress can act as a veto player on presidential attempts 
to change domestic policy, causing the president to fall out of favor with the public (see 
Mayer 2001, Howell 2005, Tsebelis 1995).   
Research has shown, though, that this opposition alone is insufficient to 
significantly alter presidential behavior (see Foster and Palmer 2006).  However, when 
there is congressional opposition and domestic conditions appear to be particularly poor, 
such as in times of economic decline, presidential action is necessary to maintain 
                                                 
 
27
 My analysis in this project is limited to the United States and its mediation efforts, primarily for reasons 
of manageability.  The US can be characterized as a “most-likely” case, thus somewhat limiting the 
theoretical generalizability of the results.  However, given the prominence of the US a mediator and the 
large proportion that US mediations comprise of all mediation make such a limitation a worthwhile one. 
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credibility as a leader and to help his electoral fortunes and also those of his party.  As a 
result, the President must go outside the domestic policy arena to demonstrate this 
competence (See Brulé 2006).  In these situations, policy choices must be made from the 
range of available policies, which often do not directly address the source of domestic 
discontent but rather substitute opportunities for the president to make policy, build good 
will, and be portrayed positively in the media to the public.  International relations has 
been shown to be a ripe policy area for such substitutions because of the president’s 
relative autonomy in the foreign policy-making process (Howell 2005: 417, Johnson and 
McCormick 1977:117-123, Mayer 2001).   
The managerial competence explanation aligns theories of foreign policy and 
domestic policy motivation.  Like domestic policy, the central goal of foreign policy, 
from the president’s perspective, is to help establish a record of successful policies and 
proposals that reap some domestic political benefit.  Thus, he has incentives to mobilize 
the numerous resources and processes available to his office to achieve that end.  This 
explanation also fits with theories of a “prudent public” and their interpretations of 
presidential action (Jentleson 1992).  Rather than simply diverting attention from 
domestic problems by channeling patriotism, the president attempts to build a record of 
success through foreign policy and thus bolster support for himself domestically.  While 
blind patriotism is likely to wane, a record of policy successes is more likely to help the 
president’s political fortunes over the long term.  Because foreign policy is often highly 
visible and because the president has a great deal of agenda-setting power in that arena 
(see Cohen 1995; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Villalobos and Sirin 2012; Andrade and 
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Young 1996), attention to foreign policy issues is likely to provide him with many 
opportunities for success. 
Policy Availability and Mediation 
In applying this rationale to mediation, I begin with the assumption that presidents 
attempt to establish a record of policies, proposals, and positions that enhance their 
electoral fortunes or those of their party (e.g., Neustadt 1960; Bond and Fleisher 1990; 
Richards, et al. 1993).  When poor domestic circumstances arise, the president proposes 
remedial policies in an effort to curtail potential voter dissatisfaction.  If a president 
succeeds in implementing policies that are credited with alleviating the problem, the 
success of his legislative initiatives may contribute to his reputation as a skilled leader. In 
addition, partisan support for the president in congress is likely to provide “cover” for 
policy initiatives by diffusing responsibility for endeavors.  The presence of an 
uncooperative Congress, however, reduces the number of remedial policies available 
(Bond and Fleisher 1990), compelling the president to look beyond the domestic arena 
for opportunities to demonstrate his competence (Richards, et al. 1993).  This greater 
focus on foreign policy issues and the international arena increases the likelihood that the 
president pursues mediation during periods of domestic hardship and congressional 
opposition.   
When an opposition Congress prevents the president from directly addressing 
poor economic performance, the president may concentrate on problems that either do 
not require the cooperation of Congress, or issues that transcend partisan and ideological 
lines.  Success in addressing these types of issues may indicate to the public that the 
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president is an adept manager of national problems (Richards, et al. 1993).  The 
president’s de facto ascendancy in foreign policy provides an obvious stage for such 
demonstrations (see e.g., Hinckley 1994; Meernik 1994; Howell and Pevehouse 2005).   
In this regard, the president may focus intently on international affairs, taking 
positions and offering solutions for international dilemmas.  Because foreign policy 
issues frequently transcend partisan and ideological lines (e.g., Stoll 1987; Schultz 2001), 
a legislative opposition may be unwilling or unable to block foreign policy proposals in 
the same manner as they oppose the executive’s socio-economic policy initiatives.  
Consequently, presidents should have a greater capacity to affect foreign policy than 
social or economic policy.  In the context of international mediation, such capacity 
translates into greater credibility the president or his surrogates, increasing the likelihood 
that a mediation offer is accepted and ultimately, successful.   
Mediation as an Appealing Policy Option 
In positing this argument, it is important to note the unique characteristics that 
mediation has as a policy option that set it apart from others, and traits that are likely to 
make it appealing to leaders seeking to use foreign policy to improve their domestic 
political standing.  
The literature on policy substitutions suggests that foreign policy substitution is 
possible, largely because the president enjoys a greater amount of latitude when it comes 
to such issues (Most and Starr 1984; Howell 2005, Johnson and McCormick 1977; Mayer 
2001).  Much of the empirical literature on this substitution effect has used the political 
use of force as the primary dependent variable.  However, the theoretical argument can be 
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made that when faced with the domestic conditions of a worsening economy and 
congressional opposition, mediation should be an attractive policy for US Presidents due 
to the number of opportunities that such engagement provides for speeches, photo 
opportunities, and other outlets to build the image of being competent, as well as the 
chance to successfully create policy without the check of the opposing Congress.   
Because the President is also constrained by the sentiments of potential voters, 
mediation should be attractive due to its low audience cost (see Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 
2003).  While the political use of force overseas has a higher potential audience cost 
because of the chance that lives will be lost, because other states in the system might be 
angered, or because the overall campaign will be billed as a loss, mediation, which is 
non-coercive, is relatively costless because it leaves the ultimate decision-making power 
in the hands of the disputing parties.  Furthermore, the use of mediation as substitute for 
domestic policy under such conditions reconciles the policy availability argument with 
notion of strategic conflict avoidance, a critique of the diversionary use of force 
hypothesis.  The strategic conflict avoidance theory contends that leaders in foreign states 
act strategically in response to the domestic conditions that face a US President.  Because 
leaders know that a US President is likely to be more risk-accepting when faced with 
domestic opposition, coupled with the argument that democratic states are unlikely to 
lose conflicts that the initiate, they are less likely to make provocative statements or 
otherwise induce conflict (see Fordham 1998; Ostrom and Job 1986; James and Oneal 
1991; Maoz and Russett 1993).  Therefore, while an argument has been made that the use 
of force is less likely to be an available policy for the President when facing domestic 
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opposition, mediation will still be an available option due to its non-binding, non-violent 
nature. 
Additionally, the range of possible outcomes for a mediation effort is greater than 
those for the use of military force.  While military endeavors are most often portrayed as 
wins and losses, or successful and unsuccessful missions, diplomatic endeavors have 
many more “in-between” outcomes, all of which can potentially frame the president as a 
competent manager of complex political issues, if not be framed a policy win.  Thus, 
engaging in military force, especially where victory, or more often “success” is not 
assured, is a risky proposition for leaders even if it may have some political payoffs.  As 
previously discussed, most mediation efforts are unsuccessful, meaning no negotiated 
settlement occurs.  However, given that an overwhelming proportion of mediation offers 
are accepted (90%), it is plausible that the mere ability to get two disputing factions to 
come together for peace talks can be framed as a policy success for a leader.  Similarly, 
the ability to broker a cease-fire or partial settlement can be portrayed as a policy success 
as the result of a competent leader.  Because, mediation is so often unsuccessful, it can be 
characterized as a difficult endeavor requiring a competent manager. Such a 
characteristic, which, unlike the use of force in many cases, satisfies Tarar’s (2005) 
contention that diversionary endeavors will only lead to improved domestic standing for 
leaders if the public recognizes them as sufficiently difficult.  
While mediation has not been directly tested, scholarly evidence shows that the 
American public regularly rallies in support of peace-oriented foreign policy (Page and 
Shapiro 1992; Brace and Hinckley 1992), suggesting that there are political incentives for 
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mediation by US Presidents.  Additionally, the practice of acting “dovish” in foreign 
policy in order to bolster domestic approval has been employed by several 
administrations in the post-World War II period (Burbach 2004).  For example, Dwight 
Eisenhower’s administration sought to position him as a peacemaker at the conclusion of 
the Korean War, and, to that end, he was vocal in calling for an improvement in US-
Soviet relations.  In this regard, he engaged in a high-profile meeting with Nikita 
Khrushchev as the 1960 elections neared, in order to improve the prospects of Republican 
candidates, despite Eisenhower’s being a lame duck (Hughes 1962:106-117, Adams 
1961).  Similarly, Lyndon Johnson consciously sought to appear as a peacemaker in in 
1968, halting strategic bombings of Vietnam in the lead-up to elections.  Even Richard 
Nixon, perhaps the most visible proponent of US operations in Vietnam, attempted to 
appear dovish, timing troop withdrawals to maintain public support (see Burbach 2004).   
When taken in consideration with the risks associated with the use of force, third-
party mediation should be attractive to presidents.  Unlike the use of force, mediation has 
less potential to be a politically expensive policy choice because it incurs few costs up 
front and does not ultimately bear many of the costs of failure.  Mediating an overseas 
dispute not only lacks the potential for violent loss of life associated with military force, 
it also requires a minimum commitment of resources and political capital from the 
mediator at the outset, which in turn minimizes the risk that he must accept in attempting 
to extract a political benefit.  Failure to succeed is also less likely to negatively affect a 
president’s fortunes.  As was seen in the case of the Iran Hostage Crisis, where the failure 
of a military operation negatively affected President Jimmy Carter’s domestic standing 
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and chance of re-election, failure in the use of force is likely to have dire consequences 
for a president.  As a mediator, however, a president has less to lose.  Should a president 
deem that mediation of a particular conflict will not yield the previously expected 
political benefits, or, if negotiations should break down, he can walk away having 
committed very few resources to the process.  In cases where talks break down, the 
president can deflect much of the criticism for such a failure onto the conflicting parties, 
especially in cases where he sought to manipulate the payoffs with significant 
concessions or guarantees to one or both sides.  Moreover, a presidential administration 
can claim victory, without having to share the credit with Congress, as the administration 
has a monopoly on formal foreign policy proceedings undertaken on behalf of the state.  
As a result, acting as a mediator is lower-risk policy option than the use of military force 
for leaders seeking to use foreign policy to demonstrate their competence as a leader to a 
domestic audience.  
Models of Media and the Presidency 
In addition to mediation’s unique characteristics, leaders, such as the US 
president, have the ability to ensure that mediation attempts are sufficiently high-profile, 
so as to yield a positive through manipulation of information in the media.  The 
presidency carries with it significant national prestige in the form of a high level of media 
attention, which the president can seek to manipulate for his political benefit and that of 
his party (Bennett 1990, Altheide and Snow 1991, Bennett, et al. 2007).  This attention is 
primarily focused on the actions of the president himself, but a disproportionate amount 
of media attention is also focused on his high-level surrogates—such as the vice 
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president, cabinet secretaries, and special envoys—who are tasked by the president with 
representing the US in negotiating foreign policy issues requiring specific attention and 
expertise.  A prominent explanation of the asymmetrical coverage of high level 
government officials is Bennett’s (1990) indexing hypothesis.  According to this 
argument, the media relies upon the volume of reports, press conferences, sound bites, 
and other media moments provided by the president, his staff, and other components of 
government for a consistent supply of news.  Such reliance, married with the numerous 
resources that the president has to craft his message and image, creates news that 
primarily serves to generate support for the government’s position.   
In applying this framework to mediation, it appears as though the president and 
his high-level surrogates have a great deal of power to manipulate the manner in which 
they are depicted to the public via the media.  Third-party mediation is highly visible in 
the media when conducted by high-level officials (Burbach 2004).
28
  Therefore, when 
mediation is attempted and is likely to be successful, or to at least project the image of 
success, it is probable that the president will play a key role in the process in order to 
magnify the political benefits to be extracted as a result of a high level of media 
attention.
29
  Likewise, high-level officials will likely serve as mediators when success is 
still probable, but not in cases where the administration expects little marginal benefit to 
                                                 
 
28
 Burbach’s data collection of New York Times articles pertaining to US mediations showed 20 front page 
stories pertaining on Kissinger’s 1974 “shuttle diplomacy,” 11 on the Dayton meeting to end hostilities in 
Bosnia in 1995, and 15 on Clinton’s Wye River conference in 1998. 
29
 Perhaps the clearest demonstration of a president’s involvement increasing the political salience and 
media coverage of a mediation event is President Bill Clinton’s role at the signing of the Oslo Accords in 
1993.  Although he was not directly involved in the mediation process, the signing ceremony on the White 
House lawn and his image shaking hands with Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat increased the Accords’ 
visibility immensely and portrayed Clinton in a positive light as a peacemaker. 
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direct presidential involvement.  In contrast, by employing lower level diplomats and 
officials to deal with the latter, the president can attempt to avoid policy issues that are 
not expected to generate political capital, could be potentially damaging, or could be 
disproportionately costly.  By avoiding these pitfalls, the president can shift his policy 
focus, and thus media coverage, to areas and issues where he is likely to be more 
successful.  Additionally, low-level officials can be employed in diplomacy to pay “lip 
service” to certain domestic constituencies who have an interest in some foreign policy 
outcome without occupying an inordinate number of the administration’s resources.  
Coupled with mediation’s minimal risk, especially relative to other available policy 
options, the president’s capacity to manipulate the news to project an image of success—
along with the high level of media attention paid to presidential actions—suggests that an 
administration can expect to see political gains from engagement in mediation. 
Findings in the Mediation Literature Suggesting Strategic Mediation 
Mediator motivation is an aspect of the diplomatic process that has been largely 
unaddressed in the academic literature, despite theoretical and empirical evidence that 
suggests that mediators are motivated by more than the altruism associated with 
peacefully resolving a conflict (see e.g. Touval 2001, Kleiboer 2002).  Some scholars 
have criticized the mediation research program for its lack of theoretical integration with 
the foreign policy literature (see Touval 2003), but little work has been done to reconcile 
the two.  Because mediation is a voluntary, non-binding form of conflict resolution, the 
study of mediation has fallen under the greater normative auspices of conflict resolution 
and therefore focused primarily on the sources of mediation success (Touval 2003).  As 
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previously discussed, scholars have often made the assumption that mediators are 
motivated primarily by conflict resolution, and the many factors thought to contribute to 
foreign policy motivations are not examined.  Although several scholars note that 
mediation should not be seen as a purely altruistic enterprise (Bercovitch 2002, Kleiboer 
2002) and that mediators have their own set of payoffs separate from those of the 
conflicting parties (Touval 1992, Princen 1992), these propositions have rarely been 
included in empirical tests.  Instead, policy prescriptions in the form of systematically 
collected conclusions about peacefully resolving conflicts have dominated the mediation 
research program.  
Where mediator motivation has been addressed, it has been explained in terms of 
structure level factors such as alliance ties (Bobrow 1981, Kleiboer 2002) or economic 
and historical ties (Grieg and Regan 2008), and mediators have been coded as 
unchanging in their capabilities and resolve toward mediation success.  However, if 
mediation is to be considered an instrument/tool of foreign policy, then the factors 
driving leaders to engage in mediation should be taken into account when examining 
outcomes.  Because of this strong consensus emerging in the foreign policy literature 
contending that leaders use foreign policy to enhance their own domestic political 
fortunes (and those of their party), structural and/or liberal explanations alone are not 
sufficient to explain leaders’ foreign policy behavior (Ostrom and Job 1986; Bueno de 
Mesquita et al. 2003).  These conclusions have primarily been tested in studies that 
examine the use of force (see Brulé 2006; Marshall and Prins 2011; Foster and Palmer 
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2006), although their theoretical underpinnings suggest an application to the entire range 
of foreign policy options available to presidents.   
Despite the lack of focus on mediator motivations, there are several findings in 
the mediation literature that highlight the discrepancy between mediators’ goals and those 
of the belligerent parties in a conflict and thus indirectly suggest that mediators are using 
mediation as a tool to sure up their domestic political standing.  First, mediators are the 
most common initiators of the mediation process, responsible for initiating roughly 50% 
of all mediations (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000; Bercovitch and Fretter 2007).  Such 
activity on the part of leaders suggests that there is some political benefit to be gained by 
such action, especially given the primacy of political survival in leader’s decision 
calculus.  Additionally, mediators are most likely to intervene in a conflict when it is 
most hostile, and thus when the belligerent parties are least likely to be amenable to 
mediation (Greig 2005).  However, overseas conflicts are most visible to the media and to 
voters at times when they are most hostile.  By offering to mediate at such times, state 
leaders can be argued to be focusing primarily on the potential domestic benefits that can 
be gained through attempting conflict management and less on a long-term, durable 
peace agreement, the political benefits of which are likely more diffuse. 
Beyond these considerations, conflicts in which mediators have used their power 
and resources to manipulate the belligerents’ payoffs under a conflict resolution scheme 
are likely to experience relapses in violence (Yuen and Werner 2005).  Such a finding 
suggests that manipulative mediation strategies, which powerful state mediators are most 
adept at using, are sufficient for inducing a short-term settlement, but not sufficient for 
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effectively guaranteeing long-term peace.  Such a solution is likely politically beneficial 
to the mediator, who has incentives to focus on much shorter political horizons (those of 
the election cycle and domestic politics) than the belligerents, who have incentives to 
focus on the longer-term.   
Similarly, Pruitt (1981) highlights the problems likely to stem from such mediator 
behavior in his analysis of Henry Kissinger’s work in the Middle East.  He argues that 
because Kissinger, and later President Jimmy Carter, used the US’s resources to 
compensate both the Israelis and the Egyptians, they complicated the conflict resolution 
process.  By compensating both sides for making concessions, the mediator assumes 
more responsibility for conflict resolution and each of the disputants gains incentives to 
try to improve their lot vis-à-vis the third party.  These findings, taken together, suggest 
that mediators choose to become involved in conflict management efforts at times when 
conflicts are most visible to their respective domestic audiences, and that they use their 
many resources to induce a peaceful settlement, despite the fact that the mediation’s 
timing and the orientation of the disputants are likely to preclude, or, at least complicate, 
a successful agreement over the long term.  In sum, these findings point the act of 
mediation as a political one, most likely focused on its domestic political impact, rather 
than long term peace.  
Implications of the Literature and Theory 
This discussion of mediation, diversion, and foreign policy decision making 
suggests that several previously un-tested domestic factors play a role in the decision to 
seek out and engage in mediation.  By integrating the conflict resolution literature with 
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the mainstream foreign policy literature, one can argue that presidents have incentives to 
use mediation in response to poor domestic performance, such as declining economic 
performance and declining approval ratings as a result of scandal, policy failure, etc., 
especially when the presence of an opposing Congress makes the passage of domestic 
legislation that directly addresses such problems difficult.  It can also be argued that 
because leaders’ primary objective is political survival, that election proximity increases 
these incentives, as well.   
Such conclusions lead me to posit the following general hypothesis at the 
conceptual level:  
When confronted with an opposition legislature and domestic vulnerability,  
leaders should be seen engaging in mediation behavior which is likely to help 
improve their domestic standing.  
 
Concrete, testable hypotheses stemming from this general conjecture are discussed in the 
proceeding paragraphs. 
Research on the economy, approval ratings, and voting suggest that voters 
evaluate incumbents based on recent and current economic conditions as well as future 
prospects of success for recent and proposed economic policies (e.g., Norpoth, 1996; 
Clarke and Stewart, 1994; MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson, 1992; Fiorina 1981).  Voter 
dissatisfaction with the economy due to sluggish growth, or higher than expected 
unemployment or inflation, decreases incumbent parties’ vote share (Palmer and Whitten 
2000).  The need to show managerial competence provides leaders with incentives to 
pursue foreign policy in an effort to reverse declining approval ratings (Tarar 2006; 
DeRouen 1995; Morgan and Bickers 1992) or to divert attention from deteriorating 
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economic conditions (e.g., Fordham 1998; Hess and Orphanides 1995).  In other words, 
democratic leaders can make trade-offs between economic performance and foreign 
policy in their quest for votes (e.g., Gelpi 1997; Miller 1995).  When the economy is 
performing poorly, leaders expect electoral punishment; but foreign policy success may 
reverse the leader’s dire political prospects if voters reward the leadership for competence 
in foreign affairs (e.g., Richards, et al. 1993).  Thus, I posit the following testable 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a: Presidents are more likely to engage in mediations in response to 
poor economic performance when confronted with an opposition legislature. 
 
Because the president and his high-level deputies command a disproportionate 
level of media attention, the rank of the mediator employed should increase in such 
situations: 
Hypothesis 1b: Presidents are likely to dispatch higher ranked mediators in 
response to poor economic performance when confronted with an opposition 
legislature. 
 In addition to these domestic political factors influencing the occurrence of 
mediation, and who mediates, they are also likely to affect the way that mediation is 
carried out.  For instance, I have argued at some length that leaders are likely to try to 
manipulate the payoffs for one or both conflicting parties in order to induce a peaceful 
agreement to end hostilities, but also to do so in a way that leads to short term boosts in 
their own prestige and credibility:   
Hypothesis 1c: Presidents are likely to employ manipulative mediation strategies 
in response to poor economic performance when confronted with an opposition 
legislature. 
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Mediation should also be an attractive policy for a president to pursue when faced 
with declining approval and a hostile opposing Congress, due to the fact that it is a less 
costly than other options available to him.  Mediation can be a high profile endeavor that 
gives a president exclusive media attention where Congress is largely absent.  Thus, it is 
an opportunity for the president and other high ranking officials within the executive 
branch to appear competent as leaders and who are working toward policy success in 
difficult or important policy areas.  Such a rationale suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2a: Presidents are more likely to engage in mediations in response to 
low approval when confronted with an opposition legislature.   
 
In a parallel argument to that above, the president and his high-level deputies 
command a disproportionate level of media attention.  Because of this high level of 
media coveragethe rank of the mediator employed should increase in situations where 
declining approval and a hostile legislature necessitate a policy success through foreign 
policy: 
Hypothesis 2b: Presidents are likely to dispatch higher ranked mediators in 
response to poor economic performance when confronted with an opposition 
legislature. 
Leaders also have incentives to manipulate in mediation when they face low 
levels of approval and an opposition legislature, which limit their ability to move 
domestic legislation: 
Hypothesis 2c: Presidents are likely to employ manipulative mediation strategies 
in response to low approval when confronted with an opposition legislature. 
  
Due to the need for political survival, mediation is also likely to be seen as a 
policy option when nearing elections necessitate policy victories.  The primary avenue 
through which the president should seek to build a record of policy successes is moving 
 67 
 
domestic legislation (Neustadt 1960; Bond and Fleisher 1990; Richards, et al. 1993).  
However, as previously discussed, an opposition Congress can make the passage of 
legislation to such ends difficult (Mayer 2001; Howell and Pevehouse 2005).  In these 
cases, the president should be seen addressing those issues which do not require 
congressional cooperation.   
A similar vulnerability is built into the political structure in the form of elections.  
Similar to declining domestic performance, impending elections make presidents 
vulnerable in that there is an increased focus on their behavior and thus a greater need for 
policy success.  Such a perspective is supported by the literature that suggests leaders are 
less likely to use military force as the chances that they will be removed from office 
increase (Chiozza and Goemans 2003; 2011; Gaubatz 1991; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003).  Nearing elections create a situation where that scenario is more likely.  Thus, 
when confronted with both an opposition congress, which is likely to make the passage of 
domestic legislation difficult, and an upcoming election, presidents have incentives to 
focus on foreign policy to build this desired record of success. 
Because presidents who use force as elections near are likely to be punished by 
voters, they generally use military force early in their tenures (Gaubatz 1991).  Thus, in 
situations where domestic policy avenues are largely unavailable to the president, yet 
nearing elections create a need for high-profile policy successes, mediating overseas 
conflicts should be an attractive policy outlet.  Because mediation is both high-profile and 
low-risk, relative to other available policy options, a high payoff for a presidential 
administration is likely:  
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Hypothesis 3a: Presidents are more likely to engage in mediations as elections 
near when confronted with an opposition legislature. 
 
As I argued with regard to economic performance and approval, because the 
president and his high-level deputies command a disproportionate level of media 
attention, the rank of the mediator employed should increase in such situations where a 
hostile legislature makes passing domestic policy difficult: 
Hypothesis 3b: Presidents are likely to dispatch higher ranked mediators in 
response to nearing elections when confronted with an opposition legislature. 
 
Leaders also have incentives to manipulate in mediation when they confront 
nearing elections and an opposition legislature, which limits their ability to move 
domestic legislation: 
Hypothesis 3c: Presidents are likely to employ manipulative mediation strategies  
as elections near when confronted with an opposition legislature. 
  
 Each of these three sets of hypotheses suggests how presidential administrations 
should act when confronted with domestic vulnerability that is best remedied through a 
series of policy successes, but legislative institutional configurations make the passage of 
domestic policy difficult or, at least, inefficient and cumbersome.  Such conditions 
suggest that the president believes that he and his administration are likely to make 
political gains as a result of engaging in mediation.  Thus, understanding the extent to 
which presidents actually benefit from such engagement is a key next step in 
understanding the dynamics of how domestic concerns drive mediator/mediation 
behavior.  Because it has been argued that presidents use mediation endeavors to better 
their political fortunes, an increase in presidential approval should be seen as a result of 
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mediation occurrence.  Additionally, increases in mediator rank and manipulative 
strategies should result in increases in presidential approval:  
Hypothesis 4a: An increase in the highest rank of mediator employed in a given 
quarter will result in an increase in presidential approval rating in the subsequent 
quarter. 
 
Hypothesis 4b:  As the public’s attentiveness to foreign policy increases, the 
positive effect of a mediator’s rank on presidential approval should also increase. 
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Chapter 3: Data and Research Design 
 
In this chapter, I outline the theoretical and practical aspects of my research 
design and discuss my reasons for using particular research techniques.  First, I discuss 
my rationale for limiting my investigation to US mediations, as a starting point in the 
analysis of how mediation is driven by domestic political factors.  Secondly, I discuss the 
structure of the proceeding empirical chapters.  Then, I discuss the International Conflict 
Management Dataset broadly, pointing out several of its strengths and weaknesses for 
this type of analysis.  Next, I describe the key dependent variables that I use to test the 
propositions I have made about leader behavior in light of domestic political conditions.  
From that point, I discuss the key independent variables that I argue are responsible for 
driving the relationships that should be seen, the controls that I use and the estimation 
techniques that I use and how the results should be interpreted. 
In order to test the theoretical propositions that I outline in the previous chapter, 
large-N quantitative methods are most appropriate. Because the goal is to make 
theoretical generalizations about the relationship between domestic politics, leader 
decision making, and foreign policy behavior, such techniques can help to explain real-
world events across time and presidential administration, rather than at one single point in 
time or in one case.  Because there is a large literature suggesting that foreign policy is 
substitutable, meaning that several policy avenues can be pursued to yield a desired 
domestic outcome (Most and Starr 1984; Reed and Clark 2005), I specify models similar 
to those used to test the influence of domestic politics on the decision to use military 
force.  After making this argument, I go further to test whether such behavior has 
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substantive effects on leaders’ popularity, which should help their domestic political 
fortunes.   
Case Selection 
In this dissertation, I examine the decision to mediate in light of the policy 
availability argument for cases of US mediation behavior from 1945-1995.  The decision 
to limit my analysis to the US case is largely based on matters of practicality and 
feasibility.  However, there are some theoretically driven reasons for doing so as well, 
which I discuss below.   
Pzeworski and Tuene (1970) famously argued that theory construction in the 
social sciences should be conducted in such a way that proper names can be removed 
from discussions, as they should apply to categories of phenomena, not just single cases.  
Similarly it has been (Sartori 1970; Verba 1967) argued that theories should have 
“travel,” meaning that they should be sufficiently generalizable to apply to similar 
situations occurring in different places and times.  As such, limiting the analysis to US 
mediation behavior somewhat limits the extent to which empirical results support a more 
general theory.  However, given that the ultimate goal of studying mediation processes is 
to better understand how to peacefully resolve conflict and that the United States engages 
in an overwhelming proportion of international conflict mediation attempts (Bercovitch 
and Schneider 2000), limiting analysis to just US cases for practical matters does not 
necessarily hinder the attainment of such a goal. 
As previously mentioned, practicality plays a large part in the decision to limit the 
analysis to one country.  The ICM dataset was originally conceived to construct theories 
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about the factors contributing to mediation success.  As such, variables concerning 
mediator identity were coded primarily by category, rather by individual or state.
30
  
Information about the individuals’ identities and affiliations is contained in an appendix 
and is not part of the main dataset.  In turn, a great deal of energy must be put in to 
coding mediator involvement, identities, ranks, etc.  Limiting the analysis to the US 
makes such a study more feasible, while producing results that shed light on the 
plausibility that these relationships may exist across states, or, at the very least, across 
powerful states.  Ideally a more comprehensive examination of the relationship between 
domestic politics and diplomacy can be undertaken in the future. 
The policy availability argument, as posited, rests heavily on the interplay 
between Congress and the president peculiar to the United States’ case.  In the US, the 
president has a disproportionate amount of unchecked formal power in the conduct of 
foreign policy, relative to domestic policy.  Congress is thought to be a veto player on 
presidential action; although this is an ex post veto when it comes to matters of foreign 
policy (Schultz 2001).  However, in several states, especially those employing 
parliamentary systems, the executive and the legislature are more directly linked and 
therefore a more unified decision-making process occurs.  Thus, the incentives for and 
constraints on foreign policy behavior for domestic gains are not as clearly defined 
(Tsebelis 1999).
31
  This difference in institutional structures has led to several studies that 
                                                 
 
30For instance, the ICM codes “functional mediator identity,” which codes individual mediators as “leader 
of a powerful state,” “representative of a powerful state,” “leader of a weak state,” “representative of a 
weak state,” “representative of an international organization,” etc. 
31
 Some scholars have argued that a similar relationship exists in parliamentary governments with minority 
coalitions (Brulé and Williams 2009; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004; Prins and Sprecher 1999).  
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have taken similar approaches, whereby only the US is examined (see Ostrom and 
Job1986; Brule 2006; Foster 2006) or only parliamentary systems are considered (Prins 
and Sprecher 1999; Palmer, London, and Regan 2004) and relatively few studies (see 
Brulé and Williams 2009) address both government types at once.  So, while limiting 
analysis to cases of mediation within a single state might limit the extent to which 
theoretical generalizations across states can be made from the results, it does not 
invalidate the research. 
Structure of Empirical Chapters 
 In Chapter 2, I posited three sets of hypotheses, each of which implies a 
relationship between domestic politics and mediation behavior.  I test and report each set 
of hypotheses in a separate empirical chapter.  Chapter 4 tests hypotheses 1a, 1b, and1c, 
as well as hypotheses 2a, 2b, and, 2c.  I chose to report these results together because 
they both focus on how measures of the president’s domestic performance and the 
makeup of Congress affect his decision making process.  Hypotheses 3a, 3b, and 3c, all 
of which deal with the election cycle and decisions to engage in mediation, are tested and 
discussed in Chapter 5.  Hypotheses 4a and 4b, which focus on the extent to which 
engagement in mediation helps to improve a president’s domestic standing, are tested and 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
 My reason for structuring the empirical results in these three chapters is to present 
three theoretically related models that are theoretically supported and empirically 
plausible, rather than presenting a single model that has three parts.  As, such the 
variables used as explanatory variables in one chapter are dependent variables in another. 
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Because this is a relatively new avenue of research, especially with regard to mediation, 
the goal is to present arguments that confirm the relationship between domestic and 
international politics.  Ideally, it paves the way for further, more refined research that can 
specify the model more precisely, both in terms of theory and methodology.   
Data 
The International Conflict Management Dataset 
The primary source of data on conflict resolution behavior is Jacob Bercovitch’s 
International Conflict Management (ICM) dataset, which contains information about 
mediation and other types of conflict management from 1945-1995.  Additionally, I 
introduce several independent variables commonly used in the foreign policy and linkage 
politics literatures to measure how domestic politics is likely to influence leader behavior 
in the international sphere.
32
  In this chapter, I begin by discussing my rationale for 
examining US mediation behavior.
 33
  Then, I continue by describing the data and then 
discuss my rationale for using such data in detail.  From these discussions, I posit three 
sets of concrete, testable hypotheses (each to be analyzed in a subsequent chapter) about 
the relationships that should be observed, and then, finally discuss the statistical 
techniques that I use to test them and how the results should be interpreted.  
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 These variables include data on economic performance, presidential approval, the partisan composition 
of Congress, the president’s ability to pass legislation, and the public’s attentiveness to foreign policy.   
33
 I purposely use the term “mediation behavior” to describe not only the offer/occurrence of mediation, but 
also the strategy employed, official(s) sent, etc. which are likely to be calculated political decisions based 
on the expected utility of such choices.  
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 The International Conflict Management dataset observes conflict management 
attempts in conflicts from 1945-1995, with data collected from several sources.
34
  It 
contains data about the nature of the conflict, the belligerent parties, and the conflict 
management environment, including mediators.  The dataset has several characteristics 
that make it especially good for testing propositions about the effect of domestic politics 
on mediation behavior.  First, it focuses on process.  Bercovitch (1986) developed his 
contingency framework of mediation process, which identifies roughly 50 variables that 
may affect mediation outcomes (Bercovitch and Fretter 2007). While some datasets, such 
as the International Conflict Behavior (ICB) dataset, choose to focus on the conflict as 
the level of analysis (see Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000), the ICM dataset allows scholars 
to look at mediation from the perspective of the mediator, as well as the conflict, and thus 
the perspective of two-level decision making.  Similarly, the ICM dataset examines 
mediation behavior in both international and civil conflicts at the same time.  Such a data 
structure allows for the testing of hypotheses concerning a leader’s decision calculus and 
not merely characteristics of the conflict environment. 
 In addition to having the appropriate focus of data, the ICM dataset also draws 
from a broader set of conflicts, including inter-state and intra-state conflicts in the same 
dataset.  Bercovitch and Fretter (2007; 148) define a conflict as “an organized and 
continuous militarized conflict, or the demonstration of intention to use military force by 
at least one state.”  This characteristic, which differs from both the ICB and Militarized 
Interstate Disputes (MID) datasets, recognizes that, from the perspective of the mediator, 
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 A table listing the data sources is published in Bercovitch and Fretter’s (2007) International Negotiation 
article outlining the dataset on pp. 150-151.   
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decisions of when and where to engage in mediation are likely to be similar across 
conflict type.  While research has shown that civil conflicts are more difficult to mediate 
than international conflicts (see Melin and Svensson 2009), the tools that mediators have 
at their disposal in each case are the same.  Beyond that, excluding one type of conflict or 
the other introduces unnecessary selection bias, and interferes with the ability to test 
hypotheses pertaining to leaders’ decision making, as mediation in one type of conflict 
may preclude or otherwise influence the decision to mediate elsewhere.
35
 
 Additionally, the dataset has a lower threshold for an incident to be considered a 
conflict, than several other datasets coding international conflict events.  As such, no 
minimum threshold for fatalities is used (Bercovitch and Fretter 2007: 153).  This 
characteristic allows the examination of “conflict” where the resort to violence has not 
yet happened in addition to occasions where it has.  Such a differentiation recognizes that 
all political “conflict” begins as some political disagreement and escalates through 
various levels of animosity and violence—the highest of which is war—but also that 
there is at least some potential for mediation at all levels (Dixon 1996; 656).   
 From such a framework, descriptive data were collected and coded with the 
conflict management attempt being the primary unit of analysis.
36
  The data are divided 
into three primary subgroups, conflict management variables, party variables, and dispute 
variables.  Conflict management variables deal with the conflict management process, 
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 Bercovitch and Fretter (2007) outline their rationale for including both inter-state and intra-state conflicts 
in the same analysis on pp154-155.  Their reasons include the goal of establishing data that lead to broad 
and generalizable analyses about conflict management.  Thus, a wide number of conflicts that vary in terms 
size/power of actors, international power structure, etc. are considered.  
36
 Each “line” of data in the original dataset is a conflict management attempt. 
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including what type of mediator was involved, the strategies they employed, etc.  Party 
variables describe characteristics of and relationships between the disputing parties. 
Dispute variables describe the nature of the dispute.  
As Bercovitch and Fretter note in their 2007 article outlining and discussing the 
merits of the ICM dataset, analysis is largely limited to formal mediations and offers 
thereof.  Due to the sometimes secretive nature of foreign policy, the number of 
mediations offered, but never accepted may be somewhat under-determined.  Along these 
lines, it could be argued that there was more or less a standing offer from the Clinton 
administration to mediate between Israelis and Palestinians during his second term.  
Therefore, the data may be somewhat skewed, leaving out offers of mediation.   
My analysis focuses on how constraints and incentives created by domestic 
politics influence the occurrence and strategy of mediation.  Because these constraints 
and incentives vary over time, using times-series analytical techniques are necessary.  
Thus, I create a time-series of quarterly observations from 1945-1995 from which to 
analyze the variation in US mediation behavior.
37
  Additionally, in order to test the 
hypotheses, I create three new dependent variables which measure US mediation 
behavior.  I discuss these variables below and test this behavior in Chapters 4 and 5.  
Finally, because I argue that engagement in mediation should help a president’s domestic 
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 Of the 227 US mediation attempts over the data period, only 6 last 3 months (1 quarter year) or longer.  
Consequently, the quarter is the most appropriate division of time to analyze.  Because most mediation 
attempts last less than 1 quarter, it is most likely that quarterly measures of the key explanatory variables 
and controls will most validly influence the dependent variables within time period.  For methodological 
reasons, some independent variables are lagged to ensure temporal precedence to the dependent variable.  
The rationale for such a decision is discussed later in this chapter. 
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political fortunes, I test how engagement in mediation influences presidential approval in 
chapter 6.   
Dependent Variables for Chapters 4 and 5 
 Because Bercovitch’s dataset attempts to make broadly applicable conclusions 
about mediation processes, the specific identities of mediators are relegated to an 
appendix for reference.  General categories, such as “leader of a powerful state” are 
created in order to measure mediator characteristics.  However, because my analysis 
focuses on how domestic independent variables influence a state’s international conflict 
management behavior, dependent variables must capture the state’s involvement in 
conflict management.  Accordingly, I use the information from Appendix 2 to create 
three new dependent variables, which I use to test hypotheses sets 1-3: US Mediations, 
US Mediator Rank, and US Mediation Strategy, which are described in greater detail in 
the next three sections.   
US Mediations 
 US Mediations is an event count variable that counts the number of new 
mediation attempts that the United States becomes involved in or offers in a given 
quarter.  Care was taken to ensure that the mediator was sent on behalf of the US 
administration and was able to negotiate on its behalf.
38
  Offers are included along with 
actual attempts because the goal is to examine the extent to which the US administration 
is focusing resources and attention on mediation.    
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 Thus, instances in which Americans served as mediators in a private capacity, such as Jimmy Carter’s 
work as head of the Carter Center, have been excluded. Conflicts in which the US is a party are excluded as 
well, thus excluding mediation/negotiation attempts by the Rev. Jesse Jackson. 
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 Table 3.1 shows the distribution of US Mediations.  The modal value is 1 new 
mediation attempt per quarter, which occurs in 62 quarters from 1945-1995.  The second-
most common value is 0, no new mediations in a quarter.  Frequency of values tends to 
decrease as the number of new mediation attempts/offers per quarter increases, with 48 
quarters in which 2 new attempts/offers are made, 17 in which 3 are made, 6 in which 4 
are made, 4 in which 5 are made, 1 in which 6 are made, 2 in which 7 are made, and 1 in 
which 8 are made.  So, while it is common for the United States to become involved 
in/offer new mediations regularly, it becomes progressively less common for it to do so 
as a number of mediations have already been offered/undertaken.
39
   
 By counting US mediations, the extent to which administrations focus on 
mediation can be tested.  However, because the theoretical argument being posited here is 
that mediation is undertaken with the intent of inducing an increase in support for the 
administration from the domestic public, more focused dependent variables that capture 
the likelihood that mediation attempts are high in profile, as well as those capturing the 
urgency and vigor with which the administration pursues successful conflict management 
are appropriate. 
US Mediator Rank 
 The second dependent variable that I use to capture US mediation behavior is US 
Mediator Rank.  This is an ordinal variable used to measure the level of commitment and 
urgency with which an administration seeks to mediate, as well as the amount of media 
coverage that such an endeavor will receive.  Because I argue that presidential 
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 It should be noted that several attempts/offers can be made for the same conflict, within a given quarter.  
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Table 3.1: Distribution of US Mediations 
US Mediations per 
quarter 
 
Frequency Percent Cum. Percent 
 
0 
 
 
60 
 
29.85 
 
29.85 
1 
 
62 30.88 60.72 
2 
 
48 23.88 84.60 
3 
 
17 8.46 93.06 
4 
 
6 2.99 96.05 
5 
 
4 1.99 98.04 
6 
 
1 0.49 98.51 
7 
 
2 0.10 99.49 
8 
 
1 0.49 100.00 
 
Total 
  
 
201 
 
100.00 
 
Mean = 1.40 
Variance = 2.04 
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administrations seek to use mediation in order to generate the image of a policy success, 
presidents should be seen mediating themselves, or sending high-level deputies to 
mediate in their stead in order to garner the most media attention from such an endeavor. 
 Table 3.2 shows the distribution of values for US Mediator Rank, codes the 
highest-ranking new mediator in a given quarter.  The rationale for using the highest-
ranking mediator in a quarter is that the highest-ranking mediator employed by an 
administration is likely to most accurately denote the extent to which any mediation 
attempt is likely to be salient in the media and thus the extent to which the administration 
is likely to benefit from such an attempt being portrayed as a success.  Because the 
president is visible at a higher level than any of his surrogates and he commands a great 
deal more media attention, mediation attempts in which he serves as the mediator are 
coded as a 3, the highest value for the variable.  High-level surrogates of the president are 
coded as a 2, the second-highest value for the variable.  These officials include the vice 
president, cabinet members, and special envoys sent by the president to mediate with his 
authority.  While these officials are likely to warrant some media coverage and their 
efforts are likely to be discussed publicly, it will likely be at a lower level than that of the 
president.  Low-level mediators, those who are likely to receive little to no media 
attention are coded as 1.  These mediators included ambassadors, state department 
officials, military officers, etc.  I argue that the administration can employ these 
mediators strategically, using them in cases where high-profile mediation may not yield 
positive feedback or to simply test the waters, after which higher-ranking mediators can 
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Table 3.2: Distribution of US Mediator Rank 
 
Highest Mediator 
Rank 
 
Frequency Percent Cum. Percent 
No mediation/ 
offered only 
 
103 51.24 51.24 
Low-ranking 
mediator 
 
46 22.89 74.13 
High-ranking 
mediator 
 
38 18.91 93.03 
President mediator 
 
14 6.97 100.00 
 
Total 
 
201 
 
100.00 
 
 83 
 
come in if it is deemed that the effort will be billed as a policy success.  Quarters in 
which no mediations occur or mediation is offered, but not accepted are coded as 0. 
US Mediation Strategy 
 Similar to the mediator rank variable is US Mediation Strategy.  This variable is 
an ordinal variable that codes the highest level (most involved) of mediation undertaken 
by the United States in a given quarter, as defined by Zartman and Touval’s (1985) 
typology of mediation strategies.  Stemming from the argument that presidents are 
seeking mediation as a tool to engineer policy victories in light of poor domestic 
performance and a hostile legislature, they should be seen using more manipulative 
strategies in order quickly engineer a policy success.  Corresponding to Zartman and 
Touval’s (1985) typology, manipulation strategies, those in which the mediator seeks to 
use his resources to manipulate the payoffs for one or both parties are coded as a 4, the 
highest value.  Occurrences of formulation strategies in which the administration seeks to 
provide a venue for discussions and suggests potential compromises, but falls short of 
guaranteeing the peace or inducing it through carrots and sticks are coded as a “3”.  
Instances in which the US uses its good offices to provide credible information to one or 
both sides are coded as a “2”.  In quarters where no mediation if offered only, a “1” is 
entered, and where no mediations occur a “0” is entered.  (see Table 3.3) 
 Each of these variables is designed to capture an element of the extent to which 
presidents seek to use mediation as a tool to better their domestic fortunes.  The 
occurrence of more mediations suggests that the administration deems that such attempts 
are the best likely to better these fortunes, relative to other available policy options.  The 
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Table 3.3 Distribution of US Mediation Strategy 
 
Highest Mediation 
Strategy 
 
Frequency Percent Cum. Percent 
No Mediations 
 
95 47.26 47.26 
Offered only 
 
8 3.98 51.24 
Information 
Strategy 
 
30 14.93 66.17 
Formulation 
Strategy 
 
8 3.98 70.15 
Manipulation 
Strategy 
 
60 29.85 100.00 
 
Total 
 
201 
 
100.00 
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use of higher-ranking mediators and more manipulative mediation strategies suggests that 
the administration is attempting to commit more resources to the mediation effort in the 
hopes that it will be billed as a policy success, as well as engineer an agreement quickly, 
thus boosting the president’s political standing.   
Independent Variables for Chapters 4 and 5 
Economic Performance 
The frequency of mediation efforts is hypothesized to be a function of 
congressional support and economic conditions.  As a measure of economic conditions, I 
include GDP growth.
40, 41
  GDP growth is the quarterly/annual rate of growth in U.S. 
gross domestic product.  Lower rates of GDP growth are expected to provide the 
motivation for presidents to seek policy success in the realm of foreign affairs when 
efforts to address the domestic economy are forestalled by congressional opposition.   
Presidential Approval 
The frequency of mediation and the rank of the mediator dispatched, and the 
strategy selected are hypothesized to be functions of congressional support and 
presidential popularity.  A measure of presidential approval is included to capture the 
public’s evaluation of the president’s job performance.  Presidential approval is 
measured as the quarterly average of all Gallup presidential job approval polls.
42
 
 
                                                 
 
40
 The source for GDP the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (retrieved from 
http://www.bea.doc.gov/).   
41
 In analyses not presented in this work, I also use measures of inflation, the misery index, and 
unemployment as robustness checks.  Each variable yielded similar results to GDP growth. 
42
 The Gallup polls ask “do you approve of the job (name of president) is doing as president?”  These polls 
were retrieved from The Roper Center via Lexis-Nexis.com.   
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Measures of Divided Government 
The analysis considers the influence of three measures of congressional support.  
The first, Partisan support, takes account of congressional partisanship.  As the number 
of seats held by the president’s co-partisans declines, Congress should be less likely to 
support the president’s proposals, leading the president to respond to poor economic 
performance with a mediation attempt.  Partisan support consists of the percentage of 
seats held by the president’s co-partisans in the chamber of Congress in which the 
president’s co-partisans hold the fewest seats.   For example, in 1978, when President 
Jimmy Carter’s administration was brokering a peace agreement between Israel and 
Egypt, the house of Congress with the fewest Democratic members (Carter’s party), was 
comprised of 61% Democrats.
43
 
The second measure of congressional support is Cohesive partisan support.  
Partisanship alone is not always an appropriate indicator of shared preferences over 
domestic policy.  Southern Democrats frequently opposed the policies of Democratic 
presidents during the period of study and supported the policies of Republican presidents 
(see e.g., Bond and Fleisher 1990).  Even when the president’s party constitutes a 
majority of members, a lack of cohesion among the president’s co-partisans in Congress 
may complicate presidential efforts to gain approval for his initiatives.  Similarly, a 
cohesive opposition majority party in Congress has the strength and incentives to thwart 
presidential initiatives (e.g., Fleisher and Bond 2000; Fiorina 1992).  Cohesive partisan 
support is derived from the “legislative potential for policy change” (LPPC) scores 
                                                 
 
43
 The value of 61% partisan support in congress is in roughly the 95
th
 percentile for values in years 1949-
1995. 
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(Brady, Cooper and Hurley 1977).  LPPC scores are based on the size and cohesiveness 
of the two parties relative to each other.
44
  Like Partisan support, the score from the 
chamber with the lower cohesive partisan support score is included in the analysis.   
Thus, in 1978, the cohesive partisan support measure for the house of congress 
containing the smaller proportion of Democrats was 15.23, signifying a high level of 
cohesive partisan support.
45
   
The third measure, Presidential success, corresponds to the percentage of 
congressional roll call votes that concurred with the president’s position.46  This is a 
relatively direct measure of the president’s ability to pursue remedial policy and most 
directly embodies the concept being tested when using measures of divided government 
(see e.g., Foster 2006; Marshall and Prins 2011).  Given that both chambers of Congress 
must approve the president’s proposal, I use the score corresponding to the chamber in 
which the presidential success score is lower.  For the year 1978, for instance, the house 
of congress passing fewer bills concurring with the president’s position, passed 69.6% of 
bills concurring with the president’s position, signifying broad ability to pass legislation 
in congress.
47
  
 
 
                                                 
 
44
 Following Howell and Pevehouse (2005), Cohesive partisan support is computed as follows: President’s 
party power = [(president’s party size in percent) X (cohesion of president’s party)] – [(opposition’s party 
size in percent) X (cohesion of opposition’s party)].  Party cohesion scores are from Cooper and Young 
(2002). 
45
 A cohesive partisan support score of 15.23 is in the 95
th
 percentile for values in years 1949-2000. 
46
 The source for Presidential success is Ragsdale (1998).  Presidential success scores are available for the 
time period 1953 through 1996. 
47
 A presidential success score of 69.6% is in slightly less than the 75
th
 percentile years 1949-1995. 
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Measures of the Election Cycle 
The introduction of the electoral cycle as a factor in the choice of foreign policy 
options, suggests, however, that conflict initiation should be less likely leading up to 
election day.  Gaubatz (1991) finds that democratic leaders are most likely to use military 
force early in their tenures, with that likelihood decreasing as elections near.  The 
proposed explanation for such a conclusion is that democratic societies are likely to 
punish leaders at the polls for pursuing policies that put lives at risk.  Thus, impending 
elections should cause US presidents to shy away from military conflict, regardless of the 
need for policy success. Truman’s  and Johnson’s experiences in 1952 and 1968, 
respectively, suggest anecdotal support for this conjecture, given that in both cases 
Presidents involved in military conflict chose not to seek re-election in the face of 
mounting public discontent with military conflict.  
 Such domestic considerations have been largely absent from explanations of how 
and when non-military foreign policy occur, however.  I argue that given this desire to 
produce a record of policy success when confronted with impending elections and low 
levels of support in Congress, presidents should be seen substituting non-military foreign 
policy options, such as third-party mediation, for military force.  As a result, I use three 
measures of the election cycle, Election Year Dummy, Election Countdown, and 
Campaign Quarters Dummy in order to test the influence of elections on mediation.  
Because it has been argued that presidential administrations use policy success to help 
their political fortunes, but secondarily those of their party, I examine mediation in as a 
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function of all presidential election years and only those years in which an incumbent 
president is running for re-election.  
Election/Re-election Year Dummy 
Because US Presidents are under increased scrutiny as elections near, it is likely 
that the policy options that they pursue during such times are crafted to better their 
chances of re-election and those of their co-partisans.  However, it is plausible that these 
efforts will take different shape when the president is running for re-election as opposed 
to when he is not running.  Thus, Election Year Dummy is coded as a “1” for each quarter 
in a US presidential election year and Re-election Year Dummy is coded as a “1” for each 
quarter of US presidential election years in which the incumbent is running for re-
election.  Although this is a fairly blunt measure of how elections might influence the 
president’s decision making, it is a common starting point. 
Election Countdown 
 Recent research has employed a variable that counts down from the time a 
president takes office until the next election (see Koch 2009; Williams 2010).  The 
argument for using such a variable is that as elections near, policy choices are 
increasingly chosen to directly influence the outcome of that elections.  Thus, Election 
Countdown is coded such that the first quarter in which is a president in office is entered 
as “16” and counts downward quarter-by-quarter to “1,” the quarter in which the next 
election occurs.  The hypotheses suggest an inverse relationship between the time until an 
election and the frequency and or magnitude of mediation behavior.  Such a measure is 
useful because it recognizes the increasing urgency with which a president must act as the 
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election becomes nearer.  However, given that incumbents, especially those running for 
re-election, are most likely to spend a great deal of time campaigning as elections near, 
mediation behavior might not be seen in the last few months. 
Campaign Cycle Dummy 
 I also employ variables that account for the fact that presidential campaigns last 
longer than the calendar year prior to the election and that presidential behavior is likely 
to be different if the incumbent is running for re-election.  Given that presidents and 
political parties often launch their campaigns in the year prior to the election, it is to be 
expected that presidents would seek to use mediations to their advantage in the year 
before the election. Furthermore, because presidents, in the few months prior to the 
election, especially those running for re-election, are likely concentrating their efforts 
domestically, Campaign Cycle Dummy is coded as “1” for the last six quarters of a 
presidential term where the incumbent is not running for re-election.  In cases where the 
incumbent is running for re-election, I code the penultimate five quarters of the 
presidential term as a “1,” but code the final term, that in which the election is held, as a 
“0.”  My rationale for such using such a scheme is that presidents running for re-election 
are almost certainly going to focus their attention domestically during the final months of 
a campaign, regardless of domestic performance or the makeup of congress.  However, 
lame duck presidents are more likely to attempt to help their parties in an election via 
foreign policy success when congressional support for his initiatives is low and the 
impending election draws increased attention to the incumbent’s record.  I also test these 
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two phenomena separately, examining re-election campaign cycles and non-re-election 
campaign cycles individually. 
Control Variables for Chapters 4 and 5 
 To control for other processes that may be affecting the occurrence of mediation 
behavior, I employ several control variables consistent with a “use of force” model.  The 
use of force model is most often specified to test how variation in domestic political 
conditions influences the use of military force.  Given that foreign policy is thought to be 
substitutable (Most and Starr 1984; 1989) and my argument suggests that leaders are 
substituting mediation, such a model is appropriate. 
First, I include a variable indicating War, which taps U.S. war involvement.  The 
United States’ involvement in wars is likely to reduce the pool of available resources with 
which presidents can address other crises.  Thus, the analysis controls for the impact of 
wars by including a dummy variable that takes on the value of “1” for years 
corresponding to the Korean, Vietnam, and first Gulf War conflicts.   
Similarly, I take account of quarterly and annual Uses of force.  If presidents are 
taking decisions to deploy military forces against targets abroad, they are likely to have 
less time to consider peacemaking efforts.  Consequently, as the number of uses of force 
increases, presidents should initiate fewer mediation efforts.  In the quarterly dataset, 
Uses of force are drawn from the Blechman-Kaplan/Fordham list of U.S. uses of force 
(Fordham 1998; Fordham and Sarver 2001).   
To control for opportunities to offer mediation, I control for the “population” of 
ongoing interstate disputes with a variable called World disputes.  World disputes is a 
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count of all new or ongoing disputes according to the MID data set in which the U.S. is 
not a party.  The values for World disputes correspond to the units of analysis – quarterly 
count for the quarterly analyses and annual count for the annual analyses.   
Because variables are observed quarterly, it is possible that observations of 
independent variables and control variables that are discrete events (for instance uses of 
force) occur later in the quarter than the mediation attempt.  In these cases, it is not 
possible that these events would have affected mediation occurrence or strategy.  
Therefore, to protect against such a problem, I have lagged these independent variables to 
ensure a proper temporal relationship for causality. 
Estimation Techniques for Chapters 4 and 5 
 Because my dependent variables for these chapters are either event counts or 
discrete ordinal variables, Ordinary Least-Squares (OLS) estimators are in appropriate for 
testing the hypotheses.  US Mediations is an event count variable, meaning the number of 
mediation attempts in each quarter is counted.  The most basic regression model for 
examining such variables is the Poisson regression model.  The distribution of values for 
US Mediations fits that of a Poisson distribution (Long 1997: 229-230).  (See Table 3.1)   
However, the Poisson regression model assumes the mean of the distribution is equal to 
the variance (Long 1997; Wooldridge 2008), an assumption not met in this case (mean = 
1.40, variance = 2.04).  Thus, the negative binomial regression estimator, which relaxes 
this assumption, is more appropriate.   
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 The other two dependent variables examined are ordinal variables, meaning that 
“its categories can be ranked from low to high, but the distances between adjacent 
categories are unknown.”  For those, I use an ordered logit estimator (Long 1997: 115). 
 For each model, I cluster the standard errors on presidential administration to 
account for variation in mediation across them.  Such a technique is more efficient than 
using fixed effects, which limits the degrees of freedom and essentially concedes that 
each presidential administration is qualitatively different, without providing an 
explanation of those differences. 
Conditional Hypotheses and Interaction Terms   
Because the hypotheses are conditional, the measures of executive-congressional 
relations are interacted with GDP growth and presidential approval to assess the effect of 
low public approval on mediation efforts conditioned by congress.  All three measures of 
the president’s support in congress are interacted with both measures of presidential 
vulnerability as robustness checks.  The marginal effects for the interaction terms should 
indicate a relationship between low public approval/low economic 
performance/impending elections and an increase in the propensity for mediation during 
periods in which congressional opposition is sufficient to block presidential domestic 
policy reform.  Marginal effects should also indicate that approval is negatively 
associated with mediator rank when congressional support is low.  Such conditional 
relationships are typically tested with a multiplicative interaction term. 
Because of these conditioning effects, there are different effects of the 
conditioned variable (public approval/low economic performance/impending elections) 
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on mediation/mediator behavior as a result of different levels of the conditioning variable 
(levels of congressional support).  Because these hypotheses test conditional relationships 
using multiplicative interaction terms, the coefficients and standard errors are not 
sufficient for interpreting the results (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Braumeoller 
2006; Kam and Franzese 2005).  In order to interpret model models, I plot the marginal 
effects along with the upper and lower bound 90% confidence intervals across the range 
of the conditioning variable.  The results are discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5.   
Research Design for Chapter 6  
 Stemming from the argument tested in the previous two chapters, that leaders 
have incentives to engage in mediation in when they need a policy victory to ensure their 
political longevity, but domestic policy avenues are blocked, is the question of whether or 
not leaders enjoy a boost in the level of public approval they enjoy as a result of such 
behavior.  While such a relationship is implied in much of the diversionary literature, 
most studies have focused overwhelmingly on the presence of this leader behavior and 
less on whether such behavior has the desired effect. 
 Mediation should be an attractive policy option for leaders, given minimal costs 
and risks, relative to other policy options, both foreign and domestic.  It is also important 
to address the notion that the president enjoys an inordinate amount of sympathetic media 
coverage, which can be directed toward those policies that he deems most likely to 
generate the greatest domestic advantage (Bennett 1990).  High level administration 
officials enjoy an increased media profile as well, but to a lower degree than the 
president.   
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While I expect the dispatching of higher-ranking mediators to have a positive 
effect on presidential approval, the positive effect of a mediator’s rank should be 
magnified by the extent to which the public is attentive to foreign policy.  Research 
suggests that public sentiment about the salience of foreign policy should play a key role 
in determining the extent to which the administration’s focus on such issues is likely to 
be rewarded by an increase in approval rating (Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch 1995).  
Although the president and his high-level surrogates command a great deal of media 
attention, which they often manipulate well, focusing on foreign policy when public 
attentiveness to such issues is high will likely yield a greater boost in approval.  For this 
reason, increasing the visibility of mediation attempts by employing higher ranking, and 
thus higher-profile, mediators when the public is attentive to foreign policy should 
compound the subsequent increase in approval rating.   
Because foreign policy initiatives are less likely to be heavily criticized in 
Congress, and because the president can make foreign policy with more autonomy than 
he can domestic policy, mediation should be an appealing policy option to boost 
presidential approval.  Although a presidential administration is able to manipulate how 
its image is portrayed with regard to a policy initiative, the extent to which the president’s 
approval rating is likely to increase is tempered by the extent to which US voters deem 
foreign policy to be an important issue area.   
Dependent Variable for Chapter 6 
I examine the effect of mediator’s rank on presidential approval after mediation 
efforts from 1945-1995, where time is observed in quarters.  The dependent variable, 
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Approval is the Gallup Presidential Approval Score.  This approval score is generated 
from the proportion of respondents who responded positively to the survey question, “Do 
you approve of the job (insert name of President) is doing as president?”48 
Independent Variables for Chapter 6 
 The first key independent variable in the analysis is Mediator Rank, which was 
coded from appendix 2 of Jacob Bercovitch’s (1999) International Conflict Management 
Data Set Codebook.  The appendix gives the names, ranks, and nationalities of individual 
mediators associated with a given conflict.  For the purposes of this analysis, only US 
mediators working in an official US government capacity were included.  The dataset 
was then converted into a quarterly time series.  US Mediator Rank is a four category 
ordinal variable that captures the highest political rank of a US mediator in a given 
quarter.
49
  Mediator rank is hypothesized to positively influence presidential approval 
because of greater levels of media coverage afforded administration officials of higher 
ranks and the ease with which these officials are able to influence how the media reports 
on a mediation effort.  Because of the hypothesized relationship between variables, the 
value of US Mediator Rank for the previous quarter (t-1) is used to explain presidential 
approval during quarter t0.   
The second set of key independent variables that I use is the same measures of 
mediator rank described above, but broken into dichotomous variables.  Thus, in quarters 
where the president is directly involved in mediating a conflict President as Mediator is 
                                                 
 
48
 This survey data was retrieved from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of 
Connecticut via Lexis-Nexis.com. 
49
 US Mediator Rank is described in detail earlier in this chapter.   
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coded as “1” and all other quarters are entered as “0.”  In quarters where the vice 
president, a cabinet secretary, or special envoy is the highest-ranking mediator, Vice 
President or Cabinet-level Mediator, is coded as a “1” and all other quarters are entered 
as “0.”  Quarters with lower-ranking mediators (below cabinet-level or special envoy) 
have Lower-level Mediator entered as “1” and all other quarters entered as “0.”  No 
Mediation is used as the reference category.  Similar to the rationale described above, the 
variables are coded in such a way that captures the level of attention likely to be paid to 
the mediation attempt.  Likewise, because of the hypothesized relationship between 
variables, the values of these dichotomous variables for the previous quarter (t-1) are used 
to explain presidential approval during quarter t0.   
Finally, to capture the conditioning effect of the public’s foreign policy 
attentiveness on the Mediator Rank, I create an interaction term with Foreign Policy 
Salience.
 50 
The extent to which the public is attentive to foreign policy is thought to 
condition the effects of Mediator Rank on presidential approval.  Given the argument that 
the President and his high-level deputies can dominate and manipulate the mainstream 
news so that it portrays the administration favorably, the impact of diplomacy on 
presidential approval should be greater when the public is particularly attentive to foreign 
policy. 
Control Variables for Chapter 6 
Research on factors that influence presidential approval suggests that a primary 
dimension upon which presidents are judged by voters and reflected in approval ratings is 
                                                 
 
50
 Foreign Policy Attentiveness is the proportion of people who chose foreign policy as the most important 
policy area. The source for Foreign Policy Salience is the Gallup Poll. 
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economic performance (Lewis-Beck 1988, Mueller 1973, Anderson 1995).  Leaders in 
office during good economic times are viewed more positively by voters than their 
counterparts who are in office during economic decline.  Therefore, an important control 
variable in modeling the effect of a mediator’s rank on presidential approval is a measure 
of economic performance.  I use three different measures of economic performance in 
different models.  The first measure, GDP growth¸ is the quarterly rate of growth in the 
US gross domestic product.
51
  In subsequent models, I measure economic performance 
with the variables inflation and unemployment, respectively.  Inflation is the quarterly 
change in the US consumer price index and unemployment is the quarterly average level 
of unemployment in the US workforce.
52
 
 In addition, I control for war.  War captures US war involvement and is coded 
with a “1” for each of the quarters corresponding with the Korea, Vietnam, and first Gulf 
War conflicts.  War is thought to reduce the number of available resources that a 
president has at his disposal to commit to a mediation effort.  Additionally, it is unlikely 
that a president will personally mediate a conflict involving two other parties during a 
time of war.  Instead, his focus will be on fighting the war and attempting to manage the 
risks and costs associated with that conflict.  However, lower-level mediators may be 
employed during these times.  In terms of presidential approval, support for the president 
is likely to be higher during times of war than during peace time. 
                                                 
 
51
The source for GDP is the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (retrieved from 
www.bea.gov).  
52
 The source for both inflation and unemployment is the Bureau of Labor Statistics (retrieved from 
www.bls.gov).  
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 Divided Government is a dichotomous variable that is coded with a 1 if either of 
the houses of Congress is controlled by the opposing party to the president’s.  Divided 
government is likely to play a role in the overall calculation of presidential approval due 
to the fact that Congress is thought to be a check on the president’s ability to successfully 
make policy, although this is argued above to be less effective toward matters of foreign 
policy (Howell and Pevehouse 2005, Schultz 1998).  Thus, presidential approval is likely 
to be lower when there is divided government. 
Estimation Techniques for Chapter 6 
The effect of mediator rank on presidential approval is analyzed using a Prais-
Winsten GLS regression model with semi-robust standard errors clustered on presidential 
administration.
53
  Because the dependent variable, Approval, is measured across time, the 
presence of autocorrelation is likely. As signified by a significant spike in the first lag of 
its partial autocorrelation function, the variable exhibits first order autocorrelations.  ( 
3.1) The AR(1) specification of the Prais-Winsten estimator corrects for first order 
autocorrelation.   
Hypothesis 4b, which employs a multiplicative interaction term should be 
interpreted graphically as discussed above in the section discussing interpretation of 
interaction terms for Chapters 4 and 5.  
Conclusion and Research Process 
 In this chapter I have discussed my rationale for using the ICM dataset and have 
described the nature of the key variables that I use to test the hypotheses.  Additionally I 
                                                 
 
53
 Clustering standard errors on presidential administrations corrects for different average levels of 
presidential approval across administrations (see Zorn 2001).   
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Figure 3.1:  Partial Auto-correlation Function for Presidential Approval 
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have discussed the statistical techniques that I use to measure each dependent variable.  
In the next three chapters, I revisit the arguments behind the hypotheses and then present 
the results from regression analyses and discuss the implications of such results. 
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Chapter 4: Domestic Performance and Diplomacy 
 In this chapter, I report and discuss the results from models testing hypotheses 
concerning the effects of domestic performance and legislative configurations on 
mediation behavior.  Operating under the assumption that presidents seek to further their 
own domestic political fortunes and those of their party, they should be seen seeking to 
build a record of policy successes (Neustadt 1960).  Domestic policy is thought to be the 
most efficient method through which leaders can achieve such a success.  However, 
passing domestic legislation requires the support of congress.  If congress is made up of a 
majority of members from an opposing political party, it has incentives to block the 
president from achieving such successes.  In these situations, where the president’s 
primary avenue for addressing poor domestic performance is essentially blocked, 
presidents should be seen seeking to portray themselves as competent managers of 
complex political phenomena that do not require the stamp of Congress.  Thus, it has 
been hypothesized that US Presidents have incentives to seek out opportunities to 
mediate overseas conflicts when poor domestic performance necessitates a policy victory, 
but legislative configurations, mainly an opposition Congress, make the passage of 
legislation difficult.    Because mediation has the potential to be a high reward endeavor 
that incurs minimal risks, relative to other available policy options, it should be an 
attractive policy choice.  In addition, under such circumstances, presidents should be seen 
mediating in ways most likely to garner ample media attention, in order to increase the 
extent to which he benefits publicly from such actions, and in ways most likely to yield a 
short-term settlement.   
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Economic Performance and Mediation 
 Hypothesis 1a contends that as economic performance declines and in the 
presence of an opposition congress, presidents should seek to engage in more mediation 
attempts.  This proposition is first tested in Models 4.1 and 4.2, shown in Table 4.1, using 
the proportion of the president’s co-partisan’s in congress as a measures of the 
president’s ability to pass legislation.  Model 4.1 shows the effects of both GDP growth 
and the partisan composition of congress on the number of US mediations undertaken, 
independent of one another.  With all other variables held equal, the negative binomial 
estimates show that, on average, GDP growth has a negative and statistically significant 
effect on the number of new mediations attempted.  Partisan support in congress has a 
positive and statistically significant effect on the number of new mediations.  This finding 
suggests that presidents see political value in engaging in mediation when the economy is 
performing poorly, independent of their ability to move legislation through congress.  It 
confirms the notion that the president seeks to demonstrate managerial competence.  
Additionally, the model suggests that presidents who enjoy broad support in congress are 
able to focus on diplomacy.   Such findings are also consistent with research suggesting 
that congress acts as a constraint on the president’s foreign policy behavior (Schultz 
2001; Tsebelis 1995; Mayer 2001).  However, the two findings taken together pose an 
interesting question: if domestic policy avenues are available to presidents, why would 
they focus on diplomacy?  Since diplomacy is likely to pay smaller political dividends 
than domestic policy, it would seem rational for the president to focus on domestic policy 
if available. 
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Table 4.1: Effects on GDP growth on US Mediations, Conditioned by 
Partisan Support in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 
 
4.1 4.2 
 
GDP Growth 
 
 
 
-0.025 
(0.009)*** 
 
-0.007 
(0.048) 
Partisan Support in Congress 2.531 
(0.730)*** 
2.661 
(0.821)*** 
GDP Growth x Partisan Support in 
Congress 
 
_____ -0.037 
(0.096) 
Uses of Force (1 lag) 
 
 
-0.004 
(0.048) 
0.004 
(0.048) 
War 
 
 
-0.622 
(0.187)*** 
-0.618 
(0.185)*** 
Election Year 
 
 
-0.087 
(0.259) 
-0.092 
(0.261) 
Approval 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
World Disputes 
 
 
0.025 
(0.025) 
0.025 
(0.025) 
Constant 
 
 
-0.442 
(0.474) 
-0.410 
(0.447) 
N 187 187 
Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.  
Negative binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on presidential 
administration in parentheses.  (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test) 
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 The control variables in the model function largely as expected.  Uses of force, 
short of war, do not have a statistically significant effect on the number of mediations 
initiated.  However, quarters in which the US is at war, significantly fewer new mediation 
attempts are undertaken.  Because the president is likely to be focusing his efforts on 
winning a longer-term conflict, which likely has high stakes for his political longevity, he 
is less apt to seek out third-party mediation as a way to demonstrate his managerial 
competence.  Similarly, the president’s approval rating is shown to have no statistically 
significant effect on the number of mediations undertaken.  Such a result, coupled with 
the negative effect of GDP growth, suggests that presidents may seek to use diplomacy to 
address poor domestic conditions that will negatively affect him at the ballot box, 
independently of his ability to move legislation through congress.  Moreover, the lack of 
correlation between approval and mediation, along with the presence of the negative 
correlation between GDP growth and mediation, suggests that the president is attempting 
to address poor performance, rather than merely divert public attention from scandals or 
other reputation damaging behavior.  On a related note, the president is not more likely to 
engage in more mediation attempts in election years in order to engineer policy successes 
that might help him in the upcoming election.   
Finally, perhaps the most interesting of the null findings involves the number of 
ongoing disputes, which can be viewed as opportunities to engage in mediation.  
Specifically, as the number of opportunities to mediate increases, the president is no more 
likely to engage in more mediation attempts.  This result implies that the president and 
his administration are focusing mediation attempts strategically, likely on those conflicts 
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in which diplomatic success would yield the greatest domestic political benefit.
54
  
Conventional wisdom suggests that president would focus his attention on domestic 
policy to remedy the negative effects of poor GDP growth. However, these results 
suggest that diplomacy is not necessarily a less preferred policy option for presidents 
seeking to sure up their domestic political fortunes than domestic policy itself.   
Model 4.2 shows the negative binomial estimates testing the conditional 
relationship.   Because interaction terms are most easily interpreted graphically, the 
marginal effects of Partisan Support in Congress on GDP Growth are plotted in Figure 
4.1, along with 90% confidence intervals.  For values of Partisan Support in Congress 
from roughly 40 to 65%, the effect of GDP growth on the number of new mediations 
attempted is both negative and statistically significant.  Thus, it can be argued that when 
the president has less than a majority of his co-partisans in congress, a declining economy 
is likely to induce the administration to engage in more mediation attempts.  While the 
results in Figure 4.1 suggest some support for hypothesis 1a, they do not completely 
conform as expected.  First, given the weak-link justification for using the percentage of 
the presidents co-partisans that is the smaller of the two houses of congress,
55
 it should 
not be expected that a president has incentives to engage in more mediation attempts for 
values of the variable up to 65%.   According to the model, when each house of congress 
is made up of at least 65% of the president’s co-partisans, declining economic growth 
should induce the administration to attempt more mediation.  However, with 65% support 
                                                 
 
54
 Because such a finding is widespread throughout my analysis, I discuss its implications in greater detail 
in the concluding chapter.   
55
 The weakest-link justification contends that because legislation must pass both houses of congress to 
become law, the house with the fewer of the president’s co-partisans is where legislation is likely to be 
blocked by the opposition.  Thus, the value for the house of congress containing fewer of the president’s 
co-partisans in used. 
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Figure 4.1:  Effects on GDP growth on US Mediations, Conditioned by Partisan 
Support in Congress 
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from co-partisans in both houses of congress, the president should have more than 
sufficient capabilities to pass legislation that directly addresses poor economic 
performance and should not have to rely on the use of diplomacy to demonstrate 
competence as a leader.  However, given that Model 4.1 suggests that presidents engage 
in more mediations when confronting poor economic performance, independent of 
congressional support, the conditioning effect of congress shown here may be less 
important. 
 A second peculiarity is the slope associated with partisan support’s conditioning 
effect.   Higher levels of partisan support in congress, according to policy availability 
theory, should decrease the extent to which a declining economy creates incentives for 
mediation.  However, in Figure 4.1, the slope of the conditioning effect declines as 
partisan support in congress increases, calling into question the extent to which the model 
supports Hypothesis 1a. 
 Scholars have argued, however, that the simple measure of partisan support in 
congress does not accurately reflect the president’s ability to pass legislation efficiently.  
As such, I employ two other, more refined measures of divided government that should 
represent the president’s ability to move legislation through congress more accurately: 
Cohesive Partisan Support and the Presidential Success Score.   
The variable Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress, takes into account the extent 
to which the president’s co-partisans are likely to vote along with him.  As previously 
discussed, Fleischer and Bond (1990) point out that southern Democrats in congress 
routinely voted against the policy initiatives of democratic presidents, thus limiting their 
abilities to move legislation despite having a legislative majority.  In addition, a cohesive 
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opposition has incentives to block presidential initiatives and the power to do so (e.g., 
Fleisher and Bond 2000; Fiorina 1992).  Thus, such a measure should more accurately 
demonstrate the extent to which the president can move legislation through Congress. 
Models 4.3 and 4.4 (See Table 4.2) show the statistical results testing Hypothesis 1a 
using the Cohesive Partisan Support variable.  In Model 4.3, which, like model 4.1 above, 
does not consider the conditioning effect of congress, GDP growth is inversely correlated 
with the number of new mediation attempts. Cohesive partisan support is positively 
correlated with new mediation attempts.  Taken together, these results suggest, as argued 
above, that presidents are seen focusing on mediation more when the economy is 
performing poorly, but also when they enjoy a broad base of congressional support.  
Thus, the use of such policy options to address declining economic performances, under 
such conditions, is likely, but not likely to be conditioned by congress, which is contrary 
to hypothesis 1a. 
 Model 4.4, like Model 4.2 above, considers the conditioning effect that Congress 
is hypothesized to have on presidential incentives to engage in mediation.  The marginal 
effects of Cohesive Partisan Support are graphed in Figure 4.2 with a 90% confidence 
interval.  The results support Hypothesis 1a, in that where the president enjoys lower 
levels of cohesive partisan support in Congress, the effect of GDP growth is negative and 
statistically significant.  Additionally, the slope of the marginal effects curve behaves 
largely as expected, becoming less negative as Cohesive Partisan Support increases.  
However, the slope remains negative and significant for higher values of Cohesive 
Partisan Support than the hypothesis suggests.  Although the marginal effects curve 
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Table 4.2: Effects on GDP growth on US Mediations, Conditioned by 
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 
 
4.3 4.4 
 
GDP Growth 
 
-0.022 
(0.009)*** 
 
-0.007 
(0.048) 
Cohesive Partisan Support in 
Congress 
0.014 
(0.005)*** 
2.661 
(0.821)*** 
GDP Growth x Cohesive Partisan 
Support in Congress 
 
_____ -0.037 
(0.096) 
Uses of Force (1 lag) 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.048) 
0.004 
(0.048) 
War 
 
 
-0.615 
(0.160)*** 
-0.618 
(0.185)*** 
Election Year 
 
 
-0.107 
(0.273) 
-0.092 
(0.261) 
Approval 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
World Disputes 
 
 
0.028 
(0.025) 
0.025 
(0.025) 
Constant 
 
 
0.805 
(0.481) 
-0.410 
(0.447) 
N 187 187 
Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.  
Negative binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on 
presidential administration in parentheses.  (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, 
one-tailed test) 
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Figure 4.2:  Effects of GDP Growth on US Mediations, Conditioned by Cohesive 
Partisan Support in Congress 
  
112 
 
becomes statistically insignificant for extreme high values of Cohesive Partisan Support, 
the models shows an inverse effect on GDP Growth where the president would likely 
have the ability to move legislation through Congress.  Therefore, the results suggest a 
limited level of support for Hypothesis 1a, although ambiguities about its validity remain. 
 Finally, I test Hypothesis 1a using the presidential success score, which is the 
percentage of roll call votes in Congress that concurred with the president’s opinion.  
This measure is a fairly direct way of measuring the president’s ability to move 
legislation efficiently and scholars have suggested that is perhaps the most appropriate 
measure to use when examining the presidential incentives to focus on foreign policy (see 
Marshall and Prins 2011).  Similar to the previous two analyses, Model 4.5, which only 
takes into account the independent effects of GDP growth and presidential success, 
behaves largely as expected.  GDP growth is inversely correlated but has no statistically 
significant effects on US Mediations; the presidential success score is positively 
correlated with US Mediations and is statistically significant.  These results suggest that, 
all other variables held equal, presidents and their administrations should be seen 
mediating overseas conflicts when the economy is performing poorly and when they are 
able to move legislation through Congress efficiently.  Moreover, the control variables 
behave as expected and in similar ways to those discussed in the models above.   
Model 4.6 shows the effect of GDP growth on US Mediations, conditioned by the 
presidential success score.  The marginal effects curve, plotted in figure 4.3, behaves as 
expected, becoming less negative as values of the presidential success score increase.  
However, despite the fact that the presidential success score is the most direct measure of 
the president’s ability to move legislation through congress, the model is only statistically 
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Table 4.3: Effects on GDP growth on US Mediations, Conditioned by 
Presidential Success in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 
 
4.5 
 
4.6 
 
 
GDP Growth 
 
-0.011 
(0.012) 
 
-0.122 
(0.103) 
 
Presidential Success in Congress 0.007 
(0.004)** 
0.003 
(0.005) 
 
GDP Growth x Presidential Success in 
Congress 
_____ 0.002 
(0.002) 
 
Uses of Force (1 lag) -0.044 
(0.039) 
-0.056 
(0.046) 
 
War -0.511 
(0.129)*** 
-0.528 
(0.123)*** 
 
Election Year -0.142 
(0.293) 
-0.110 
(0.295) 
 
Approval -0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.012 
(0.008) 
 
World Disputes 0.024 
(0.023) 
0.027 
(0.023) 
 
Constant 0.651 
(0.629)** 
1.022 
(0.760)* 
 
N 172 172 
 
Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.  
Negative binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on presidential 
administration in parentheses.  (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test) 
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Figure 4.3:  Effects of GDP Growth on US Mediations, Conditioned by Presidential 
Success in Congress 
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significant for a small range of presidential success score values: roughly 45-55% 
success.  Thus, the results only show limited support for the policy availability argument. 
 In order to further test the policy availability argument I use two different 
dependent variables that are designed to better capture the urgency with which a 
president should seek policy successes when confronted with poor economic performance 
and an opposition legislature.  These dependent variables are mediator rank and 
mediation strategy.  While a quarterly count of mediation attempts captures an 
administration’s level of focus on diplomacy, it might not accurately convey the urgency 
with which a policy victory is sought.  Given the need to engineer a policy success to 
counter the negative effects of poor economic performance, the president should be seen 
committing a greater number of resources to mediation.  However, a simple count 
variable treats each mediation attempt as if it is the same and therefore does not capture 
effort and/or commitment to success.  In some ways, an increased number of attempts 
might actually detract from the urgency with which the president is seeking to show 
managerial competence, or at least the public’s perception thereof, through diplomacy.   
In order to magnify the extent to which demonstrating managerial competence is 
likely to benefit the president, he should attempt to increase the mediation effort’s media 
profile.  One way that he can do this is to dispatch higher-ranking mediators, who are 
likely to command a greater level of media attention.  The US Mediator Rank variable is 
an ordinal variable that codes for the highest ranking mediator employed by the US in a 
given quarter.
56
  Thus, I posit Hypothesis 1b, which suggests that higher-ranking 
                                                 
 
56
 Mediator ranks are divided into four categories based on the level of media attention the mediator is 
likely to bring to the endeavor.  The categories are: 0 = no mediation/ offered only, 1 = low-level 
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mediators should be dispatched when an administration confronts both poor economic 
performance and an opposition congress.   
 Models 4.7 and 4.8, shown in Table 4.4, use ordered logit regression to test 
Hypothesis 1b.  Model 4.7 shows the ordered logit results without the interaction between 
cohesive partisan support and GDP Growth.  It demonstrates a negative and significant 
correlation between GDP growth and mediator rank.  When the president must confront 
poor economic performance, he should attempt to increase the profile of remedial 
policies, or, in this case, the substituted policy.  Cohesive Partisan Support, though, does 
not achieve statistical significance in the model.  All other controls largely act as 
expected. War has a negative and significant impact on the rank of mediator, which 
suggests that the president and his high-level deputies are focusing their attention on 
winning the war, as losing would cause them to incur high political costs, rather than on 
diplomacy.  Interestingly, however, uses of force short of war are positively correlated 
with mediator rank and statistically significant, suggesting perhaps that high-ranking 
mediators are employed as a part of a mixed foreign policy strategy, using both 
diplomacy and military force.  Since the measurement of the dependent variable is an 
aggregated one, measuring the highest-ranking mediator in a given quarter, it is difficult 
to make this conclusion with much certainty.  More precise measures of the dependent 
variable, as well as a time series-cross sectional data format, which could account for 
characteristics of the conflict, would help to better clarify the nature of such a 
relationship. 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
mediators, 2 = cabinet-level mediators, special envoys, and the vice president, 3 = president as mediator.  
See chapter 3 for more discussion. 
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Table 4.4: Effects on GDP growth on Mediator Rank, Conditioned by 
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 
 
4.7 
 
4.8 
 
 
GDP Growth 
 
-0.049 
(0.036)* 
 
-0.042 
(0.360) 
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress 0.003 
(0.014) 
0.004 
(0.023) 
GDP Growth x Cohesive Partisan 
Support in Congress 
 
_____ -0.001 
(0.003) 
Uses of Force (1 lag) 0.183 
(0.129)* 
0.189 
(0.129)* 
War -1.092 
(0.466)*** 
-1.020 
(0.448)** 
Election Year -0.338 
(0.504) 
-0.354 
(0.474) 
Approval -0.017 
(0.018) 
-0.018 
(0.018) 
World Disputes -0.043 
(0.067) 
-0.046 
(0.069) 
N 187 187 
Note: Dependent variable is the highest mediator rank per quarter.  Negative binomial 
estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential administration in 
parentheses.  (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test) 
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Figure 4.4:  Effects of GDP Growth on Mediator Rank, Conditioned by Cohesive 
Partisan Support in Congress 
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 According to the policy availability argument, mediator rank should be negatively 
associated with GDP growth for low levels of cohesive partisan support in congress.  
Model 4.8 tests this proposition directly, and the substantive results are shown 
graphically in Figure 4.4.  However, the relationship with GDP Growth is not statistically 
significant for any value of cohesive partisan support.  Such a result suggests no 
relationship between GDP growth and mediator rank and fails to provide evidence in 
support of policy availability and policy substitution.
57
    
  Finally, the third test of the policy availability is done with a variable that 
captures the highest (most manipulative) strategy undertaken by the United States in a 
given quarter.  Presidents in need of a policy victory to boost their domestic political 
standing have incentives to commit a greater number of resources to mediation efforts to 
increase the likelihood of engineering peaceful settlement, at least over the short term.  
Manipulating the payoffs for the disputing parties should be an appealing way for 
presidents to induce an agreement quickly and create a policy victory likely to help his 
domestic political standing.   
 Hypothesis 1c suggests that when confronted with both poor economic 
performance and low levels of support in congress, the president should be seen using 
manipulative mediation strategies.  Models 4.9 and 4.10 (See Table 4.5) show the results 
for ordered logit regression models testing Hypothesis 1c.  Both models show no 
relationship between GDP growth, congressional composition, and mediation strategy.  
                                                 
 
57
 In addition to the models presented, I tested the effects of GDP growth on mediator rank with both 
Partisan Support in Congress and Presidential Success Score as conditioning variables.  Neither model 
showed a statistically significant relationship between key independent variables and mediator rank.  Each 
behaved similar to the model presented above and are therefore, for the sake of brevity, omitted from my 
discussion. 
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Table 4.5: Effects on GDP growth on Mediation Strategy, Conditioned by 
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 
 
4.9 
 
4.10 
 
 
GDP Growth 
 
-0.027 
(0.041) 
 
-0.019 
(0.040) 
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress 0.011 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.017) 
GDP Growth x Cohesive Partisan 
Support in Congress  
_____ 0.0009 
(0.003) 
Uses of Force (1 lag) 0.043 
(0.112) 
0.025 
(0.107)) 
War -1.158 
(0.457)*** 
-1.150 
(0.447)*** 
Election Year -0.418 
(0.579) 
-0.403 
(0.559) 
Approval -0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.019 
(0.014)* 
World Disputes -0.038 
(0.063) 
-0.033 
(0.065) 
N 187 187 
Note: Dependent variable is the highest mediation strategy per quarter.  Ordered logit 
estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential administration in 
parentheses.  (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test) 
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Figure 4.5 shows the conditional effects of cohesive partisan support on GDP growth’s 
effect on mediation strategy.  It fails to achieve statistical significance for all values 
cohesive partisan support.  Therefore, it does not support the policy availability 
argument, nor does it support the more general managerial competence explanation.
58
 
 A probable explanation for the lack of support for hypothesis 1c is that 
manipulative mediations are almost entirely unique to states.  Given the unique ability 
that states have to manipulate in mediation attempts, such strategies are likely used 
regardless of the president’s domestic standing.  In the US case, manipulation is the 
strongest strategy used in roughly 30% of quarters, while information strategies are 
employed only in only 15% of quarters; formulation strategies are most rare, being the 
highest strategy employed only 4% of the time (see Table 3.3).  Thus, while the ability to 
engineer a policy success quickly might be appealing to a president, it is unlikely that 
lesser strategies would have been considered or employed, even if the economy had been 
performing better.   
Presidential Approval and Mediation 
 While substantial research shows that presidents are judged overwhelmingly on 
the performance of the economy, a more general measure of his public standing is his job 
approval rating.
59
  The approval rating captures the aggregate voter sentiment and can 
explain public dissatisfaction with the president, even when the economy is performing 
well.  Because presidents are thought to want to establish a record of policy successes in 
                                                 
 
58
 In addition to the models presented, I tested the effects of GDP growth on mediation strategy with both 
Partisan Support in Congress and Presidential Success Score as conditioning variables.  Neither model 
showed a statistically significant relationship between key independent variables and mediator rank.  Each 
behaved similar to the model presented above and are therefore, for the sake of brevity, omitted from my 
discussion 
59
 Gallup asks respondents “How well do you think (insert president’s name) is doing as president of the 
United States?” 
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Figure 4.5:  Effects of GDP Growth on Mediation Strategy, Conditioned by 
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress 
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order to boost public approval, mediation is likely to be a low-risk, high-profile policy 
option when approval numbers are low and congressional opposition makes passing 
domestic legislation difficult. 
 Hypothesis 2a concerns the number of US mediations being undertaken in a 
quarter, which I argue should increase in light of low approval ratings and the presence of 
an opposition congress.  Models 4.11 and 4.12 test this hypothesis; coefficients are 
reported in Table 4.6.  Presidential approval rating has no significant effect on US 
mediations.  The Cohesive Partisan Support Variable has a positive and significant effect 
on the number of mediations attempted, suggesting, as with the models presented above, 
that more mediations occur, all other variables held equal, when the president enjoys 
broad support in Congress.  As expected, control variables for war suggest a strong 
negative and significant effect.  Interestingly, this is one of the few models showing GDP 
growth not having a statistically significant effect on US mediations.  Similarly, controls 
for election year and world disputes have no statistically significant impact.  These results 
suggest that presidents do not see mediation as a way to better their political standing 
when their approval ratings are low. 
 Model 4.12 tests the hypothesized conditioning effect of the president’s ability to 
move legislation through congress on presidential approval’s effect on US mediations.  
The results are shown graphically in Figure 4.6, and are inconsistent with the hypothesis.  
In fact, high levels of presidential success in congress are shown to negatively condition 
presidential approval’s impact on US mediations, while lower levels of presidential 
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Table 4.6: Effects on Presidential Approval on US Mediations, Conditioned 
by Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 
 
4.11 
 
4.12 
 
Presidential Approval -0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress 0.014 
(0.005)*** 
0.036 
(1.063)*** 
Presidential Approval x Partisan Support 
in Congress 
 
_____ 
 
-0.024 
(0.012)** 
Uses of Force (1 lag) -0.006 
(0.048) 
-0.0037 
(0.049) 
War -0.615 
(0.160)*** 
-0.608 
(0.158)*** 
Election Year -0.107 
(0.273) 
-0.103 
(0.263) 
GDP Growth -0.023 
(0.009)*** 
-0.021 
(0.009)*** 
World Disputes 0.028 
(0.025) 
0.022 
(0.025) 
Constant 0.805 
(0.481)** 
-0.078 
(0.477)** 
N 187 187 
Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.  Negative 
binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on presidential administration in 
parentheses.  (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test) 
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Figure 4.6:  Effects of Presidential Approval on US Mediations, Conditioned by 
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress 
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success have a positive, but statistically insignificant effect—the opposite of what is 
expected from Hypothesis 2a.
 60
   
Further tests of presidential approval’s effects on mediation behavior are 
conducted using mediator rank and mediator strategy as dependent variables.  Models 
using the Mediator Rank variable demonstrated some support for the policy availability 
argument.  Models 4.13 and 4.13 show the ordered logit results testing the relationship 
between presidential approval, cohesive partisan support and mediator rank and are 
reported in Table 4.7.  In Model 4.13, approval is not statistically significant, nor is 
cohesive partisan support.  GDP growth and war are both negatively correlated with 
mediator rank and statistically significant, which is consistent with the other models 
presented in this discussion.  Model 4.14 tests the conditional relationship between 
presidential approval and cohesive partisan support in congress.  The interaction term is 
shown graphically in Figure 4.7.  The conditioning effect of cohesive partisan support on 
presidential approval’s effect on mediator rank is negative and significant for extreme 
low levels of cohesive partisan support in congress.  Additionally the marginal effects 
curve behaves as the policy availability argument suggests it will: increasing as cohesive 
partisan support increases and becoming statistically insignificant once the president has 
sufficient support in congress to move legislation.  Thus, the model shows some support 
for the policy availability argument.  However, as is with the other models presented, 
                                                 
 
60
 Results for the models using partisan support in congress and presidential success score are omitted for 
the purposes of brevity.  They behave in the same manner as the models using cohesive partisan support in 
congress and do not achieve statistical significance. 
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Table 4.7: Effects on Presidential Approval on Mediator Rank, 
Conditioned by Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 4.15 4.16 
 
 
Approval 
 
-0.017 
(0.018) 
 
-0.013 
(0.018) 
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress -0.003 
(0.014) 
-0.135 
(0.072)** 
Approval x Cohesive Partisan Support in 
Congress  
_____ 0.002 
(0.001)** 
Uses of Force (1 lag) 0.183 
(0.130)* 
0.025 
(0.107)) 
War -1.092 
(0.466)*** 
-1.08 
(0.488)*** 
Election Year -0.338 
(0.579) 
-0.369 
(0.414) 
GDP Growth -0.049 
(0.036)* 
-0.055 
(0.037)* 
World Disputes -0.043 
(0.067) 
-0.060 
(0.072) 
N 187 187 
Note: Dependent variable is the highest mediation strategy per quarter.  Ordered logit 
estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential administration in 
parentheses.  (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test) 
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Figure 4.7:  Effects of Presidential Approval on Mediator Rank, Conditioned by 
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress 
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perhaps the most theoretically salient finding is the negative correlation between GDP 
growth and mediator rank, independent of cohesive partisan support in congress.
61
 
Finally, I test the relationship between presidential approval and mediator strategy 
in model 4.15 and introduce the conditioning effect of cohesive partisan support in model 
4.16.  Model 4.15 shows no significant variables except for the strong negative effect of 
war.  The conditional effect of cohesive partisan support on presidential approval’s 
influence on mediation strategy behaves as hypothesized.   The interaction term is plotted 
graphically in figure 4.8.  For lower values of cohesive partisan support, the effect of 
presidential approval on mediation strategy is negative and significant, but becomes less 
negative and statistically insignificant as values of cohesive partisan support increase to 
where the president has sufficient support in congress to move legislation.  These results 
support the argument that presidents commit more resources to mediation efforts when 
they are politically vulnerable and do not have the ability to move legislation through 
congress efficiently.
 62
   
Summary and Discussion of Results 
 By and large, the results presented in this chapter fail to support the primary 
general hypotheses posited: those expecting evidence of supporting the policy availability 
argument.  Only four of the interaction models testing the conditional relationship 
between domestic performance and the president’s ability to move legislation through 
congress behaved as expected and thus provided support for the hypothesized 
                                                 
 
61
 I also examined models using the Partisan Support in Congress and Presidential Success Scores, but 
failed to obtain statistically significant results.   
62
 I also examined models using partisan support in congress and the presidential success score, but none 
showed significant results and thus, they are not reported. 
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Table 4.8: Effects of Presidential Approval on Mediation Strategy, 
Conditioned by Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 
 
4.15 4.16 
 
Presidential Approval 
 
-0.017 
(0.0315) 
 
-0.147 
(0.016) 
Cohesive Partisan Support -0.111 
(2.155) 
-0.081 
(0.053) 
Presidential Approval x Partisan 
Cohesive Support  
 
_____ 0.002 
(0.001)** 
Uses of Force (1 lag) 0.043 
(0.112) 
-0.012 
(0.119) 
War -1.158 
(0.457)*** 
-1.148 
(0.468)*** 
Election Year -0.418  
(0.458) 
-0.466 
(0.561) 
GDP Growth -0.027 
(0.041) 
-0.034 
(0.038 
World Disputes 0.037 
(0.063) 
-0.049 
(0.068) 
N 187 187 
Note: Dependent variable is the highest mediator strategy per quarter.  Negative binomial 
estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential administration in 
parentheses.  (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test) 
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Figure 4.8:  Effects of Presidential Approval on Mediation Strategy, Conditioned by 
Cohesive Partisan Support in Congress 
 
  
132 
 
relationship.  Consequently, I can only contend that there is limited empirical support for 
the policy availability argument as an explanation for why we see variation in the focus 
on and level of commitment to conflict mediation across time. 
The notion that mediation behavior is influenced by domestic politics is well 
supported, however, as is the managerial competence explanation for the political use of 
foreign policy.  In the models where the individual effects of GDP growth and 
congressional support are measured independently of one another, the relationship 
between GDP growth and the number of new mediations and the relationship between 
GDP growth and mediator rank are negative in all model specifications. Accordingly,  
there is support for the argument that presidents engage in a higher volume of mediations 
in response to a poorly performing economy and use higher-ranking mediators to give the 
efforts a high media profile, with the aim of demonstrating their ability to competently 
manage complex international events and thereby improve their standing with the public.   
However, results showing that presidents engage in more mediation efforts, 
independently of congressional support, in response to poor economic performance bring 
up the question of why presidents choose to focus on foreign policy in response to poor 
economic performance when passing legislation that directly addresses the source of such 
poor performance is an available policy option.  Such a question cannot be directly 
addressed with the results presented in this chapter.  The models without an interaction 
term, which consistently show this negative and significant relationship, do not suggest 
that the president and his administration are not trying to pass domestic legislation as well 
as focus on mediation.   
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One potential explanation for why leaders would focus on mediation as well as 
domestic legislation that directly addresses the sources of poor economic performance or 
otherwise seeks to remediate it is that the different policy options have different time 
frames over which they pay off politically.  For instance, legislation aim at boosting the 
economy might take some time to take root and thus the political benefits thereof would 
likely be delayed, although they might be more durable, improving the president’s 
political standing over the long term.  Mediation, however, may function as a bridge in 
these circumstances helping to boost the president’s domestic standing in the short term.  
Lian and Oneal (1993) argue that diversionary uses of force often create short-term 
spikes in the president’s approval rating, but that those increases regress to the mean 
within a few months.  Perhaps the same can be said of mediation behavior, which, given 
its high profile and low threshold for success, is more likely to provide quicker 
improvements to the president’s domestic political standing, even if they are smaller and 
less durable over the long term.  Thus, any subsequent research should attempt to control 
for the volume of domestic legislation being pursued by the president as he pursues 
mediation. 
An additional interesting finding suggests that the makeup of congress may also 
work as a constraint on the ability to pursue foreign policy initiatives.  Given the robust 
positive and significant coefficients describing the influence of congressional makeup on 
mediation behavior, it appears that the president is less likely to engage in mediations or 
attempt to increase the level of attention paid to them at times when he lacks ample 
support in congress.  This result is consistent with Howell and Pevehouse’s “party cover” 
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argument, which suggests that in order for the president to be able to engage in foreign 
policy for political gain he must have sufficient “cover” from co-partisans in congress. 
Thus, such a finding could be attributed to the fact that mediation does not directly 
address the sources of poor economic performance, something which a strong opposition 
is likely to point out and criticize. 
A final interesting finding presented in the models is the consistently insignificant 
coefficient for world disputes.  This result is important because it suggests that the 
president is not simply seeking to mediate any conflict, as there is no variation in the 
president’s propensity to engage in mediation based on the number of opportunities to do 
so.  We can thereby infer that, it is likely that the president and his administration are not 
only choosing when and how to get involved in mediation, but where.  Therefore, some 
account of which conflicts the president is most likely to benefit from mediating should 
be incorporated into further research.  This ability would also allow for finer examination 
of mediation behavior than the rather blunt measures used here allow. 
In sum, I find strong support for the managerial competence explanation for the 
political use of foreign policy to address declining economic performance.  On average, 
presidents engage in more mediation attempts, as well as mediate in a more high-profile 
fashion, when GDP growth is low.   I also find limited support for the policy availability 
explanation, which argues that, on average, presidents engage in mediation behavior in 
order to offset the negative political effects of poor economic performance when an 
opposition congress is likely to make passing legislation difficult.  To a lesser extent, I 
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find empirical support for the policy availability argument as it pertains to declining 
presidential approval ratings and mediation. 
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Chapter 5: Election Cycles and Mediation 
 The policy availability research agenda has focused primarily on presidential 
vulnerability due to poor domestic performance, arguing that presidents are limited in the 
policy options available to address such poor performance when an opposition congress 
can block the passage of legislation.  However, in democracies, elections are a built-in 
vulnerability that presidents must contend with at regular intervals.  Thus, it can be 
argued that as elections near, presidents should seek to build and highlight a record of 
policy successes in order to be re-elected, or, when they are term-limited, help secure 
election for a co-partisan.  Presidents should seek to build such a record through passing 
legislation.  However, such endeavors can be difficult or inefficient when an opposition 
congress can hold up or block the president’s initiatives.  Because the president faces 
time constraints, namely the need to establish his record of successes before the election, 
he has incentives to circumvent congress by focusing on foreign policy, an area in which 
he enjoys a greater deal of autonomy. 
 Research on diversionary conflict has shown that the president can seek to better 
his standing with the public through the use of military force (Levy 1989; Ostrom and 
Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Brulé 2006).  However, the use of military force is 
risky.  Presidents who lose military conflicts are almost certain to be removed from office 
and the costs of winning can be high, in terms of loss of life, controversy of motives, etc.  
To this end, Gaubatz (1991) has shown that presidents shy away from military conflict as 
their tenures in office progress, a trend that he argues occurs because presidents fear 
punishment at the ballot box.  So, as elections near, they become more risk averse, 
seeking policy options that are less risky, even if the potential political reward is lower as 
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well.  Because an opposition congress serves as a check on the president’s ability to pass 
legislation, however, there may come times when the president needs to engineer a policy 
victory, but cannot move bills through congress and does not want to risk military 
conflict because of nearing elections.  I argue that mediation of overseas conflict should 
be an attractive substitutable policy option confronting such situations.   
 Testing such a proposition presents several challenges, as creating a theoretically 
justified measure of when elections are likely to incentivize foreign policy behavior is 
difficult.  On one hand, presidents have incentives to engage in mediation as elections 
near, but, on the other, there are great incentives to be focusing on direct campaigning, 
especially in the last few months leading up to an election.  To address this ambiguity, I 
employ several measures of the election cycle that are designed to capture windows of 
time in which the administration is most likely to attempt to use mediation to boost their 
electoral fortunes.  
 First, I employ the bluntest measure of the election cycle, the election-year 
dummy variable.  Each quarter of a presidential election year is coded as “1.”  This 
measure captures the notion that parties and presidential administrations focus an 
inordinate amount of their time on elections in the year leading up to it.  Additionally, I 
use a similar dummy variable for re-election year, coding “1” for each quarter of 
presidential election years in which the incumbent is running for re-election.  However, it 
can be argued that the “year” is an arbitrary measure, and that, in fact, parties and 
administrations begin campaigning earlier.  As such, the second measure that I employ, 
campaign cycle, extends the election cycle to the final two quarters of the year prior to 
the election or re-election.  Then, a third measure, election countdown, employed in 
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studies examining the relationship between elections and the use of force, counts down 
the number of quarters from one election to the next, beginning at quarter 15, the quarter 
after the election and in which the president takes office and counting down to zero.  
While none of these measures can perfectly capture when the president is likely to seek 
mediation as a policy option, relative to the elections, each captures theoretically 
plausible scenarios that are easily testable. 
Elections and Mediation Attempts 
To test Hypothesis 3a, I employ negative binomial regression and the US 
Mediations variable, which counts the number of US mediation attempts begun in a given 
quarter as the dependent variable.  I use, Partisan Support in Congress, Cohesive 
Partisan Support, and Presidential Success Score in separate models to measure the 
president’s ability to move legislation through congress.   
The influence of elections on mediation conditioned by congressional support is 
assessed using negative binomial regression.  Table 5.1 shows the negative binomial 
estimates for the relationships between the congressional conditions, the election cycle, 
and U.S. mediation efforts across quarters from 1945-1995.  Models 5.1, and 5.2 assess 
the effect of all presidential elections on the number US mediations initiated per quarter.   
Model 5.2 contains a multiplicative interaction term, which is plotted graphically in 
Figure 5.1.  Model 5.1 shows that the election year variable has no statistically significant 
effect on the number new mediation efforts made in a given quarter.  However, the effect 
of partisan support in congress is positive and significant, supporting Howell and 
Pevehouse’s (2007) party cover conjecture.  This conjecture suggests that the president is 
able to focus on foreign policy because of the high level of support he enjoys in congress.  
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Table 5.1: Effects on Elections on US Mediations, Conditioned by Partisan 
Support in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 
 
Election Year 
 
 
-0.084 
(0.259) 
 
1.689 
(0.951)*** 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
Re-election Year 
 
_____ _____ 0.070 
(0.257) 
1.768** 
(0.783) 
Partisan Support in 
Congress 
2.447 
(0.755)*** 
3.251 
(1.01)*** 
2.562 
(0.730)*** 
3.180 
(0.871)*** 
Election Year x Partisan 
Support in Congress 
_____ -3.856 
(1.792)*** 
_____ _____ 
Re-election Year x 
Partisan Support in Cong. 
_____ _____ _____ -3.690 
(1.671)** 
Uses of Force (1 lag) 
 
-0.002 
(0.028) 
0.007 
(0.035) 
-0.005 
(0.024) 
0.005 
(0.030) 
War 
 
-0.612 
(-0.618) 
-0.570 
(0.194)*** 
-0.619 
(0.205)*** 
-0.620 
(0.211)*** 
GDP Growth 
 
-0.023 
(0.009)*** 
-0.028 
(0.009)*** 
-0.023 
(0.009)*** 
-0.029 
(0.010)*** 
Approval 
 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.007) 
-0.006 
(0.010) 
World Disputes 0.027 
(0.026) 
0.026 
(0.026) 
0.027 
(0.027) 
0.028 
(0.027) 
Constant 
 
-0.397 
(0.446) 
-0.788 
(0.591)* 
-0.494 
(0.387)* 
-0.852 
(0.508)*** 
N 188 188 188 188 
Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.  
Negative binomial estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential 
administration in parentheses.  (*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test) 
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As a result, congress’s constraint on presidential action is decreased, as is the 
opposition’s ability to substantively criticize the policy choices.  Additionally, controls 
war and GDP growth are negatively correlated and significant, as expected.  The results 
suggest that, independently of one another, election years have no significant effect on 
the number of new US mediations undertaken, while the level of partisan support in 
congress that the president enjoys has a strong positive influence. 
Model 5.2 shows the results of the interacted model, testing the extent to which 
the president’s partisan support in congress conditions his decisions to seek out and 
engage in mediation in election years.  While the signs of the coefficients act as expected 
and the significance level of the interaction term appears to support the hypothesis, the 
levels of certainty calculated with the interaction terms’ coefficients and their associated 
standard errors are unsuitable for testing hypotheses about marginal effects (e.g., Kam 
and Franzese 2005; Brambor, Clark and Golder 2006).  In order to properly assess 
statistical significance, I plotted the marginal effects of elections and re-elections along 
with upper and lower 90% confidence levels across the range of the presidential success 
variable.  Figure 5.1 shows the effect of election years conditioned by the president’s 
level of partisan support in congress.  The level of partisan support at which the upper 
bound of the 90% confidence interval does not cross the zero line indicates that the 
marginal effect of the election year is negative and significant when the president has 
roughly 50% partisan support in congress.  Such a result is indirectly supportive of the 
hypothesis because presidents enjoying broad congressional support do not need to rely 
on mediation for policy success.  However, for values of the partisan support that are 
lower than roughly 45%, the coefficients are positive, but decreasing, which is supportive 
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Figure 5.1:  Effects of Election Year on US Mediations, Conditioned by Partisan 
Support in Congress 
 
 
  
142 
 
of the hypothesis—but because the 90% confidence intervals cross zero, they are not 
statistically significant and thus cannot be shown to support the argument.  These results 
demonstrate limited and indirect support for the policy availability argument because, 
while presidents are not seen engaging in more mediation attempts during election years 
because they lack partisan support in congress, presidents enjoying broad partisan support 
in congress engage in fewer mediations. 
Stronger support for the argument exists in Models 5.3 and 5.4, the latter of which 
is shown graphically in Figure 5.2, which tests the argument using only the presidential 
elections in which the incumbent president is running for re-election.  Model 5.3 behaves 
as expected, with re-election year having no independent effect on the number of US 
mediations attempted.  Control variables behave largely as expected with war and GDP 
growth showing negative and significant effects.  Model 5.4, which tests the conditional 
effects of partisan support in congress on the president’s propensity to seek out and 
engage in third-party mediation in re-election years, shows support for the policy 
availability argument.   Figure 5.2 shows that, consistent with Hypothesis 3a, the effect of 
elections is positive and significant for low levels of partisan support in congress 
(roughly 40% and below).  Thus presidents who lack broad congressional support are 
likely to seek out mediation when running for re-election.   Additionally, similar to 
Model 5.2, presidents who have broad support in Congress do not use mediation when 
running for re-election, as demonstrated by the negative and significant values of the 
marginal effects curve for levels of congressional support greater than roughly 65%.
63
  
                                                 
 
63
 Hypothesis 2a was also tested using Cohesive Partisan Support and the Presidential Success Score.  The 
results are not reported for purposes of brevity.  Results are supportive of Hypothesis 2a, nearly identical to 
the results shown here. 
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Figure 5.2:  Effects of Re-election Year on US Mediations, Conditioned by Partisan 
Support in Congress 
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The presence of significant results in the model using only re-election years, 
along with the lack thereof in the model using only elections, suggests that presidents 
running for re-election seek to use their incumbency advantage to secure re-election by 
engaging in diplomacy, which challengers are not able to do.  Thus, while it can be 
argued that presidents seek to establish a record of policy successes in order to better 
their electoral fortunes and those of their party, the empirical results suggest that they do 
so with a greater eye toward their own electoral fortunes.
64
  
 Because the election year and re-election year may not accurately capture the 
period of time in which the president is seeking to shore up domestic support through 
foreign policy initiatives before turning his focus to campaigning for re-election I employ 
the two other measures of the election cycle discussed above and in Chapter 3.  The 
results for models using the Campaign Cycle variable, which codes a “1” for the final six 
quarters of the presidential term, behave almost identically to those using the election 
year and re-election year dummy variables.
65
   
 The Election Countdown variable which counts down the number of quarters until 
the next election shows that partisan support in congress has a positive and significant 
effect on the election cycle’s influence on the number of new mediation attempts made in 
a given quarter.  The results, which are reported in Table 5.2 (Models 5.5 and 5.6), show
                                                 
 
64
 It should be noted that President Bill Clinton’s lame duck attempt at mediating the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict is outside the data period of the ICM dataset and thus not included in these models.  Given that the 
Clinton administration made a concerted effort at mediating this conflict, while facing strong opposition in 
congress and knowing he would not for re-election, the results of these models could be different with more 
current data. 
65
 For purposes of brevity, these results are not reported.  
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Table 5.2: Effects of Time Until Elections on US Mediations, Conditioned by 
Partisan Support in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 
 
5.5 5.6 
 
Election Countdown 
 
 
 
-0.007 
(0.017) 
 
-0.134 
(0.076)** 
Partisan Support in Congress 2.626 
(0.750)*** 
0.692 
(0962) 
Election Countdown x Partisan 
Support in Congress 
 
_____ 0.261 
(0.143)** 
Uses of Force (1 lag) 
 
 
-0.005 
(0.024) 
0.003 
(0.025) 
War 
 
 
-0.627 
(0.198)*** 
-0.608 
(0.204)*** 
GDP Growth 
 
 
-0.024 
(0.009)*** 
-0.029 
(0.009)*** 
Approval 
 
 
-0.006 
(0.008) 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
World Disputes 
 
 
0.028 
(0.027) 
0.023 
(0.027) 
Constant 
 
 
-0.491 
(0.391) 
-0.491 
(0.615) 
N 188 188 
Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.  
Negative binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on presidential 
administration in parentheses.  (*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test) 
  
146 
 
 that the amount of time remaining before an election has no independent effect on how 
partisan support in congress affects the number of new mediation attempts undertaken. 
 However, the interaction term model, plotted in Figure 5.3, shows that for high 
levels of partisan support in congress, the number of quarters until the next election has 
an increasingly positive effect on the number of new mediations attempted, which is only 
statistically significant for values above 65% partisan support.  For low levels of partisan 
support, as expected, partisan support in congress has a negative, but increasing marginal 
effect on how the number of quarters remaining till the next election influences the 
number of new mediations attempted.  Thus, as the number of quarters till the election 
decreases, the number of mediations should increase, when the president has low levels 
of partisan support in congress.  While these results behave as expected, they fail to 
achieve statistical significance.
66
 
Elections and Mediator Rank 
Table 5.3 shows results for tests of hypothesis 3b, examining the marginal effects 
of elections on the rank of the official chosen to mediate, as conditioned by presidential 
success in congress.  Given that the president’s policy initiatives are more likely to be 
scrutinized in election years, he has incentives to send higher-level mediators to mediate 
where he thinks the chances for success, or the likelihood that the administration’s efforts 
will be portrayed as such, are high, so as to increase the level of media attention the 
endeavor receives.  In both models 5.7 and 5.9, which test the effects of election year and 
re-election year, respectively, as well as, partisan support in congress independently of 
one another, the results show no statistically significant relationship between key 
                                                 
 
66
 Models were also tested using Cohesive Partisan Support and the Presidential Success Score, which 
produced similar results not reported here, for purposes of brevity.   
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Figure 5.3:  Effects of Time Till Election on US Mediations, Conditioned by Partisan 
Support in Congress 
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Table 5.3: Effects on Elections on Mediator Rank, Conditioned by Partisan 
Support in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 
 
5.7 5.8 5.9 5.10 
 
Election Year 
 
 
-0.350 
(0.458) 
 
1.938 
(3.684) 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
Re-election Year 
 
_____ _____ 0.057 
(0.612) 
3.811 
(4.170) 
Partisan Support in 
Congress 
 
-0.182 
(2.155) 
0.904 
(2.916) 
0.269 
(2.241) 
1.628 
(3.125) 
Election Year x Partisan 
Support in Congress 
 
_____ -5.102 
(8.771) 
_____ _____ 
Re-election Year x 
Partisan Support in 
Congress 
 
_____ _____ _____ -8.464 
(10.118) 
Uses of Force (1 lag) 
 
0.183 
(0.122)* 
0.193 
(0.119)* 
0.177 
(0.107)** 
0.197 
(0.113) 
War 
 
-1.017 
(0.413)*** 
-0.956 
(0.420)** 
-1.041 
(0.431)*** 
-1.041 
(0.447)*** 
GDP Growth 
 
-0.038 
(0.033) 
-0.046 
(0.032)* 
-0.042 
(0.036) 
-0.052 
(0.031)** 
Approval 
 
-0.018 
(0.018) 
-0.017 
(0.018) 
-0.017 
(0.019) 
-0.147 
(0.020) 
World Disputes 
 
-0.043 
(0.065) 
-0.042 
(0.069) 
-0.040 
(0.065) 
-0.037 
(0.072) 
N 
 
188 188 188 188 
Note: Dependent variable is the highest ranking new mediator per quarter.  
Ordered logit estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential 
administration in parentheses.  (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test) 
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independent variables and the rank of mediators.  Controls behave largely as expected.  
However, interestingly, US uses of force, short of war is positively correlated with 
mediator rank and statistically significant, suggesting, perhaps, that mediation and the use 
of military force are not mutually exclusive.   
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the marginal effects of election years and re-election 
years on mediator rank, respectively, conditioned by the president’s level of partisan 
support in congress (coefficients are shown in Models 5.8 and 5.10, respectively). The 
models behave as expected in terms of sign, but are not statistically significant for low 
levels of partisan support in congress.  Such a result yields no support for hypothesis 3b.  
However, such a result can be explained by the fact that the president, who occupies the 
highest category of the mediator rank variable, has incentives to stay in the United States 
during election years.  Instead, he may be sending lower-ranking mediators to mediate 
during these times.  Furthermore, the president does not have to serve as the actual 
mediator to draw attention to mediation efforts; he can simply make it a policy priority 
and can highlight it through press conferences, media releases, and the White House 
Press Office, among other ways, while continuing to campaign domestically. 
Similar to the models above, the election and re-election year dummy variables 
may not completely capture the period of time in which the president is likely to have 
incentives to use diplomacy to boost his domestic standing before turning his focus 
homeward and to the election campaign.  To that end, I employ two other theoretically 
plausible measures of when the election cycle might create incentives for the president to 
mediate conflict overseas, or send high-level surrogates to do so in his stead.  The first set 
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Figure 5.4:  Effects on Election Year on Mediator Rank, Conditioned by Partisan 
Support in Congress 
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Figure 5.5:  Effects on Re-election Year on Mediator Rank, Conditioned by Partisan 
Support in Congress 
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of models, using the Campaign Cycle variable, does not produce statistically significant 
results for either election campaigns or re-election campaigns.
 67
  Finally, I employ the 
Election Countdown variable, which measures the number of quarters remaining till the 
next election.  Results are reported in Table 5.4.  The results of the independent model, 
shown in Model 5.11, yield no statistically significant results from key independent 
variables, nor did the results from the interacted model shown in model 5.12.  The 
marginal effects curve, plotted in Figure 5.6 shows that the interacted model behaves as 
expected with regard to sign, but failed to achieve statistical significance.   
 The absence of significant results for tests of mediator rank, but the presence of 
them for tests of the number of mediation attempts, may suggest that while the president 
sees political value in attempting to resolve overseas conflicts, there is an opportunity 
cost incurred when serving as the mediator himself or when sending other high-level 
officials.  Given that elections are nearing, the president likely sees more benefit to his 
campaign and those of his co-partisans to focus on domestic policy, regardless of the 
makeup of congress.  However, sending lower level officials to mediate has potential to 
pay political dividends as well.  And, as previously mentioned, the president has the 
ability to use his office to bring attention to mediation attempts in which lower-ranking 
mediators are working. 
Elections and Mediation Strategy 
Finally, I test hypothesis 3c, which focuses on the highest-level (most 
manipulative) mediation strategy employed in a given quarter.  Mediation Strategy is a 4-
value ordinal variable, which codes a “0” for cases in which no mediation occurs, 
                                                 
 
67
 Results for these models are shown in not reported for purposes of brevity..   
  
153 
 
Table 5.4: Effects of Time Until Election on Mediator Rank, Conditioned by 
Partisan Support in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 
 
5.11 5.12 
 
Election Countdown 
 
 
 
0024 
(0.048) 
 
-0.231 
(0.2887) 
Partisan Support in Congress -0.177 
(1.877) 
-4.348 
(5.464) 
Election Countdown x Partisan 
Support in Congress 
 
_____ 0.541 
(0.665) 
Uses of Force (1 lag) 
 
 
0.180 
(0.119)* 
0.192 
(0.106)** 
War 
 
 
-1.024 
(0.413)*** 
-0.970 
(0.414)*** 
GDP Growth 
 
 
-0.038 
(0.040) 
-0.047 
(0.038) 
Approval 
 
 
-0.019 
(0.018) 
-0.021 
(0.018) 
World Disputes 
 
 
-0.042 
(0.063) 
-0.050 
(0.058) 
N 188 188 
Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.  
Negative binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on presidential 
administration in parentheses.  (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test) 
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Figure 5.6:  Effects of Time Until Election on Mediator Rank, Conditioned by 
Presidential Succes in Congress 
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including times when it was offered, but not accepted.  A “1” is coded when the most 
manipulative strategy used in the information strategy, where the mediator uses his good 
offices to bring the truth to light and add credibility to each side’s concessions.  A”2” is 
coded when the highest strategy employed in a given quarter in a formulation strategy, 
where mediators provide a venue, set the agenda, and discuss potential terms, but stop 
short of adding any of their own resources to the settlement. And, a”3” is coded when the 
highest strategy employed is a manipulative strategy, where the mediator uses carrots and 
sticks to manipulate the payoffs for one or both parties.  According to Hypothesis 3c, the 
president should seek to use more manipulative strategies as elections near, when 
confronted with an opposition congress, so as to increase the likelihood that the carrots 
and sticks used to induce the disputing parties will yield some type of settlement and thus 
boost the president’s domestic standing.  As in the models above, I test this argument 
using measures of the president’s support in congress and measures of the election cycle, 
which are likely to capture how the president’s incentives to focus on foreign policy 
change leading up to elections.   
 Models 5.13-5.16, shown in Table 5.5, test the effects that election years and re-
election years have on which mediation strategies are employed, given the president’s 
level of support in congress.  The independent models (Models 5.13 and 5.15) do not 
show statistically significant results for any key independent variables.  Thus, the 
presence of impending elections, and the partisan composition of congress do not 
independently influence the decision of what mediation strategy to employ.  Models 5.14 
and 5.16 test the conditional effects of the president’s partisan support in congress on an 
election year’s or re-election year’s influence on mediation strategies.  In both cases, the 
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Table 5.5: Effects of Elections on Mediation Strategy, Conditioned by 
Partisan Support in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 
 
5.13 5.14 5.15 5.16 
 
Election Year 
 
 
-0.417 
(0.562) 
 
1.545 
(3.003) 
 
_____ 
 
_____ 
Re-election Year 
 
_____ _____ -0.296 
(0.484) 
2.867 
(3.171) 
Partisan Support in 
Congress 
1.188 
(2.028) 
2.174 
(3.003) 
1.373 
(2.126) 
2.544 
(3.047) 
Election Year x Partisan 
Support in Congress 
_____ -4.303 
(7.039) 
_____ _____ 
Re-election Year x 
Partisan Support in 
Congress 
_____ _____ _____ -7.045 
(7.571) 
Uses of Force (1 lag) 
 
0.032 
(0.010) 
0.046 
(0.089) 
0.033 
(0.088) 
0.058 
(0.091) 
War 
 
-1.110 
(0.434)** 
-1.050 
(0.452)** 
-1.158 
(0.448)** 
-1.158 
(0.480)*** 
GDP Growth 
 
-0.021 
(0.037) 
-0.026 
(0.034) 
-0.022 
(0.038) 
-0.030 
(0.033) 
Approval 
 
-0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.018 
(0.015) 
-0.017 
(0.0016) 
-0.014 
(0.016) 
World Disputes 
 
-0.035 
(0.063) 
-0.036 
(0.064) 
-0.031 
(0.064) 
-0.029 
(0.068) 
N 188 188 188 188 
Note: Dependent variable is the highest mediation strategy employed in a quarter.  
Ordered logit estimates with robust standard errors clustered on presidential 
administration in parentheses.  (*p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test) 
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marginal effects curve behaves as expected, with positive effects for low levels of 
partisan support in congress that decrease and become negative as levels of partisan 
support increase.  However, the model fails to achieve statistically significant results for 
all values of partisan support in congress (see Figures 5.7 and 5.8).
68
  
Finally, I test the relationship between congressional support for the president and 
elections using Koch’s (2009) Election Countdown variable, which measures the amount 
of time, in quarters, remaining until an election.  Results are presented in Table 5.9.  In 
Models 5.17 and 5.18, I use the Presidential Success Score as a measure of support for 
the president in congress.  Results are supportive of the policy availability argument.  
While Model 5.17, which measures the effects of time remaining until an election and 
presidential success in congress independently of one another, fails to show significant 
results for the key independent variables, the interacted model behaves as expected. 
Model 5.18, which is plotted graphically in Figure 5.7, shows the marginal effects 
of time until the next election having a negative and statistically significant impact on 
mediation strategy given low levels of presidential success in congress.  Thus, as time till 
the election decreases, when the president has difficulty moving legislation through 
congress (roughly 40% success and below), the highest (most manipulative) mediation 
strategy employed in that quarter is likely to increase.  Such a result supports the policy 
availability argument for why we see variation in mediation strategy.
69
                                                 
 
68
 Nearly identical results are found employing the Campaign Cycle variable, and, for the purposes of 
brevity are not reported. 
69
 Similar models were tested using Partisan Support in Congress and Cohesive Partisan Support.  These 
models behaved as expected in terms of the sign and slope of the marginal effects curve, but they failed to 
achieve statistical significance for all values of presidential support in congress. 
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Figure 5.7:  Effects on Election Year on Mediation Strategy, Conditioned by 
Partisan Support in Congress 
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Figure 5.8:  Effects on Re-election Year on Mediation Strategy, Conditioned by 
Partisan Support in Congress 
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Table 5.9: Effects of Time Until Election on Mediation Strategy, Conditioned by 
Presidential Success in Congress 
 
Independent Variable 
 
5.17 5.18 
 
Election Countdown 
 
 
 
0.042 
(0.058) 
 
-0.267 
(0.123)** 
Presidential Success Score 0.008 
(0.011) 
-0.030 
(0.018)** 
Election Countdown x Presidential 
Success Score 
 
_____ 0.005 
(0.002)** 
Uses of Force (1 lag) 
 
 
0.10 
(0.107) 
0.043 
(0.102) 
War 
 
 
-1.10 
(0.539)** 
-1.13 
(0.521)** 
GDP Growth 
 
 
-0.009 
(0.052) 
-0.024 
(0.055) 
Approval 
 
 
-0.029** 
(0.018) 
-0.027 
(0.020)* 
World Disputes 
 
 
-0.050 
(0.057) 
-0.060 
(0.056) 
N 188 188 
Note: Dependent variable is the quarterly count of new US mediation attempts.  
Negative binomial estimated with robust standard errors clustered on presidential 
administration in parentheses.  (* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01, one-tailed test) 
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Figure 5.9:  Effects on Time Till Election on Mediation Strategy, Conditioned by 
Presidential Succes in Congress 
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Conclusion and Discussion of Results  
In all, the empirical results in these models produce varied levels of support for 
the hypotheses.  With regard to hypothesis 3a, there is some empirical support.  In the 
specific case of an incumbent president running for re-election, the models suggest that 
the inability to move legislation through Congress conditions the president’s decision to 
mediate overseas conflicts.  The models also suggest that the number of mediations 
attempted decreases in election years in which the president enjoys broad support in 
congress and can thus add to his record of policy successes through domestic policy, 
making endeavors in foreign policy risky and unnecessary.  Such findings are particularly 
interesting because they suggest that a president seeks to use foreign policy when he is 
running for re-election, and thus trying to boost his own political fortunes, in ways that 
are not used when he is a lame duck, and thus posturing to help elect a successor from his 
party.   
I find no empirical support for Hypothesis 3b, which suggests that elections 
should lead to higher-ranking mediators being employed, when a president lacks the 
wherewithal to efficiently move legislation through congress.  So, the fact that no 
significant results are seen in such cases can be explained by the incentives that the 
president and his administration have to focus on campaigning in election years.  Because 
the president spends much of his time in an election year on the campaign trail, it is 
unlikely that he will serve as a mediator himself.  However, because presidential 
mediations occupy the top category of the ordinal Mediator Rank variable, the results 
might be skewed somewhat as a result.  Similarly, the president can draw attention to 
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mediation attempts that are likely to positively reflect his managerial competence even 
when he is not the mediator.  He can use the numerous resources of the executive office 
and his high media profile to shed a positive light on mediation endeavors being carried 
out by his deputies. 
Such an explanation appears quite plausible when the lack of significant results in 
models using Mediator Rank as the dependent variable is combined with the presence 
thereof in models using US Mediations, an event count variable measuring mediation 
volume, as the dependent variable (when a president is running for re-election).  Taken 
together, the results suggest that the administration makes more attempts at mediation in 
re-election years, but does so with lower level officials, ostensibly because the president 
is at home campaigning.  Thus, in order to benefit politically from these mediation 
attempts, the president would have to project media attention to them by discussing them 
in campaign speeches, press conferences, etc. 
Finally, I find limited support for hypothesis 3c, which contends that more 
manipulative mediation strategies are likely to be employed as elections near, when the 
president is unable to efficiently move legislation through congress.  Given that state 
actors use manipulative tactics most often, this result is less novel than the other findings 
in the chapter.  However, it provides support for the policy availability argument, which 
suggests that politically vulnerable presidents have incentives to focus their attention on 
foreign policy when congressional composition makes the passage of legislation difficult.  
Given the need to secure policy victories before election day, the president should 
commit more resources toward political endeavors as the elections near.  Thus, he is more 
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likely to try to induce disputing parties to come to an agreement for which he can take 
credit, even if it is only successful in the short term.  
As discussed in the previous chapter, the lack of significant findings for the World 
Disputes control variable is an interesting one that suggests that mediation efforts are 
strategically aimed at conflicts where the president would benefit from the creation of a 
peaceful settlement.  While such an argument is to be expected given the assumption that 
the president is a rational actor, the data, in its current format, is incapable of testing such 
a hypothesis.  As such, the creation of a data-set that can account for the president’s 
domestic political standing and motivations as well as specific characteristics of 
individual conflicts is necessary for this research agenda to progress. 
The results presented in this chapter provide support for the more general premise 
that this dissertation seeks to address: domestic politic structures and motivations affect 
the offer, occurrence, and process of third-party mediation.  Similar to the suggestion 
made above, research examining the outcomes of mediation efforts in light of mediators’ 
domestic political standing would yield increased support for the arguments presented 
here, and is thus a necessary next step in the research program. 
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Chapter 6:  Mediation and Presidential Approval 
 Several studies in the foreign policy research program suggest that US presidents 
have incentives to use foreign policy in order to boost their domestic political standing 
(see Ostrom and Job 1986; Morgan and Bickers 1992; Miller 1995; Foster and Palmer 
2006; Brulé 2006, etc.)  However, in nearly every case, the research focuses on the 
presence of foreign policy behavior and not the result.  Lian and Oneal (1993) test the 
substantive impact of the rally-round-the-flag effect and argue that the net benefit of the 
political use of force over time is roughly a zero percent increase in the president’s 
approval rating.  Scholars have since sought to show that the use of foreign policy for 
domestic political gains is not about inducing rallies around the flag, but rather an 
opportunistic attempt to demonstrate managerial competence when handling complex and 
highly salient political issues (Tarar 2006), much the same as any other policy initiative.  
However, attempts to test whether the president enjoys domestic gains from such action 
have been few.  In this regard, to this point, I have argued that the president has 
incentives to engage in higher levels of mediation behavior given domestic vulnerability 
and, in some cases, an uncooperative legislature.  In this chapter, I test the effects of 
mediation behavior on the president’s approval rating, perhaps the most basic indicator of 
his domestic political standing.  
The dependent variable, Approval, is the Gallup Presidential Approval Score.  
This approval score is generated from the proportion of respondents who responded 
positively to the survey question, “Do you approve of the job (insert name of President) is 
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doing as president?”70  Such a measure is thought to reflect the president’s chances at re-
election as well as his ability influence policy and set the political agenda.  By engaging 
in mediation, the president and his administration are seeking to demonstrate their ability 
to lead, to build consensus and to make peace, thus creating the image that the president 
is doing his job well. 
Mediation appears to be a well-suited policy area for presidents to portray 
themselves as capable leaders.  It is unique in that it is a policy endeavor that has 
numerous outcomes, nearly all of which can be framed as a success for the mediator.  For 
instance, the mere occurrence of peace talks between two long disputing parties at the 
behest of a third is likely to be heralded as a positive step toward a more durable peace 
agreement, even if no such agreement is forged.  Similarly, the mediating party is likely 
to be heralded as a leader and a peacemaker, despite the fact that no long-term agreement 
has been made.  Such an image might not be a lasting one, but it is likely to pay political 
dividends in the short term.  Thus, the perception of the mediator and how mediation 
efforts are portrayed to the public are likely to play a major role in how the public reacts 
to such efforts.  Leaders seeking to enhance their political fortunes likely act strategically 
when making decisions about when to mediate, who mediates, and how they mediate. 
Mediation Volume, Strategy and Presidential Approval 
 In Chapters 4 and 5 I find limited evidence that presidential administrations 
engage in a greater number of mediation attempts per quarter in response to domestic 
vulnerability.  Such a finding may suggest that presidents expect to see political benefit 
from focusing on conflict resolution.  However, it is unlikely that a mere increase in the 
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 This survey data was retrieved from the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of 
Connecticut via Lexis-Nexis.com. 
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volume of mediation attempts, all other variables held equal, will yield an increase in the 
presidential approval rating.  The increased number of mediation attempts made likely 
reflects an increased commitment to finding a suitable agreement in key conflicts around 
the world.  In this vein, an escalation of mediation strategy is unlikely to increase 
presidential approval on its own.  An escalation of strategy should increase the likelihood 
of success, which is, in turn, likely to increase presidential approval.  Because of the 
structure and format of the data, though, it is difficult to test these relationships, as the 
ICM dataset has imprecise data about the timing of mediation successes/ end points.  As 
such, I propose to test hypotheses concerning these variables in further research, when 
more precise data about the timing of mediation outcomes is available. 
Mediator Rank and Presidential Approval 
 Higher ranking mediators, however, are argued to increase the profile of the 
mediation effort so as to portray the president as successful.  Given the media’s 
dependence on the administration for information, the president can use his office to 
increase the media profile of a mediation attempt when and where he believes it will help 
him politically.  Additionally, he can use low-ranking mediators in situations that are 
likely to be cumbersome, that have low prospects for success, or that will be politically 
unpopular.  Thus, conflict resolution is a policy area in which simply increasing the 
profile is a rational move that a president is likely to make when he sees the potential to 
gain politically from focusing his attention there. 
To test this hypothesis, I examine the effect of mediator’s rank on presidential 
approval after mediation efforts from 1945-1995. The first key independent variable in 
the analysis is Mediator Rank, which was coded from Appendix 2 of Jacob Bercovitch’s 
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(1999) International Conflict Management Data Set Codebook.  The appendix provides 
the names, ranks, and nationalities of individual mediators associated with a given 
conflict.  The dataset was then converted into a quarterly time series.  Mediator Rank is a 
four category ordinal variable that captures the highest political rank of a US mediator in 
a given quarter.  Mediator rank is hypothesized to positively influence presidential 
approval because of greater levels of media coverage afforded administration officials of 
higher ranks and the ease with which these officials are able to influence how the media 
reports on a mediation effort.   
Recall from the previous chapters that the Mediator Rank variable is coded in 
such a way that measures the level of media attention paid to mediation efforts in a given 
quarter.  The highest-ranking new mediator employed in a given quarter is coded.
71
   The 
coding scheme is as follows: due to the fact that presidents’ actions command a higher 
level of media attention than other officials, presidential mediation attempts are 
categorized separately.  A “3” is entered if the president himself mediated an overseas 
conflict in a given quarter.  Those mediators who are high-level representatives of the 
president, and whose actions are thus likely to command significant media attention, are 
grouped into their own category.  A “2” is entered if the highest ranking mediator was the 
vice president, a cabinet secretary, or a presidentially appointed special envoy.  Finally, 
low-level mediators, whose actions are likely to go unnoticed or receive little media or 
public attention, are categorized together.  US officials such as ambassadors, 
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 The ICM dataset codes for individual mediation attempts within a conflict, based on the date each 
attempt begins. Thus, if a high-level mediator enters as mediator where a lower-ranking mediator has been 
previously employed, the higher-ranking mediator is coded for the quarter in which the higher-ranking 
mediator becomes involved.  Of the 227 US mediation attempts over the data period, only 6 last 3 months 
(1 quarter year) or longer.  
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undersecretaries of state, and military officers are coded with a “1.”  Quarters without a 
new mediation attempt are coded as “0.”  Because of the hypothesized relationship 
between variables, the value of Mediator Rank for the previous quarter (t-1) is used to 
explain presidential approval during quarter t0.   
 Research on factors that influence presidential approval suggests that a primary 
dimension upon which presidents are judged by voters and reflected in approval ratings is 
economic performance (Lewis-Beck 1988, Mueller 1973, Anderson 1995).  Leaders in 
office during good economic times are viewed more positively by voters than their 
counterparts who are in office during economic decline.  Therefore, an important control 
variable in modeling the effect of a mediator’s rank on presidential approval is a measure 
of economic performance.  I use three different measures of economic performance in 
different models.  The first measure, GDP growth¸ is the quarterly rate of growth in the 
US gross domestic product.
72
  In subsequent models, I measure economic performance 
with the variables inflation and unemployment, respectively.  Inflation is the quarterly 
change in the US consumer price index and unemployment is the quarterly average level 
of unemployment in the US workforce.
73
 
 In addition, I control for war.  War, captures US war involvement and is coded 
with a “1” for each of the quarters corresponding with the Korea, Vietnam, and first Gulf 
War conflicts.  The control for war is thought to reduce the number of available resources 
that a president has at his disposal to commit to a mediation effort.  Additionally, it is 
unlikely that a president will personally mediate a conflict involving two other parties 
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The source for GDP is the US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis (retrieved from 
www.bea.gov).  
73
 The source for both inflation and unemployment is the Bureau of Labor Statistics (retrieved from 
www.bls.gov).  
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during a time of war.  Instead, his focus will be on fighting the war and on attempting to 
manage the risks and costs associated with that conflict.  However, lower-level mediators 
may be employed during these times. 
 Divided Government is a dichotomous variable that is coded with a 1 if either of 
the houses of Congress is controlled by the opposing party to the president’s.  Divided 
government, is likely to play a role in the overall calculation of presidential approval due 
to the fact that Congress is thought to be a check on the president’s ability to successfully 
make policy, although this is argued above to be less effective toward matters of foreign 
policy (Howell and Pevehouse 2005; Schultz 1998). 
 The effect of mediator rank on presidential approval is analyzed using a Prais-
Winsten GLS regression model with semi-robust standard errors clustered on presidential 
administration.
74
  The results are reported in Table 6.1.  Because the dependent variable, 
Approval, is measured across time, the presence of autocorrelation is likely.  As signified 
by a significant spike in the first lag of its partial autocorrelation function, the variable 
exhibits first order autocorrelation.  The AR(1) specification of the Prais-Winsten 
estimator corrects for first order autocorrelation.  Model 6.1 shows the Prais-Winsten 
estimates of the effect of mediator rank on presidential approval.  The coefficient for 
mediator rank, the key independent variable, is positive and significant, suggesting that 
increases in mediator rank have positive effects on presidential approval.  These results 
support Hypothesis 4a.  Additionally, consistent with the literature, GDP growth is 
positively correlated with presidential approval and statistically significant, as the public 
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 Clustering standard errors on presidential administrations corrects for different average levels of 
presidential approval across administrations.   
  
171 
 
Table 6.1:  Effect of Mediator Rank on Presidential Approval  
Independent Variable 6.1 6.2 6.3 
 
 
Mediator Rank  
(1 lag) 
 
1.277** 
(0.511) 
 
1.153** 
(0.533) 
 
1.242** 
(0.500) 
GDP Growth 
(1 lag) 
0.248* 
(0.153) 
____ ____ 
Inflation 
(1 lag) 
____ -0.494 
(0.526) 
____ 
 
Unemployment 
(1 lag) 
____ ____ -1.18 
(1.100) 
War 0.998 
(2.381) 
0.762 
(2.483) 
-0.098 
(2.311) 
Divided Government 
 
-7.841* 
(5.274) 
-7.39 
(5.033) 
-7.773* 
(5.407) 
Constant 
 
57.78*** 
(5.398) 
60.378*** 
(6.716) 
65.642*** 
(10.737) 
N 188 188 188 
R-squared 0.1121 0.1027 0.1002 
Rho 0.813 0.789 0.807 
Note: Prais-Winsten Estimates.  Dependent variable is the Gallup Presidential 
Approval Score. Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on 
presidential administration.  *p<.01, **p<.05, ***.10, one-tailed tests. 
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should react positively to a growing economy.  Further, divided government is negatively 
correlated with presidential approval and statistically significant, as divided government 
is thought to be an obstacle to presidential success.  In terms of substantive effects, the 
results from Model 6.1 demonstrate that a US president can significantly improve his 
approval rating by serving as a mediator by or sending high-level representatives to do 
so.  According to the model, direct presidential involvement in conflict mediation will, on 
average, increase the president’s approval rating by nearly 4 percentage points.  Thus, 
mediation becomes a useful tool in times of economic decline, when poor economic 
performance begins to negatively affect the public’s perception of the president and his 
administration.  For instance, in a situation where the GDP growth rate is two standard 
deviations below its mean (-4.86), and the president is faced with an opposing Congress, 
engagement in mediation is likely to lift his approval rating in the subsequent quarter 
from 48.7%, with no mediation, to 52.56%.  This result suggests that the president can 
use mediation as a strategic policy instrument to shift attention toward an issue area 
where he can portray himself as a successful leader, and thus stop falling approval ratings 
or perhaps overcome institutional hurdles to policy success, such as an opposition 
Congress. 
 Because presidential approval is thought to be primarily influenced by economic 
conditions, Models 6.2 and 6.3 have been employed using different economic indicators 
as robustness checks.  In Model 6.2, the sign of the coefficient for inflation is negative, as 
is the coefficient sign for unemployment level in Model 6.3.  While the signs in both of 
these models behave as expected, neither is statistically significant.  However, the overall 
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results from this set of models suggest robust support for the theoretical argument that 
increases in mediator rank have a positive effect on presidential approval. 
The second set of key independent variables that I use are the same measures of 
mediator rank described above, but broken into dichotomous variables.  Thus, in quarters 
where the president is directly involved in mediating a conflict President as Mediator is 
coded as “1” and all other quarters are entered as “0.”  In quarters where the vice 
president, a cabinet secretary, or special envoy is the highest-ranking mediator, Vice 
President or Cabinet-level Mediator, is a coded as a “1” and all other quarters are entered 
as “0.”  Quarters with lower-ranking mediators (below cabinet-level or special envoy) 
have Lower-level Mediator entered as “1” and all other quarters entered as “0.”  No 
Mediation is used as the reference category.  Similar to the rationale described above, the 
variables are coded in such a way that captures the level of attention likely to be paid to 
the mediation attempt.  Likewise, because of the hypothesized relationship between 
variables, the values of these dichotomous variables for the previous quarter (t-1) are used 
to explain presidential approval during quarter t0.   
The results for this additional test of Hypothesis 4a are reported in Table 6.2.  A 
Prais-Winsten GLS model is used for the reasons described above, as the dependent 
variable has not changed.  By using dichotomous variables in this model, the individual 
effects of the various mediator ranks on presidential approval are tested.  Thus, while the 
models in Table 6.1 assume a linear increase in the effect of mediator rank on presidential 
approval, the models in Table 6.2 test the different categories of mediator rank for 
varying magnitudes of effect.  Consequently, Model 6.4 is specified similar to Model 6.1, 
but includes the three dichotomous mediator rank variables as the key independent 
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Table 6.2: Effect of Mediator Rank on Presidential Approval: 
Dichotomous Variables (Quarterly Data, Prais-Winsten GLS Estimates) 
Independent Variable 6.4 
 
6.5 6.6 
 
President as Mediator 
(1 lag) 
 
3.196** 
(1.646) 
 
2.651* 
(1.700) 
 
3.020* 
(1.650) 
Vice President/ 
Cabinet-level Med. 
(1 lag) 
3.662**    
(1.356) 
3.605*** 
(1.208) 
3.681*** 
(1.241) 
Lower-level Mediator 
(1 lag) 
0.224    
(0.945) 
0.120 
(0.925) 
0.207 
(0.881) 
GDP Growth 
(1 lag) 
0.241* 
(0.150) 
____ ____ 
Inflation  
(1 lag) 
____ -0.518 
(0.538) 
____ 
Unemployment 
(1 lag) 
____ ____ -1.149 
(1.154) 
War 0.727 
(2.468) 
0.768 
(2.464) 
-0.080 
(2.382) 
Divided Government 
 
-7.990* 
(5.410) 
-7.557* 
(5.183) 
-7.941* 
(5.541) 
Constant 57.962*** 
(5.824) 
60.592*** 
(6.867) 
65.585*** 
(11.224) 
N 189 189 189 
R-Squared .1243 .1106 .1129 
Rho 0.8185165 0.7951502 0.8128555 
Note: Prais-Winsten Estimates.  Dependent variable is the Gallup Presidential 
Approval Score. Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on 
presidential administration.  ***p<.01, **p<.05, *.10, one-tailed tests. 
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variables.  The model suggests that both presidential and vice-presidential/cabinet-level 
mediators are positively correlated with increases in presidential approval, but that low-
ranking mediators are not.  More interesting is that the model suggests that vice-
presidential/cabinet-level mediators have a greater positive impact on presidential  
approval than do presidential mediators.
75
  Substantively, presidential mediations are 
likely to yield a 3.2 percentage point increase in approval, while vice-presidential/ 
cabinet-level mediations are likely to yield a 3.7 percentage point increase in approval, 
with all other variables held constant.  Because the equality of two variables test suggests 
that the substantive impact of presidential mediators and vice-presidential mediators is 
roughly the same, these results do support the theoretical argument more generally, 
suggesting that high-profile mediations should lead to increases in presidential approval 
and that administrations can seek to manipulate public opinion by engaging in diplomacy.   
 The substantively equal positive impact of vice-presidential/cabinet-level 
mediations on presidential approval can likely be explained by the presence of an 
opportunity cost associated with the president acting as a mediator.  Because the 
president must focus on so many issue areas, committing to mediate an overseas dispute 
may detract from his ability to focus on domestic policy, success at which likely yields 
greater political dividends than successful diplomacy.  Additionally, the fact that the 
president is not directly involved in negotiations with the disputing parties does not mean 
that he is not making public comments on the matter or directing the media attention paid 
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 I conducted an equality of two variables test to see if indeed the vice-presidential/cabinet-level mediators 
had a greater positive effect on presidential approval in subsequent quarters.  For the hypothesis H0: 
Presidential mediator – vice-presidential/cabinet-level mediator = 0, F=0.14, p(F) = 0.72.  Thus, I fail to 
reject H0; vice-presidential/ cabinet-level mediator  has the same substantive impact on presidential 
approval as a president acting as mediator. 
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to his office to a mediation effort that is being spearheaded by one of his top-level 
representatives.  Such a rationale is also consistent with Burbach’s (2004) finding that 
presidential speeches concerning peace-making creates a “dovish” foreign policy image 
for his administration and leads to increases in his approval rating.  Thus, the president 
can drive the initiative while one of his top deputies engages in negotiations on the 
ground. 
 This model is also consistent with several cases of US mediation where the 
president has dispatched a top-level deputy to lead the administration’s diplomatic effort, 
and has used his office to spotlight the goings on.  For instance, Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger’s series of shuttle diplomacy attempts between Israel and its Arab neighbors in 
the 1970s was portrayed positively in the media and resulted in substantive, albeit brief, 
increases in presidential approval for the Ford administration.  Similarly, Secretary of 
State Alexander Haig’s attempt at mediating the Falklands Crisis between the United 
Kingdom and Argentina coupled with his successor’s, George Schultz’s, mediation 
attempts between Israel and various factions involved in the Lebanese Civil War, led to 
spikes in presidential approval in early 1983 and again in early 1985 with the negotiation 
of the partial Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon.   
 In addition to its consistency with real world events, model 6.4 suggests that low-
level mediations have no systematic substantive effects on presidential approval.  Given 
that these mediation attempts are carried out by low-level diplomats, and other 
administration officials who do not command the same level of media attention as their 
higher-ranking colleagues, their efforts alone are unlikely to have an impact how the 
public views the president. 
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 Models 6.5 and 6.6 are employed as robustness checks, similar to models 6.2 and 
6.3.  As seen above, inflation and unemployment level are signed in the direction 
expected, but lack statistical significance.  In all, these controls lend support to the 
theoretical argument. 
Finally, I test Hypothesis 4b, which suggests that mediator rank’s effect on 
presidential approval is likely to be conditioned by the public’s attentiveness to foreign 
policy.  In order to capture the conditioning effect of the public’s foreign policy 
attentiveness on the Mediator Rank, I create an interaction term with Foreign Policy 
Salience.
 76 
The extent to which the public is attentive to foreign policy is thought to 
condition the effects of Mediator Rank on presidential approval
.
  Given the argument that 
the President and his high-level deputies can dominate and manipulate the mainstream 
news so that it portrays the administration favorably, the impact of diplomacy on 
presidential approval should be greater when the public is particularly attentive to foreign 
policy. 
 The results for the test of Hypothesis 2 are reported in Table 6.3.  This hypothesis 
contends that different levels of foreign policy attentiveness by the public conditions the 
effect of mediator rank on presidential approval.  Thus, there are different effects of 
mediator rank’s effect on the approval rating for different levels of foreign policy 
salience.  Because this hypothesis tests a conditional relationship using a multiplicative 
interaction term, the coefficients and standard errors are not sufficient for interpreting the 
results (see Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006; Braumeoller 2006; Kam and Franzese 
2005).  In order to interpret model 6.7, I have plotted the marginal effects of mediator 
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 Foreign Policy Attentiveness is the proportion of people who chose foreign policy as the most important 
policy area. The source for Foreign Policy Salience is the Gallup Poll. 
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Table 6.3: The Effect of Mediator Rank, Conditioned by Foreign Policy 
Salience, on Presidential Approval  
 
Independent Variable  
 
6.7 
 
Mediator Rank 
(1 lag) 
 
0.560   
(0.524) 
Foreign Policy Salience 0.162 
(0.155) 
Foreign Policy Salience x Mediator Rank 0.029** 
(0.015) 
GDP Growth  
(1 lag) 
0.256*  
(0.151) 
War 
 
-2.213 
(2.971) 
Divided Government 
 
-7.317* 
(5.16) 
Constant 53.808*** 
(6.323) 
N 189 
R-squared 0.1418 
Rho 0.792 
Note: Prais-Winsten Estimates.  Dependent variable is the Gallup Presidential 
Approval Score. Semi-robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered on 
presidential administration.  *p<.01, **p<.05, ***.10, one-tailed tests. 
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rank in Figure 6.1 along with the upper and lower bound 90% confidence intervals across 
the range of the foreign policy salience variable.  The graph in Figure 1 shows the 
coefficients for mediator rank’s effect on presidential approval given the range of values 
of foreign policy salience.  The upper and lower bounds of the 90% confidence interval 
do not cross the zero line for values of foreign policy salience above roughly 15%.   This 
result means that the coefficients for mediator rank are significant at the 90% confidence 
level for values of foreign policy salience above roughly 15%.   
Model 6.7 suggests that as more voters become focused on foreign policy, the 
greater influence an increase in mediator rank will have on presidential approval.  Thus, 
presidents can magnify the increase in their approval rating by dispatching higher level 
mediators to engage in diplomacy when foreign policy salience is high.  The substantive 
implications of this conditioning effect are great.  A one standard deviation increase in 
foreign policy salience (about 20%) from its mean of roughly 28% doubles the extent to 
which mediator rank influences presidential approval (the coefficient for mediator rank 
increases from about 1 to 2).  Given this relationship, a president can use the resources 
and characteristics of his office to his advantage, by choosing to engage in diplomacy 
when the voting public is most likely to react positively to such an action.  Additionally, 
the administration can employ higher ranking mediators at politically critical times, 
should it need to, to maximize its domestic political return on a mediation effort.  The 
findings are also consistent with those found by Edwards, Mitchell, and Welch (1995) 
arguing that for issues to substantively effect the president’s approval rating, they must be 
politically salient. 
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Figure 6.1:  The Effect of Mediator Rank, Conditioned by Foreign Policy 
Salience, on Presidential Approval 
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Overall, these analyses support my hypotheses and theoretical argument that US 
presidents are primarily driven by the desire to stay in office and seek to use foreign 
policy to enhance their electoral fortunes (Ostrom and Job 1986; Bueno de Mesquita et 
al. 2003).  To that end, presidents can capitalize on the great amounts of media attention 
paid to them and their high-level surrogates by engaging in diplomacy when they are 
most likely to be successful and at those points in time when such actions are most likely 
to elicit a positive response from voters. 
Conclusions and Discussion of Results 
This analysis suggests that unlike suppositions underlying the “rally effects” 
explanation for political uses of force, the mechanism by which the president gains in 
domestic support from foreign policy initiatives is tied to policy success, or at least to the 
image thereof, being communicated to the public through media.  Thus, as with domestic 
policy, the president seeks to use foreign policy to build a record of success and to appear 
competent as a leader in order buttress and bolster his level of domestic support.  Because 
of the president’s prominent role in foreign policy issues and his ability to manipulate 
media portrayals of his administration, mediation is a policy option whereby he can 
efficiently seek to improve his domestic standing.  It is important to note, though, that 
results show mediator rank influences presidential approval because high-ranking 
officials acting as mediators are paid a disproportionate of attention by the media.  Thus, 
the president and his top deputies are likely to mediate those conflicts from which they 
expect to gain a significant political benefit, a benefit that is magnified by this heightened 
level of media coverage. 
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These results provide empirical support for theories suggesting that Presidents’ 
use foreign policy actions to improve their domestic political standing.  Taken with the 
results found in previous chapters, the findings presented here suggest that engaging in 
mediation is likely a useful short-term remedy to boost the president’s approval rating.  
Such boosts may be critical as elections near or at times when poor economic 
performance requires presidential actions and legislation that would directly address the 
economy might take some time to bear fruit. 
More generally, these results begin to reconcile theories of mediation with more 
general theories of foreign policy.  This theoretical reconciliation has important 
implications for the conflict resolution research program and suggests several avenues for 
further research, a few of which I will mention here.  To this point, few studies of 
mediation have heeded Saadia Touval’s (2003) suggestion that mediation should be 
considered an instrument of foreign policy and, as such, motivations for engaging in 
mediation should be treated like motivations for other foreign policy engagement.  
However, given that domestic political considerations have been shown to be a major 
driving factor in the nature of the mediation process, states should not be considered 
unchanging unitary actors in studies attempting to explain mediation success.  In addition 
to mediator rank, the extent to which engaging in mediation is likely to enhance leaders’ 
domestic political fortunes could be argued to drive the strategy selected by a mediator, 
as well as the decision to choose mediation from the number of foreign policy options at 
a leader’s disposal.   
In addition to suggesting avenues for new research, this theoretical perspective 
can be further incorporated into what is already thought to be known about mediation 
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processes and better inform those findings.  Since most mediation attempts end in failure, 
and because many “successful” attempts lack durability, with violence returning after an 
agreement, it seems appropriate to pursue an examination of whether leaders driven by 
the desire and the need to improve their domestic political standing choose to engage in 
mediation in ways that are more conducive to quick, short-term successes that improve 
domestic standing—perhaps at the expense of lasting peace abroad.  Moreover, Greig’s 
(2005) finding that mediation is most often offered at times when it is least likely to be 
successful could be examined further, specifically to see how domestic political 
objectives influenced the decision to offer mediation at a time when the conflict is highly 
visible to the public, but not amenable to peaceful negotiations.  Such forays would do a 
great deal to both improve understanding of the conflict resolution process and to 
integrate the conflict management literature with mainstream theories of foreign policy. 
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Chapter 7 - Conclusion 
 
 This dissertation set out to address the question of why mediation by state actors, 
despite characteristics suggesting that such mediations are likely to be successful, 
regularly ends in failure.  I have argued that domestic politics plays a key role in 
providing state leaders with incentives and constraints to focus on mediation as a policy 
option and that short-term, domestic political goals often preclude these leaders from 
mediating conflict in ways that lead to durable long-term peace agreements.  Moreover, 
such an argument begins to reconcile the conflict resolution research program with the 
mainstream foreign policy decision making research program, which, up to this point, 
have largely developed independently of one another.  This work builds on research 
suggesting that conflict resolution is a political endeavor and not an altruistic one.  Even 
in cases where leaders have strong moral convictions driving them to seek resolution of a 
given conflict, by acting through the state apparatus, they are constrained and 
incentivized by domestic political considerations.  Therefore, the need to secure re-
election and maintain office is likely to determine when and how leaders are likely to 
engage in mediation, which, in turn, is likely to explain the results of mediation attempts.   
In this chapter, I briefly revisit this argument and discuss my findings.  Then, I 
proceed to discuss the implications of these findings, both empirically and theoretically, 
and point to shortcomings and limitations of the research.  From this point, I evaluate the 
state of both the conflict resolution and foreign policy decision making research programs 
and make suggestions for further research in light of the findings that I have presented.  
 
  
185 
 
The Conflict Resolution Research Program 
 Up to this point, research on conflict resolution has largely been conducted 
independently of the foreign policy decision making research program.  Because of its 
normative goal of finding ways to peacefully resolve conflict, mediators have largely 
been thought to be altruistic in their motives, or, at the very least, unchanging in their 
motives.  However, a large literature has emerged that focuses on the motivations of state 
leaders (see Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003; Ostrom and Job 1986, etc.), suggesting that 
they use foreign policy in the same way they use domestic policy, to improve their 
domestic political fortunes.  Such a rationale suggests that the motivations that a leader 
has to seek mediation are likely to influence how that mediation effort is carried out, the 
number of resources committed to it, and the extent to which the mediator is likely to see 
the effort through to a durable peace settlement.  This argument also suggests that while 
states might have the greatest ability to engineer peace agreements through mediation, the 
incentives and constraints state leaders face from their domestic audience are likely to 
create incentives for engaging in mediation, but also limit the extent to which they likely 
to be committed to ensuring a long-term settlement.  Thus, as leaders’ incentives and 
constraints change, based on domestic political issues, mediation behavior should as well.  
The results found in the preceding chapters are largely supportive of this argument, 
although they vary in their robustness. 
Key Empirical Findings in Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 examines the extent to which domestic performance influences 
mediation behavior.  I use two key independent variables to measure domestic 
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performance, the rate of GDP growth, which is a strong indicator of overall economic 
performance, and the presidential approval rating, which captures a broader measure of 
how voters view the president’s performance.  In addition, I test how this influence is 
conditioned by the makeup of congress.  I draw upon literature suggesting that presidents 
have incentives to focus on foreign policy when domestic conditions are poor, 
necessitating presidential action, and when low levels of support make passing legislation 
that more directly addresses these poor conditions is difficult (Brulé 2006; Oneal and 
Russet 1993; Marshall and Prins 2011).  Because congress has a less direct check on 
foreign policy than on domestic policy, low-risk foreign policy options like diplomacy 
should be appealing to presidents, as domestic policy avenues are not available.  
I find evidence for my general argument, contending that domestic politics drives 
mediation behavior, as well as for more specific arguments contending that leaders use 
mediation to demonstrate managerial competence of complex political events to their 
constituents. Support for the policy availability argument, specifically, is more limited.  
There is some evidence suggesting that the president’s ability to move legislation through 
congress conditions the extent to which economic performance influences mediation 
behavior.  However, the most salient finding in the dissertation is the negative correlation 
between GDP growth and mediation, which occurs independently of the makeup of 
congress.  Such a result is found using multiple dependent variables that are indicators of 
mediation behavior.  Such a finding is novel, because presidential administrations are 
thought to prefer to seek domestic policy avenues to address poor economic performance.  
This negative correlation, independent of the makeup of congress suggests that presidents 
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are using mediation in response to poor economic performance even when domestic 
policy avenues are open to them.  Future research will need to address the reasons for 
such a finding.  One plausible argument is that legislation seeking to improve economic 
conditions may take time to bear fruit, even if passed easily.  Successful diplomacy might 
be a stop-gap measure that pays quick dividends, even if they are short-lived, as research 
on the political use of foreign policy suggests (see Lian and Oneal 1993).  The results for 
models measuring the extent to which presidential approval has an effect on mediation 
behavior yield few significant results, indicating that low approval ratings do not induce 
the president to take action the way that poor economic performance does.   
Scholars have argued about the causal mechanism operating behind the political 
use of foreign policy.  Because most studies on the subject focus on the use of military 
force, rally-round-the-flag effect arguments have been made.  Such an argument contends 
that vulnerable leaders seek to use military force to divert attention from poor domestic 
performance and induce a rally in levels public support by invoking patriotism against an 
external enemy.  A competing claim, the managerial competence argument, suggests that, 
as with any other policy initiative, the president seeks to demonstrate his competence as a 
leader through foreign policy.  The presence of this inverse relationship between 
economic performance and mediation behavior lends support to the managerial 
competence argument.  First, because rally-round-the-flag effects involve an appeal to 
patriotism in the face of an enemy, it is unlikely that mediation would induce such an 
effect.  However, because protracted overseas conflicts are complex political phenomena 
which can be portrayed as relevant to voters, it is more likely that the president will seek 
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to use them in order to develop a record of success, especially when poor domestic 
performance presents the need for quick policy victories. 
A second interesting finding is the positive correlation between congressional 
composition and mediation behavior.  Such a finding suggests support for Howell and 
Pevehouse’s (2007) party cover hypothesis, which suggests that higher levels of partisan 
support in congress provide the president cover to focus on foreign policy.  Thus, more 
foreign policy behavior should be seen when the president has significant partisan 
support in congress.  Such an effect is found to occur directly with more robustness than 
the conditional policy availability argument.  This finding is interesting because it 
suggests that foreign policy is used most often when the president can diffuse 
responsibility for the effort across branches of government.  To this end, it is likely that 
mediation endeavors undertaken when the president lacks ample support in congress may 
not be seen through to completion, as he is not likely to expose his administration to 
criticism.  The presence of empirical support for the party cover conjecture also suggests 
that congress not creates incentives for engaging in mediation, but also that it can serve as 
a constraint, limiting the extent to which a president can pursue conflict resolution as a 
policy option.   
In sum, the results support the notion that domestic politics play a key role in how 
and when mediation occurs, and thus such factors must be taken into consideration when 
attempting to identify and explains the conditions under which mediation is likely to be 
successful.  Because states are not likely to be unitary actors when it comes to foreign 
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policy, as the incentives and constraints associated with engaging in foreign policy 
change, so too should the practice of mediation, and thus, perhaps, its success. 
Key Empirical Findings from Chapter 5 
 Chapter 5 tested a similar argument, which contended that elections were simply 
built in vulnerabilities with which the president must deal regularly.  As a result, his 
policy record is likely to come under greater scrutiny as elections near and the president 
should seek to shore up support through a series of policy successes.  However, an 
opposition congress can make such an endeavor difficult.  To that end, the president 
should be seen substituting foreign policy, an area in which he has increased autonomy, 
in order to build such a record of successes.  However, given the fact that policy failure is 
likely to negatively affect the president leading up to an election, he should be seen 
selecting policy options that are low-risk, relative to other available policy options.  
Because the use of military force is risky, given the potential for loss of life or the lack of 
a victory prior to election day, it is unlikely that such policy options will be employed as 
elections near (Gaubatz 1991).  Mediation is a policy option which is relatively low-risk, 
but still has the potential to be billed as a high-profile policy success. 
 There is strong evidence that presidents seeking re-election engage in more 
mediation attempts as elections near, when confronting an opposition congress.  Such a 
finding supports the policy availability hypothesis, suggesting that presidents have 
incentives to focus their attention on foreign policy when vulnerability requires action, 
but the lack of congressional support makes passing domestic legislation difficult or 
inefficient.  However, when incumbent presidents are not running, no such relationship is 
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present.  In cases when the president is not running for re-election, he engages in fewer 
mediation attempts, when he enjoys broad support in congress.  This finding provides 
indirect support for policy availability.   
No support is found for the notion that presidents employ higher ranking 
mediators when elections are near and opposition in congress makes the legislative 
process cumbersome.  A mitigating factor that is likely to contribute to this finding is the 
fact that the president has incentives to devote an overwhelming amount of his time to 
campaigning during the months leading up to an election.  Moreover, especially in cases 
when the president is not running for re-election, the media pay more attention to the 
campaign than on the sitting president, making mediation a less-beneficial political tactic 
for the president’s party. 
Of the three major questions addressed in this chapter, the one pertaining to 
elections and mediation has yielded the most ambiguous findings.  However, given the 
aggregated nature of the data, such findings are perhaps to be expected.  The measures of 
the election cycle may not properly capture the window of time in which the president 
has incentives to focus his energy on foreign policy.  Additionally, the president may feel 
the need to keep his focus on domestic politics during the campaign cycle and thus any 
international policy initiatives from which he hoped to benefit would have been carried 
out earlier in the term.  Due to these ambiguities, it is difficult to argue in support of the 
hypotheses suggesting that elections have a major impact on mediation behavior.   
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Key Empirical Findings from Chapter 6 
 In Chapter 6, I test one of the major assumptions underlying the analysis in the 
previous chapters.  In each of the previous chapters, it is assumed that presidents are 
likely to enjoy a rally in public support by demonstrating competence in managing 
overseas conflict.  The models shown in Chapter 6 show support for this assumption 
when mediator rank is used as the independent variable.  However, no such support is 
found for the other two independent variables, the number of new mediations and 
mediation strategy.  Because the ICM dataset is vague about when mediation outcomes 
occur, it is difficult to directly test when mediation success leads to increases in 
presidential approval.  Therefore, these three independent variables are proxies and 
perhaps indirect tests of effects of mediation on presidential approval ratings.   
 The models using mediator rank variable demonstrate that the higher media 
profile associated with higher-ranking mediators leads to increases in presidential 
approval.  Such a finding suggests that the president and his high-ranking deputies have 
significant command over the media and can induce rallies in support of the 
administration independent of success.  Additionally, the effect of mediator rank’s 
influence on presidential approval is magnified when people are paying more attention to 
foreign policy.  These findings, taken together, further support the notion that domestic 
political sentiment introduces both incentives for and constraints on an administration’s 
decision to engage in mediation.  Furthermore, leaders can use this domestic focus to 
their advantage engaging in high-profile mediations at times when the public is most 
likely to respond positively to such endeavors. 
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 While high-profile mediation is shown to lead to an increase in presidential 
approval, it is unclear from the results presented here how durable or long lasting such an 
increase is likely to be.  Further research is necessary to understand leaders’ short-term 
and long-term motives for engaging in mediation.  For instance, if the president is 
engaging in mediation in response to poor economic performance, but is also able to pass 
legislation that directly addresses the source of such economic problems, mediation is 
most likely a stop gap measure.  However, if the president lacks efficient access to the 
legislative process, engagement in mediation is likely to be a move of desperation. 
Theoretical Implications of the Research 
 Despite the variation in robustness of results, the empirics taken together strongly 
suggest that domestic politics is likely to condition the occurrence and practice of third-
party mediation by state actors, as well as the likelihood that the mediation will.  As such, 
states cannot be considered unitary actors when attempting to construct theories about the 
likelihood that mediation will succeed in bringing about peace.  Instead, leaders’ 
domestic political circumstances must be taken into account, as should the range of 
policy options that are likely to be available to the leader.  In the case of the US president, 
he is likely more driven by shorter-term, domestic political goals than durable long-term 
peace agreements overseas.  Thus, he is likely to focus on mediating conflict when he 
sees it as politically advantageous to do so, but is also likely to shift his focus away from 
such efforts when policy options that pay higher political dividends become available or 
when he has achieved such goals as re-election, and thus can focus on other policy 
preferences.   
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 Similarly, focusing on foreign policy, even in low-risk endeavors such as 
mediation, involves an opportunity cost.  The evidence shown here suggests that the 
president is more likely to engage in mediation when he has sufficient “party cover” in 
congress, meaning that his co-partisans can shield him from major criticism, or at the 
very least, ensure that public criticism has minimal political effects.  However, there is 
also some evidence for the policy availability argument.  In extreme cases, where 
congress has essentially blocked the president’s ability to move legislation and poor 
economic performance, low approval ratings, or nearing elections require a policy 
success, the president becomes more risk accepting and engages in more diplomacy. 
 These findings, as previously mentioned, can also be applied in order to help 
better explain what is already thought to be known about conflict resolution processes.  
For instance, Yuen and Werner’s (2005) finding that manipulated outcomes are likely to 
relapse into conflict can be explained by the fact that the mediating party was focused on 
generating a policy success in the short term to boost his domestic political fortunes, and 
thus less concerned with the longer-term ramifications of the effort.  In this vein, and 
perhaps most clearly, the finding that mediators seek to intervene when conflict is most 
fierce, but also most visible internationally, can be explained by the fact that political 
leaders see the potential to benefit domestically from an attempt to quell the violence that 
is absent at lower levels of intensity and visibility.  And, finally, the mere observation 
that most mediation attempts are unsuccessful suggests that leaders engage in mediation 
with other political goals in mind.  Otherwise, mediation would be carried out in ways 
more likely to guarantee long-term peace. 
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 The results also provide support for the notion that the president’s goal in 
focusing his attention on foreign policy is much the same as that of domestic policy: to 
demonstrate his competence as a leader and build a record of policy success.  The fact 
that we see presidents using diplomacy to build support for themselves while domestic 
conditions are poor cannot be explained by the rally-round-the-flag effect, which suggests 
that the president is attempting to divert the public’s attention from these poor conditions 
by invoking patriotism and shifting animosity toward an outside adversary. 
Suggestions for Further Research  
 Like so much empirical research, this project was limited by the data.  In turn, the 
creation of a dataset that allows researchers to test both mediator characteristics, such as 
their domestic political circumstances, and conflict characteristics is necessary for the 
research agenda to move forward.  The consistent null finding for world disputes suggests 
that there is no variation in the number of new mediation attempts undertaken by the US 
in light of the number of opportunities available for mediation. Thus, it is likely that the 
US is returning to the same enduring conflicts, which are of strategic or political 
relevance to the administration.  Such research is also likely to help explain why the 
president chooses mediation over other foreign policy options when seeking to boost 
domestic support. 
 Additionally, this research approach can be extended to other non-military foreign 
policy options such as the provision of foreign aid and the use of sanctions.  Given that 
military conflict has the potential to be costlier than these non-violent, less-coercive 
policy options, it is likely that vulnerable, risk-averse leaders will consider employing 
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such policies to shore up domestic support, or at least stop the deterioration thereof.  
Moreover, given the observation that most mediation attempts are unsuccessful and many 
of those that enjoy success over the short term see relapses in violence later, mediation 
should be studied in a signaling framework.  Due to the fact that powerful states are 
thought to have the wherewithal to guarantee peace, the process and strategy of mediation 
is likely to signal the level of commitment that the state’s leader has  for engineering a 
peace agreement.  Similarly, domestic political institutions likely constrain leaders who, 
motivated by preferences, are likely to attempt to mediate conflict.   
Concluding Remarks 
 The findings presented in this dissertation present a bleak outlook for mediation 
success, despite the need for such efforts around the world and the thought that states are 
equipped with the characteristics and capabilities to best resolve conflicts.  Given that 
political leaders are incentivized and constrained by their domestic political sphere, 
which is the arena that ultimately keeps them in power, it is likely that successful 
mediation will always be subordinate to domestic politics.  In addition to the need for 
better understanding of mediation processes, such a scenario suggests that a great deal 
more attention should paid to improving informal mediation and creating  better 
international and regional institutions to help create and maintain peace. 
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